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ABSTRACT
THE TRIANGLE FIRE AND THE LIMITS OF PROGRESSIVISM
MAY 1996
FRANCES B. JENSEN, B.A., WESTFIELD STATE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerald W. McFarland
One hundred and forty- six women, most of them young
immigrants, died in the fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist
Company in New York City's Lower East Side on March 25,
1911. One of the worst industrial disasters in the
history of the United States, it confirmed the belief of
progressives that unregulated industrialism had gone awry.
This tragedy, however, have rise to a campaign for
protective labor legislation in the Empire State and
provided historians with an example of the reform impulse
in the years prior to World War I
.
This dissertation makes the case, both implicitly and
explicitly, that this disaster, if examined in both a
social and a political context, can be used to increase
our understanding of three broad aspects of the history
and historiography of the progressive era. First, it can
help us to evaluate the debate among historians over the
true extent and effectiveness of the reform movement.
Secondly, it will help us examine how coalitions of
diverse and incompatible groups temporarily united to
V
demand reform legislation, and finally it can allow us to
interweave many histories of the era-
-the immigrant
experience, American radicalism, trade unionism, the
suffrage movement, and progressive reform-
-that formerly
have been analyzed as separate stories.
The idea of limitations is emphasized in each of the
dissertation's predominate themes. The reform initiative,
in terms of both its liberalism and the effectiveness of
the legislation it produced were limited. Furthermore,
the degree of cooperation generated by the reform
coalition that responded to the Triangle Fire was
temporary and produced few enduring associations.
The ongoing historical debate regarding the meaning
and the results of progressivism has produced extensive
but incoherent opinions which call for further scholarly
clarification. This dissertation not only provides a
framework for further analyzing the events surrounding the
Triangle Fire, it also produces additional information
about progressivism- -its membership, its goals, its
achievements, and the political and social environment
which produced the movement
.
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CHAPTER I
THE TRIANGLE FIRE AND THE HISTORIANS
The flames that swept through the Triangle Shirtwaist
Company in New York City on March 25, 1911, left 146
workers dead, most of them young immigrant women. This
event was surely one of the worst industrial disasters in
the history of the United States. At the time, it
confirmed progressive Americans' belief that rampant
industrialism had gone awry. It has since furnished
historians with evidence of the adverse effects that rapid
and unregulated industrialization had on workers. The
tragedy at the Triangle company has also stimulated
scholarly interest because it gave rise to a noteworthy
campaign for regulatory legislation in New York State.
That state's accomplishments ushered in an era of
protective labor legislation that served as a model for
similar efforts in other states. It also provides
scholars with an example of the progressive reform impulse
that reached its peak in the first decade of the twentieth
century
.
The historian, however, has purposes beyond simply
retelling the story of the Triangle Fire and the program
of reform that it inspired. Indeed, this dissertation
will make the case, both implicitly and explicitly, that
the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, if examined in both a social
and political context, can be used to increase our
understanding of three broad aspects of the history and
historiography of the progressive era. Through a study of
the Triangle Fire, we can evaluate the debate among
historians over the true extent and effectiveness of the
reform impulse: we can also examine how coalitions of
diverse and incompatible groups -- feminists, working-
class women, socialists, conservative trade unionists, and
middle-class social reformers -- temporarily united to
demand reform legislation during the progressive era: and
through a description of circumstances leading to the fire
as well as its consequences, we can interweave many
histories -- of the immigrant experience, of American
radicalism, of trade unionism, of the suffrage movement,
of progressive reform -- that is the past have often been
treated as separate stories.
The compelling nature of the Triangle tragedy tended
to arrest interpretation of the event at a point that
modern historians of the progressive era have long
considered to be suspect. The usual historical treatment
of the fire and its aftermath considered the wretched
circumstances that industrial workers were forced to
endure, the tragic results those conditions had on the
lives of the immigrant laborers, and the successful
efforts of progressive reformers to eliminate or, at
least, ameliorate the evils that resulted from
industrialization.^ However, this interpretation of
progressivism as a victory of liberal reformers was
questioned by scholars as early as the 1950' s. Both
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Richard Hofstadter in his Age of Reform (1955) and Gabriel
Kolko in his Triumph of Conservatism (1963) directed
attention to the conservative aspects of progressivism and
suggested that progressive reforms were neither really
liberal nor really effective in attacking the inequities
that threatened American democracy in the first decades of
the present century.^
The Hofstadter and Kolko books stimulated other
historians to reexamine the progressive era reforms and to
reevaluate the effectiveness of the broad reform crusade
that was a hallmark of that period. A similar
reconsideration of the Triangle Fire and its results, one
that considers and explains the often timid response of
radicals, union leaders, politicians, and middle-class
reformers, should be attempted and is, in fact, long past
due .
When Richard Hofstadter challenged the older liberal
school of progressive historiography, he provoked a
spirited debate about the origins and the nature of
progressivism. The debate has produced extensive and
contradictory views: some historians have suggested that
progressivism was a movement led by middle-class
reformers, while other argued for either the working class
or the upper class as the chief source of reform.^
Scholars have also offered varying opinions about the
goals of the progressives. Some asserted that the
reformers' primary intent was to Americanize the
immigrants settling into the nation's industrial centers,
thereby eliminating slums and poverty and, at the same
time, destroying the political machines. Other historians
suggested that conservative reformers sought, above all
else, the goal of social control and supported the passage
of regulatory legislation mainly in order to reduce the
likelihood of social and political upheavals erupting
among the urban masses. Still other scholars maintained
that the reformers had attempted to further the cause of
political democracy, while others believed that the
primary goal of the progressives was to accommodate the
needs of corporate businessmen.'' The number of
historical studies attempting to clarify the nature and
goals of progressivism proliferated, but at the same time,
the portrait of progressivism that emerged seemed
increasingly obscure.^
By the late 1960's, the variety of views about
progressivism was so extensive and the range of ideas
suggested was so broad and incoherent that historian Peter
Filene published "An Obituary for the Progressive
Movement," an article in which he suggested a way out for
scholars.'' His proposal was simple. He maintained that
there had never been a united progressive movement, and
that it was therefore impossible to properly delineate
unified sources and goals. The most that could be
established, he argued, was that a broad reform impulse
had existed, which had many roots and diverse forms. Each
4
group involved had specific goals which caused it to
respond in its own way to the exigencies of the time.
There were instances when various groups would form
coalitions in order to realize common purposes, but these
combinations were temporary and fragile in nature. They
could not, with any validity, be termed a general
movement. Filene's insightful thesis provides a
convenient framework for analyzing the events surrounding
the Triangle Fire, since the alliance of reform groups
that responded to the disaster was in some regards
improbable, although it was also highly successful. At
the same time, the coalition was exceedingly fragile.
The publication of Filene's thesis in 1970 failed to
end the debate over progressivism
. Indeed, it seemed to
encourage the efforts of historians involved in research
into United States history between 1895 and 1915. The new
social historians of the late 1970' s and early 1980'
s
continued to investigate the progressive era and give
particular attention to the role of specific groups --
immigrants, working-class women, feminists, radicals, and
social reformers -- that participated in the events
surrounding the Triangle Fire and the campaign for reform
that resulted from that event.''
While these specialized histories were valuable for
establishing the social and political environment during
the progressive era, the new scholarship itself became a
source of controversy. Thomas Bender's article entitled
"Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American
History," which was published in June 1986, summarized the
substance of the arguments against the New Social
History.^ He acknowledged the value of the brilliant
monographs written about an extensive range of social
history topics, but he called attention to the failure of
the social historians to bring their work into a
comprehensive synthesis. He argued that their excessive
specialization had produced a proliferation of "parts"
that needed to be gathered together into an integrated
"whole"
.
While Bender's criticism of the New Social History
has weaknesses of its own, his argument about the need for
synthesis is certainly relevant to the study of the
Triangle Fire. Historians of the socialist movement, the
immigrant experience, and the trade unions, as well as
women's historians and political historians, have all
touched on the subject of the fire, but none of the
existing studies gives an overview of how such diverse
interest groups came together during the Triangle
incident. Attempting the task of synthesis is the primary
concern of this dissertation.
Another matter requires clarification -- namely, how
this dissertation's subtitle, "The Limits of
Progressivism, " pertains to the historiography of the
Triangle Fire. Stated simply, the ideas of limitations is
emphasized in each of the dissertation's predominate
6
themes. First, what were the limits of the reform
initiative, in terms of both its liberalism and the
effectiveness of the legislation it produced? Second,
what were the limits of the cooperation generated by the
reform coalition that responded to the Triangle Fire?
Finally, what are the limits of using a single tragic
event as a framework to try to achieve a measure of
synthesis between political and social history?
7
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CHAPTER II
THE GARMENT INDUSTRY
AND
THE WOMEN WHO LABORED IN IT
The New York City garment industry provided
enterprising immigrants with the means to acquire some
measure of materials wealth, a realization of the dream
that had originally enticed many of them to abandon their
European homelands and emigrate to the United States. At
the same time it forced great numbers of workers to eke
out livelihoods for themselves and their families at only
a subsistence level. The industry also offered young
women, newly arrived from towns and villages in Russia and
Italy, opportunities to assist their families financially
as they settled into life in urban America.
The garment industry, so important to these new
arrivals and increasingly significant to the burgeoning
economy of the growing city, developed gradually during
the nineteenth century. The men's clothing industry began
to expand rapidly as early as the Jacksonian years.
American-born tailors worked in their own homes and in
small shops to produce inexpensive ready-made men's suits
and coats. During and after the 1840' s, growing numbers
of Irish immigrants, escaping the potato famine, arrived
in New York City and joined, whenever possible, the
American workers in the tailor shops. Many of these
workers were later forced out of their positions by German
immigrants who came in increasing numbers after 1850.
These new arrivals brought with them from Germany
tailoring skills and a tradition of home industry. Their
ability to produce clothing at a lower cost forced the
small shops owned by non-Germans to close.
^
Nevertheless, the garment industry continued to
expand. In 1860 there were 4,014 shops in which 114,800
workers produced clothing. ^ Most of these workers were
foreign-born: fifty-five percent had immigrated from
Germany and thirty- four percent from Ireland.^ A growing
number of these German tailors were Jews who, because of
their skills, worked primarily in the manufacture of
custom-made clothing.'* After 1850 women began to replace
men in the ready-made clothing industry, although they
were outnumbered by men as late as 1860.^
The workers who produced ready-made clothing were
employed in three types of industry patterns.^ Some
worked in "inside shops", factories or workshops run by
individual manufacturers with the help of their employees
Other workers- -men, women, and children- -labored in their
own homes, usually located in tenement buildings in the
area of Mott, Mulberry, and Baxter Streets. Families
engaged in such work often employed a few workers to
assist them and usually worked in the same few crowded
rooms in which they lived. A third group worked in
"outside shops" where a contractor was given specific
tasks to complete by a large manufacturer. He in turn,
either distributed assigned jobs to home workers or to
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employees who worked in his shop. Contractors who ran
these sweatshops often employed relatives and
acquaintances from their own ethnic groups or even from
common villages in the old country. The sweatshops
themselves were unsanitary pestholes where the immigrants
worked long hours for low wages
.
There were few initial complaints from the foreign-
born workers who enthusiastically competed for positions
in the sweatshops. They were willing to work for lower
wages than American-born workers would accept. These
immigrants agreed that, difficult though their lives were
in the new land, their weekly pay envelopes enabled them
to live far better than they had in the old country. They
were anxious to work extended hours in order to amass the
funds they needed to bring members of their families from
Europe to join them in the United States.
by the turn of the century, many of the German- Jewish
immigrants had taken advantage of opportunities available
to them and had risen from the ranks of machine operators
to become manufacturers in their own right. One
contemporary who, with some distress, witnessed the
ascendancy of this group of enterprising businessmen,
noted that they were concentrated of Fifth Avenue between
Fourteenth and Twenty- third Streets, where they had
demolished the once elegant homes of the city's old elite
and had built buildings to house their thriving business
concerns .
®
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As these old immigrants prospered, they no longer
wished to be identified as German-Jews but took pride in
their Americanization, which had enabled them to join the
ranks of respectability. While they still practiced the
old religion, they formed synagogues that were labeled
"progressive" and disassociated themselves from the
Russian Jews who were arriving in New York City at an
unprecedented rate. They lived "uptown, away from the
crowded Jewish quarter in the Lower East Side where the
newcomers congregated, and they scorned the newcomers' use
of Yiddish, their old-country immigrant dress, their
"barbarous" Jewish theater, and their Jewish newspapers,
which disseminated "dangerous" socialist ideas. ^° They
did not, however, turn completely away from the Russian
Jews; they spent great sums of money, funnelled through
Jewish charity organizations to assist the Eastern
European refugees and transform them into "Americanized
Jews . "^^
As owners of shops and factories, they were anxious
to hire the newly-arrived Jewish immigrants from the
shtetls, the small Jewish communities in Eastern Europe.
These East European newcomers had abandoned their homes to
escape the pograms that had disrupted the already
restricted life in the Pale during the last year of
tzarist rule. By the turn of the century, one-third of
the Jews in Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe had left
their homelands, and ninety percent of these immigrants
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had journeyed to the United States. ^= A large majority
of them remained in New York City where they had
disembarked after their trip to America. Many went to
work for their coreligionists in the garment industry and
were comfortable working in their establishments because
their poor knowledge of English would not be an impediment
and they would be allowed to observe their Saturday
Sabbath rituals without the obstructions that they might
experience in a gentile establishment.
After 1900, the garment industry, affected by the
increasing importance of fashion, began to cater to the
needs of women who no longer wished to wear hand-made
clothing or were unable to patronize expensive custom-made
dress shops where dressmakers sewed for their wealthy
clientele. Ready-made women's clothing manufacturing
concerns began a phenomenal expansion, and soon ladies'
wear, lingerie, shirtwaists, dresses, coats, and suits,
all in a multitude of styles, were fashioned for the
growing new market. By 1910 the combined clothing
manufacturing trades employed forty-six percent of New
York City's labor force .
While many of these Eastern European Jews employed in
the needle trades initially accepted their low wages
without complaint since their pay appeared to be
considerably more generous than what they had earned in
the old country, they soon came to resent the fact that
their wages were so meager that they were unable to
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provide even a subsistence living for their families.
Life was far more expensive in American urban areas than
it had been in the shtetls of tzarist Russia. In order to
survive, Jewish women and children had to enter the labor
force. Married women often worked at home doing
specialized sewing operations or finishing work until
legislation during the 1890' s discouraged this type of
employment.^'' Young Jewish girls often sought employment
in the huge shops and factories that mushroomed up in the
Lower East Side, for many decades the center of Jewish
life in New York City, and an area that eventually
expanded northward into Lower Manhattan.
In the world of the Russian shtetl, the Jewish women
had traditionally played a less than consistent role in
both the family and in the community. As dictated by the
tenets of their culture, they held a subordinate position
in society. They had neither civic nor religious
importance and were never consulted on matters of concern
in the community. Men headed families, sat in the places
of importance in the synagogues, and directed neighborhood
affairs through positions on their community councils. A
family rejoiced if it was blessed with sons,^^ while an
abundance of daughters only increased the sense of
frustration which dogged the existence of Jews in the
tzarist empire. "In Russia a woman was nothing,"" and
an old Jewish proverb warned men to render prayerful
thanks to God that they were not born women
.
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At the same time, Jewish women led far from sheltered
lives. They were obligated to assist, as needed, with the
support of their families, and, if they were "fortunate"
enough to marry scholars, they were obligated to assume
the role of family breadwinners in order to permit their
learned husbands time and energy to pursue rabbinical
studies or to seek enlightenment in the traditional study
of Jewish law.^'-^ While many women assisted their
husbands in the position of unrecognized business
partners, other women often ran their own shops, bakeries,
and businesses. Such business women were a necessary and
acknowledged part of the local economy.
Unmarried girls were also expected to assist their
families with domestic help, child care assistance, and
with efforts to support their parents, younger sisters,
and scholarly brothers. Some entered domestic service,
others worked in family businesses, and a large number
worked in handicrafts and manufacturing . The primary
occupation for Jewish women, however, was work in the
needle trades. Sewing was considered a good trade for
young women in Jewish families. Many owned their own
sewing machines and served apprenticeships, learning to do
fancy dressmaking for wealthy clientele, while others
worked in their own homes or in small tailoring
establishments doing contract work for middlemen. Few
worked in large-scale factories that manufactured ready-
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made clothing. The garment industry in Europe had not
developed to that extent.
During the last years of the nineteenth century,
working-class girls in the Pale of Settlement became
active in movements that promoted Jewish self-defense in
the face of increasing anti-Semitic violence. They
also supported the Zionist movement, which insisted that
the only way to escape the injustices heaped on Jews in
eastern Europe was to emigrate en masse to Palestine,
where efforts would be made to set up an independent
Jewish state." Young Jewish workers, male and female,
also gave enthusiastic support to the socialist movement,
which promised to end the violence and discrimination
against Jews and to restructure political and economic
power on an equitable basis throughout the Russian Empire
Referred to as the Bund, the socialist organization took
part in revolutionary activities, sponsored huge strikes,
and provided a means to harness the discontent and fear
that was prevalent in the Jewish community. Young women,
who made up one -third of the Bund membership
, were
active in the movement and were often radicalized by thei
efforts. At the same time, men accepted the women as
partners in the movement, granting them responsibilities
and authority that often resulted in an ambiguous kind of
gender equality. This new status, however, was of
small importance to these working girls. They were far
more concerned with achieving working-class equality.
17
The new-found independence and sense of personal
importance which they derived from their affiliation with
radical movements in Russia served these Jewish workers
well after they left their homelands. Many of them
emigrated alone, found work in the garment industry, lived
frugally, and sent a large portion of their earnings back
to support their families in the old country. Others
emigrated with their families and, as children, went off
to work in the factories long before they were legally old
enough to do so. In many cases, these young daughters
became the primary breadwinners in their large families.
In 1902 the journalist Hutchins Hapgood, a resident
of Greenwich Village and an observer of Jewish life in the
Lower East Side of New York City, wrote that the modern
type of Jewish immigrant women possessed many virtues that
might be considered "masculine in character . "^'^ They
were "serious in nature "^^ and did not "bank in any way
on the fact that they were women. "^^
Hapgood recounted other unusual details about the
interests and activities of Jewish immigrant women in New
York City. Many were socialists, he claimed, while others
were nihilists. A great many of them worked in
sweatshops, and all were interested in radical ideas such
as the social equality of women. ^° They usually worked
until they married. At the time, if their husbands were
unable to support them, they devoted themselves to
increasing family income by applying themselves to
18
economic activities within the domestic sphere. They took
in boarders or worked on specialized sewing tasks for
local contractors.^^
When the young Jewish girls located employment in the
factories, they found themselves working next to Italian
women who had emigrated from their homeland in an effort
to escape the grinding poverty in which they had lived in
Italy. The pre-emigration life-style of the Italian women
differed considerably from that of their Jewish coworkers.
Although there were regional differences in the status of
Italian women, most of the Italian immigrants from
Italy to the United States in the peak years of
immigration came from the south, the Mezzoaiorno
. where
peasant families usually owned undersized plots of land
that they cultivated in family groups, producing only an
inadequate living. Money was always had to come by.
Women, mothers and daughters, worked alongside male
members of their families in agricultural pursuits."
Often family earnings had to be supplemented by day
labor in the fields of nearby large landowners. Young
girls assisted their families in this way, but only when
they could work under the protective eyes of their
brothers or some other male family member. Mothers
worked closer to home, often doing spinning, weaving, or
dressmaking, and their work would be sold to increase the
family income
.
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Italian men frequently emigrated alone, working in
the United States either temporarily or permanently. Some
sent a portion of their earnings home or saved to bring
their families to join them. Other men simply abandoned
their original families and, forming new attachments,
began lives over again in America. This migration of
their men placed great responsibilities on the Italian
women left at home. They became the sole support of their
families and were forced to work longer and harder than
they had previously. In 1900 more Italian women worked as
wage-earners than did women in the United States. It
is not surprising, however, to note that they were paid
approximately half of what men made in wages, even when
there was little difference in the work done." These
women were never organized, but there is evidence that
they often took part in demonstrations and strikes
demanding lower taxes and cheaper food.-^^
In spite of their contributions to the family income,
Italian women had always been held in low esteem by the
society in which they lived. Usually illiterate, they
nevertheless handled the family finances. They could also
independently own and inherit property, but they could not
make decisions regarding either their possessions or their
lives without their husbands' consent. Italian women did
not even gain control over their own earnings until
1919." They were, in effect, legally viewed as minors
living under their husbands' watchful guardianship. Their
20
subordinate role was not questioned either by them or by
the rest of Italian society.
The life-style of many Italian families changed a
great deal after they emigrated to the United States.
Those who remained in New York City usually settled in
distinct sections of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx.
The largest number located in Manhattan, where about a
third of the Italian immigrants resided in the area below
Fourteenth Street in the Lower East Side."" Male heads
of households, formerly agrarian workers, lacked the job
skills that might have enabled them to earn comfortable
wages, and they were forced to do menial work in low-
paying, seasonal occupations.^^ For these reasons,
Italian immigrants had a below average income and a
standard of living that ranked lowest of all the foreign-
born in New York City.''^
Because these circumstances forced their families
into frightening poverty, Italian women, married and
single, were required to enter the labor force. Some
worked at home while others worked in nearby factories.
They found employment in industries such as candy-making,
artificial flowers, and tobacco. Many of them were hired
in the garment -making industries where, as early as 1911,
approximately 36% of the women employed were southern
Italians."^ Few skills were required in these
industries, and the tasks performed by the women were
little more than extensions of the domestic chores in
which they were traditionally involved. In fact, many of
the younger Italian girls were anxious to find work in the
garment trades. Initially unaware that the degree of
specialization used in the industry would mean that a
worker could never learn to make an entire garment, they
believed that employment in the needle trades would train
them in dressmaking and enable them to make their own
clothing and that of their families. Such a skill would
make them more attractive to potential husbands. What is
more, even though those women who came from Italy trained
in the skills of fine dressmaking and embroidery were
often able to better adjust to the system in the factories
of New York City and earn higher wages, they soon found
their skills disintegrating due to the emphasis on speed
and specialization in the American system."*^
While their employment was low-paying, seasonal, and
irregular, these new members of New York City's labor
force seldom had problems locating work and were often the
primary breadwinners in their families. Employers
recognized the desirability of hiring Italian women, often
indicating that they were hard-working and quick to learn.
They advertised extensively in Italian newspapers for such
workers .
Willing to work for the lowest wages, these women
were easily absorbed into the city's garment industry.
They were usually docile, hard-working, and easy to
exploit. Because they were seldom able to read and speak
English, were unacquainted with the manufacturing system
in their new places of employment and new participants in
the American economic system, they were often unaware of
their own exploitation/^ They were ignored by the
fledgling trade unions because they lacked skills and
because they were women. Nor were they anxious to
organize. In fact, they often served as strikebreakers,
albeit unknowingly/"^
Forced by their husbands and fathers to shun
socializing during and after work, the Italian women led
isolated lives, able to find companionship only within
their families. Other foreign-born workers despised them
many Irish even refused to work with these "guineas" or
"dagoes, "'^^ The Jewish girls in the city's garment
industry, however, worked side-by-side with the Italian
women. Still, often they were unable to communicate in
more than a rudimentary way, and the two groups seldom
enjoyed a close or friendly relationship. The Jewish
girls found the passivity of the Italians difficulty to
comprehend
.
As the garment industry expanded and became more
prosperous after the turn of the century, it became more
competitive and increasingly centered in factories . The
factory owners, in turn, enlarged their labor force in
order to meet the demands placed on them. These employer
were often deficient in their record keeping, and they
made little attempt to regularize production. Employment
in the industry was seasonal, and most workers suffered
through layoffs on a regular basis. They could usually
find work during busy seasons, three or four months in the
spring and two or three months in the late summer and
early fall. But during the remainder of the year, garment
workers were often laid off for four to eight weeks at a
time/5 Because the labor supply was so plentiful, there
was no motivation for owners to rationalize their
employment practices. The problems faced by the workers
as a result of these policies were not a matter of
consideration for their employers.
Given the seasonal fluctuations within the industry,
labor turnover was high. This was not viewed as a problem
by employers who saw merit in hiring young, inexperienced
girls as "learners." These new workers were paid at a
lower rate than were the skilled, experienced employees.
As late as 1914, 25% of the women in New York City's dress
and shirtwaist industries were classified as "learners"
and earned substandard wages." Even the "old hands"
were usually employed to do either hand-work or finishing
work and were subject to periodic layoffs. A marked
sexual division of labor gave men in the clothing trades
more job security; the few men^^ in the industry were
hired to do the technologically advanced and skilled
chores and they therefore made the highest wages and were
less likely to be laid off, even during the slack seasons.
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When men and women worked in identical positions, men's
wages were usually higher than those of women."
Nevertheless, wages were uniformly low throughout the
garment industry. In January 1910, Dr. Woods Hutchinson
chaired a small committee that inquired into conditions in
the shirtwaist
-making industry for Survey
, a periodical
concerned with social problems of the day. Mary Van
Kleeck, later an investigator for the Russell Sage
Foundation, was a member of the Hutchinson Committee",
and made public data that had been collected. The average
wage for women, with an allowance made for time lost
during the slack season, was five dollars a week.^^ If
the wages of "learners" were eliminated" from the data
considered, it would appear that the experienced women
made between seven and eight dollars a week.^^ The
maximum weekly wage for a female worker, and this was
truly exceptional, was twenty dollars in the busiest
season.^'' Men averaged between sixteen to eighteen
dollars a week, although the higher earnings of
subcontractors were included in Van Kleeck' s data and
skewed the results." At that time, it was necessary for
a working family with five members to make $1000 a year in
order to survive at even a subsistence level.
Out of their meager wages, women employees were
forced to pay fines for mistakes made in their assigned
work or for infractions of company rules. For instance,
tardy workers, even those only five minutes late, would
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not be allowed to report to work until after lunch, thus
forfeiting half a day's wages. ^° Some shops charged a
fine for late arrival, often a cent for each minute after
the opening deadline. Workers were usually required to
purchase their needles, thread, and other necessities used
in the course of their work. These petty expenses were
much resented by the women in the needle trades.
The hours of work demanded of employees in the
garment industry varied according to the shops surveyed.
In an ordinary work week, employees were required to work
between 56-60 hours. During the busy season, the hours
were usually extended, and workers were compelled to stay
in the evening and to report for work seven days a
week." Some employers refused to compensate their
employees for the extra hours of labor. The excessive
work hours continued even after the Supreme Court, in the
case of Muller v. Oregon in 1908, declared that the Oregon
statute limiting hours of work for laundresses in Oregon
to ten hours each day was not in conflict with the
Constitution. The court was influenced in making its
decision by the Brandeis Brief, in which Louis Brandeis
and his sister-in-law Josephine Goldmark, working for the
National Consumers League, presented evidence that long
hours of were detrimental to the health of women and would
in time interfere with their child-bearing and maternal
roles." While the court failed to specify the number of
hours women could work, the decision did invite the states
to proceed with regulation." Nineteen states, from 1909
to 1917, passed laws concerned with the regulation of
hours employers could expect women to work. Most of the
laws were concerned with the number of hours worked and
the prohibition of night work for women."
New York was something of a pioneer in terms of
statues limiting the working hours of women. In 1899 a
law was enacted stipulating that neither women nor minors
could be employed more than ten hours a day or sixty hours
a week." This law was amended in 1907 to institute a
six-day week for all women working in factories." After
Muller V. Oregon
. New York State revised its earlier
mandates, and in 1912 legislation was passed restricting
the hours that women and males under eighteen years of age
could work to nine hours a day and fifty- four hours a
week.^^ The prohibition of night work for women employed
in factories was enacted in 1899 by the New York State
legislature,^^ but this restriction was annulled in 1907
by the state court.''" In 1915, however, the state court
reversed its earlier decision and declared the 1899
prohibition in regard to women employees to be valid.
In spite of the new concern of the courts and of the
state legislature, employers often ignored or evaded
restriction
.
'^^ Women factory workers seldom complained
about these attempts to circumvent the laws. Too often
their primary concern was the need to compete with men for
better paying positions and to increase their wages, by
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any means possible. if longer hours spent over the sewin
machines in their employers factories meant a few more
dollars in their pay envelopes each week, they were
willing to pay the price. Protective legislation resulte
in limitations on their ability to accomplish their goals
Physical conditions in the factories and shops of th
garment industry were unsanitary and exceedingly
dangerous. During Fire Prevention Week in January 1911,
the Women's Trade Union League solicited complaints from
workers regarding conditions in the factories that
employed them. They were invited to forward anonymous
charges to the offices of the League, which then verified
them by sending inspectors to the shops and factories in
questions. On January 11, 1911, the Women's Trade Union
League filed an extensive list of the reported problems
that they were able to confirm to Rudolph P. Miller, New
York City Superintendent of Buildings . '^^
The problems reported to Miller were formidable in
terms of their number and the dangers they presented to
those employed in the reported factories. Many of the
buildings, some as high as ten stories, lacked fire
escapes. Others had either no elevators or an inadequate
number considering the hundreds of people employed on the
upper floors. A common complaint concerned the narrow,
dark, and obstructed stairways which the workers had to
descend in single file at the end of their long days.
Some apprehensive employees reported problems with
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unsatisfactory ventilation due to an inadequate number of
windows or locked windows
.
Many employees were concerned
that doors especially those opening to the upper floors,
were locked or opened inward.
The machinery used in the shops was often dangerous,
and employers failed to enclose it as a protection for
workers. Many employees reported that alcohol and
excelsior, combustible in combination, were often used
near each other or near machinery, and workers were
fearful of the possibility of fire given the piles of
flammable scrap material which littered the shops. Some
factories had inadequate water supplies, while others had
too few toilets or toilets that had failed to work for
several months. Often those reporting on conditions in
their places of employment complained that the buildings
were dangerous, filthy, and vile-smelling.^^ In sum, the
lot of the immigrant workers in New York City' s garment
industry who had come to the United States seeking the
legendary American dream was a mockery of the vision that
had originally inspired them to leave their homelands.
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CHAPTER III
THE SHIRTWAIST INDUSTRY:
THE EMPLOYERS
The manufacture of shirtwaists was a relatively late
addition Lo Lhe garitUMiL indusLry. Tntroducec^ about 1890,
these businesses grew rapidly once the Gibuon Girl, the
creation of popular artist Charles Dana Gibson, becanu« a
symbol of modern American femininity. The Gibson Girl was
always dressed in a shirtwaist combined with a tailored
skirt. Usually made of a crisp, light, translucent cotton
or linen referred to as lawn, lAu- shirtwaist enliaiu^ed the
delicate and womanly look in vogue at the time. in Llie
dc:;i<jn oL the blouse-like garment, however, there was
clearly a masculine element exemplified by the cut of the
collar, the efficient lines, and the fitted waist. The
Gibson Girl shirtwaists symbol ized to a new generation of
high-spirited young women the prospect of a freedom and
independence heretofore unknown. They were worn not only
by the wealthy, who had the opportunity to enjoy the new
way of life open to some women of the time, but also by
the middle-class and working-class women who usually
imitated the clothing styles of the upper classes.
There is little available data about workers employed
in the manufacture of the fashionable garment during Llio
shirtwaist industry's first decade. Even the Census of
Manufacturers taken by the federal government during that
period grouped shirtwaist makers with others uiKJer the
heading "Women's Clothing-Factory Product."^ New York
State Department of Labor statistics included them under
the heading of "White Goods" with makers of lingerie.
^
Nevertheless, the industry had emerged as a trade
distinct from others in the garment industry by 1910. in
that year there were 450 shirtwaist factories in New York
City.^ There were no uniform procedures used in these
business concerns. Each shop worked on a distinct style
of shirtwaist, some tailored, others more elaborate and
feminine in design. Each establishment therefore
developed a unique manufacturing process to produce its
particular style.*
Many of the owners of these shirtwaist firms moved
their manufacturing establishments into imposing buildings
situated in an area beginning around Fifth Avenue and
Washington Square and eventually expanded into the area
from Canal Street to Fortieth Street.^ The factories
housed in this area bore little resemblance to
manufacturing centers located in either New York City
tenement buildings or those in other industrial cities in
the nation. Each building had several stories, some as
many as twenty: they had frames constructed of iron, and
they were built of granite, stone, brick, and even marble.
Constructed after the turn of the century, these buildings
were never intended to be used as factories. They were
built to warehouse, display, and sell manufactured goods.
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Buyers would visit the warehouse, inspect the merchandise,
and place their orders/
Since the purpose of these buildings was primarily to
warehouse goods, and because the buildings were
"skyscrapers" with elevators providing access to the upper
floors, there was little concern for stairways. Often,
therefore, stairways were narrow, without adequate light,
and with sharp and winding turns. Workers descending
these stairs had to negotiate them single-file. Large
factory buildings with floor areas over 2,500 square feet
on each floor were required by law to have more than a
single stairway.^ Inspectors from the New York City
Building Department were required to indicate that the
stairways, as well as the rest of the buildings, met the
legal requirements when construction was completed. These
inspectors, however, were examining what were officially
warehouse buildings, not factories where hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of workers were employed.^
These large buildings consisted of a single open room
on each floor or loft. Depending on the available area,
as many as five hundred workers could be employed on each
floor. ^ Sewing machines, cutting tables, and workers
were packed as closely as possible. Often machine
operators were seated so close together that it was
impossible for one row of women to rise and push their
chairs back without disturbing another row of workers.
New York factory laws of the time specified that every
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factory worker had to have 250 cubic feet of air available
to her.^" Since the loft buildings had ceilings ten or
eleven feet high, while an average tenement building's
ceiling was eight feet high, the number of machine
operators who could be packed into an area could be
increased by a quarter or more/^ even though the average
square- foot floor space occupied by workers was less than
in a tenement factory.
In addition to the large number of workers who could
be jammed into a loft building, there were many other
advantages for garment industry firms moving into these
"towers." There was rising concern during the Progressive
Era about the unhealthy consequences of purchasing
clothing made by immigrant workers in their cramped,
overcrowded tenements, where the lack of hygiene was often
noted by carping social reformers. Businessmen realized
that public opinion, if not legal mandates, would in the
near future, require them to house their workshops in
factories that would be open to official inspectors.
Since few factories that met existing regulations were
available, these loft buildings were suitable for their
needs. In addition, factory owners could use electricity
to run their machinery instead of the costly gasoline that
fueled the engines used in factories located in older
tenement structures. The savings were considerable.
Perhaps most important to the money-conscious
entrepreneurs, the loft buildings were supposedly
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fireproof. Constructed of stone and metal and with
stairways enclosed in masonry-covered walls, the structure
itself contained little that was flammable, and insurance
rates were lower than those set for other types of factory
buildings. Such insurance was still costly, but prudent
businessmen could not do without it since fires in the
garment district and elsewhere in New York City were
commonplace. In 1910 the City suffered fire losses in the
amount of $8,591,831, an amount five times that
experienced in London and nine times that in Paris."
In the 19th century, New York City factories had been
insured by "factory mutuals" that charged low premiums for
firms that agreed to lower their risks through preventive
measures such as the installation of sprinkler systems.
Unfortunately, mutual insurance companies were driven out
of the city by an insurance monopoly, the New York Fire
Insurance Exchange
.
The cost of insurance then increased
regardless of safety devices installed in factories. In
1898 several factory owners began to add sprinkler systems
on their own initiative, hoping to lower their insurance
costs, but insurance companies refused to reduce their
rates . The concerned owners then proceeded to form
insurance associations of their own, making them, in
effect, self -insured. In reaction to this, many of the
old stock insurance companies began to lower rates on
buildings with sprinkler systems, thus reducing the income
of the city's brokers and agents. The Exchange,
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controlled by these same brokers and agents, withdrew
brokers licenses from local companies that had been
reducing rates. Without these licenses, the companies
could not legally operate. The associations collapsed.
After thus driving the insurance associations out of
business, the Exchange then permitted its companies to
sell insurance to factory owners in far greater amounts
than their companies were worth. In case of a fire,
therefore, a businessman who was over-insured could
realize a profit instead of a loss.'^ Such a situation
did not encourage attention to fire prevention measures,
nor did it motivate concern about fire hazards in the
shirtwaist factories
.
Despite their high rates, insurance companies found
themselves losing money as a result of the increasing
number of expensive fires in the industry . Early in 1911,
the Exchange decided to increase rates by thirty- five
percent in order to protect profits. They gave no
consideration to encouraging fire prevention through rate
incentives and inspections
.
The shirtwaist firms, if they could pay the
escalating premiums, had few problems obtaining fire
insurance, no matter what the condition of their
factories. Many of the larger businesses purchased
coverage, through insurance brokers, from several
insurance companies willing to jointly share the risks
involved. In case of fire, each concerned insurance
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company would pay a small portion of the total coverage
purchased by the insured. Losses, therefore, would be
minimal
.
^'^
The shirtwaist industry, along with other industries
in the needle trades, experienced periods of financial
distress during the first decade of the 20th century.
There was a brief but uncomfortable recession in 1903 and
a severe panic in 1907, Labor unrest, which often
manifested itself in inconclusive strikes, some of them
lengthy and financially draining, was endemic in the
industry.'' The shirtwaist firms suffered further losses
when the one-piece dress and other styling innovations
were introduced and caught the fancy of the buying
public. Economic uncertainty in the industry resulted
in an epidemic of factory fires that produced heavy losses
for the companies that insured the firms involved.
Ignoring their own responsibility for the existing
situation, the insurers complained that "factory fires
were fairly saturated with moral hazard.
In spite of the instability in the industry, new
shirtwaist enterprises were continually launched during
the decade
,
generating intense competition . Rival firms
struggled to realize increased profits and to keep their
heads above water in the contest for survival . The least
arduous way to accomplish this was to decrease the cost of
production by obtaining the maximum amount of work from a
minimum number of employees working for the least possible
amount of money. One of the most effective means of
gaining these ends was the subcontracting system. An
employer would hire an "old hand," an experienced machine
operator with contacts in the industry. He, in turn,
would hire several machine operators to work under his
direction. Often these young women were relatives or
immigrants from the same Russian shtetl as the contractor.
He would teach them the discrete skills involved in the
manufacture of the waists, each worker learning to
accomplish her assigned task.
The factory owner would agree to pay the contractor a
set rate for all the waists produced by the contractor and
his team, the rate varying according to the style of the
garment. The contractor would then settle with each of
his workers, paying them on an individual basis according
to the work each one accomplished and in line with
previously arranged rates. As a result of this system,
the company had no dealings with its employees. The
workers were unaware of the rate agreed on by the
contractor and the employer. They earned only what the
contractor wanted to pay them, and this amount was usually
small since the contractor wished to retain as much as
possible for himself. If the employees became
dissatisfied with their lot, it was usually the contractor
who felt the brunt of their anger and not the firm's
owner
.
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The fierce competition in the shirtwaist industry
resulted in low wages and sporadic work for employees.
During busy seasons, workers were forced to labor over
their machines for twelve and fourteen or more hours a
day, often working seven days a week. During slack
seasons, they might be laid off for weeks and even months
at a time. Rivalry in the industry also decreased the
concern that the owners displayed for the wretched and
dangerous environments in which their employees were
forced to work, since such attention usually necessitated
unwanted expenditures.
In spite of the precarious conditions in the
industry, shrewd businessmen found ways of amassing
substantial fortunes in the manufacture of shirtwaists.
Max Blanck and Isaac Harris were two such entrepreneurs.
Known in the industry as the "Shirtwaist Kings, "^^ Blanck
and Harris were the proprietors of the Triangle Shirtwaist
Company, one of the largest firms in New York City. They
were crude and ruthless men, devoted to enriching
themselves without giving thought to either ethical or
legal niceties.
Unlike most other shirtwaist manufacturers of the
era, Blanck and Harris were born, not in Germany, but in
Russia and immigrated to the United States with their
young wives in the last years of the nineteenth
century. Blanck began his career in the garment
industry by doing tailoring work out of his home on East
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street in the Lower East Side.- m 1901 he joined Isaac
Harris in setting up a shirtwaist manufacturing firm at
155-158 Wooster Street, in the center of the garment
district." Their association was profitable and
apparently amiable since it endured, through good times
and troubled times, for almost twenty years. During
that period, the partnership expanded its interests,
purchasing either sole ownership or control of several
other businesses, always in the shirtwaist industry, in
Newark, New York City or Philadelphia." Until 1918,
however, the Triangle Company remained the cornerstone of
their "Empire. "^^
Sometime during the year ending on July 1, 1903
Blanck and Harris moved their establishment into a newly
constructed building at Washington Place and Greene
Street." Built by Joseph Asch of Saugatuck,
Connecticut, the ten-floor loft building was 135 feet high
and was fireproof, although it had wooden trim, window
frames, and floors. The building, which cost Asch about
$400,000 to construct, had been completed in mid- January
1901
The Asch building had an internal floor area of
10,000 square feet on each floor and, as such, was
required by law to have at least three staircases . It
was, however, equipped with only two very narrow, winding
staircases. The Building Department inspector, Rudolph
Miller, notified the architect of this violation in May
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of 1900, before the building was finished. The architect,
Julius Franke, asked that the Department grant an
exception to this regulation since the building had a
single exterior fire escape that he felt could be counted
as a third staircase." Inspector Miller argued that the
fire escape, located in the rear of the building, should
lead down to the yard and not end, as had been planned, at
the second floor. The architect promised to honor the
inspector's request, although when the building was
finished, the narrow and flimsy fire escape descended only
to the second floor and had one window opening to the fire
escape on each floor. Miller admitted at a later date
that he was not sure that he had ever granted approval of
the Asch Building, even after the construction and before
it was occupied. Nor was there further concern
expressed over the inadequacy of the fire escape since, at
that time, the law did not mandate fire escapes on any
type of building.
Opening inward into each loft in the Asch Building
were wooden doors, again in violation of the State Labor
Law that stated that factory doors had to be constructed
to open outwardly, if practical. The Triangle
architect felt it was impractical since the last step on
each landing was just a single stair's width from the
door
.
The building also had four elevators, two of them
freight elevators and two passenger elevators. As was
the case in most factories of that time, only one stairway
was used by the employees." The other was used for
management, staff, and visitors. Most of the workers were
unaware that there were doors on the Washington Place side
of the building since they were accustomed to using only
the Greene Street elevators and the Greene Street
stairway. 2« At this stairway, partitions were set up to
form a narrow passageway with a twenty- inch doorway
through which employees had to pass in single- file before
descending the stairs." A staff member was always
stationed there at the end of the day to inspect the
girls' handbags as they left the shop, a measure
instituted to prevent pilferage. Considerable evidence
also indicates that doors were kept locked during working
hours, a practice expressly forbidden by New York State
factory laws.
In spite of its deficiencies, the building was
impressive to observers and considered safer than most
buildings used as factories in New York City at that
time.''° Even seventy-five years later, former employees
mentioned the elaborate foyer that greeted visitors
entering the building.*^ Max Blanck must have been
especially satisfied with the edifice since he was the
firm's "outside man" whose responsibility it was to
entertain buyers from other stores that bought the
Triangle Company's Waists.'*^
4 7
Blanck himself was described as a "sporty" but
unemotional man.^^ He lived comfortably, moving his
growing family into wealthier neighborhood almost on a
yearly basis. He dressed stylishly owned a large
automobile, and was driven on his errands by a
chauffeur. Isaac Harris, on the other hand, spent his
days in the working areas of the Washington Place factory.
He directed the daily work and checked to see that it was
adequately completed. He was familiar with the workings
of the machinery in the plant and was well acquainted with
all phases of garment production."^ He was a small,
frail, and serious man"^ who maintained his family at the
same address on West 101 Street even after the company's
profits began to substantially increase.*^
When the partners first moved their new business into
the Asch Building, they occupied only the ninth floor. ^°
By 1906, however, they found it necessary to take over the
eighth floor, and, in 1908, their increased volume of
production led them to appropriate the tenth floor
also.^^ By 1911, the company employed approximately 600
women and about 100 men.^^ Sixty employees worked on the
tenth floor^^ where the offices, the packing room, and
the showroom were located.^" Approximately 225 were
employed in the main cutting room, which was located on
the eighth floor. A large stock of material, light-
weight and flammable, was also stored there. The
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remaining operators worked at sewing machines in close
proximity to one another on the ninth floor.
In 1908 Blanck and Harris' business profits surpassed
one million dollars," in spite of the fact that the
nation was just emerging from the Panic of 1907. They
were acknowledged as the leading shirtwaist business in
the city, perhaps in the nation. Their employees did not,
however, benefit from the success of the Triangle
partners
.
The Triangle Shirtwaist Company was a perfect example
of everything that was exploitive, negligent, and heedless
in the shirtwaist industry. Ida Deutchman, who had been
employed in many shirtwaist factories, claimed that the
Triangle Company was the worst shop she had ever worked
in, Blanck and Harris were task masters who displayed a
complete lack of concern for the welfare of their
employees. Even though both men had relatives working
in various positions in their factory, they were oblivious
to the dangerous conditions in the shop and the poor
morale of those who worked for them. Most of the women
working for Blanck and Harris would have echoed the
sentiments of Yetta Altman who worked for another
shirtwaist company on Greene Street in the Lower East Side
during the first years of the century. Many year later,
Yetta vehemently declared that she had hated her boss, a
monster who forced his workers into slavery. She stated
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with great passion that she would have killed him if she
had had the opportunity.^^
Pauline Newman, an East European immigrant, obtained
a position at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company shortly
after it moved into the Asch Building. Although she had
not yet reached the age when she could be legally
employed, she got up at 5:30 each morning, took a horsecar
to Greene Street, and walked to her place of employment,
where she began work at 7:30 am. During the busy season
she worked until 9:00 in the evening. Because she was an
unskilled child, her job was simple, repetitive, and
boring: she cut off thread ends on the finished
shirtwaists. Her starting pay was $1.50 a week.
Experienced girls usually made $6.00, and the exceptional
worker made $12.00 a week. While most workers were paid
for overtime work, the rate was that which they ordinarily
received. Pauline, as a child, made no more than $1.50 no
matter how many hours she worked. ^°
Blanck and Harris were secretly alerted to the times
when inspectors were to pay periodic visits to their
shop.^^ During these inspections, the illegally-employed
children climbed into the huge boxes in which finished
shirtwaists were stored and waists were piled on top of
them. " Inspectors were also known to take bribes from
factory owners, ignoring not only evidence of illegal
child labor but also other obvious violations of the
law."
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While hiding from inspectors must have been an
adventure for the children, their days in the Triangle
Factory were usually long and dreary. The workshop was
cold in winter and stifling in the summer months. in many
shops, the young women, as they worked at their machines,
sang folk songs that had been sung by workers in East
Europe." The Triangle owners not only forbade singing
but refused to allow their employees even to talk with one
another while they were at work." The women could not
eat their lunches on the fire escape as was common in
other factories." Bathroom breaks were monitored by
foreladies," and fines were imposed for such things as
making an error that ruined a piece of material. Even
more annoying than these petty rules and restrictions were
the costs of needles, threads, and other needed supplies
that workers had to purchase. Considering their niggardly
wages, workers found these expenses an indisputable
hardship
.
Nevertheless, the physical conditions at the Triangle
factory were a greater cause for concern than the low
wages and the pettifogging regulations. Many women worked
in continual fear, and with good reason. Oil was
needed to lubricate the many machines in the factory; two
barrels of oil were stored on both the eighth and the
ninth floors, and the floors under the machines were
soaked with oil.^^ Under the cutters' tables were huge
bins where remnants, scraps, and oil -soaked rags were
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tossed. Boxes loaded with rolls of tissue paper and
supplies of the flimsy material used in making the waists
were everywhere. Paper patterns were hung on overhead
wires over the cutters' tables. Many scraps were
carelessly tossed on the floor. Eventually a ragman,
employed for that purpose, would come in and sweep up
these discarded clippings and haul them away. He refused
to come, however, unless he could pick up at least a bale
at a time, so the refuse cluttered the floor for anywhere
from eight days to several weeks. ''^ In 1909 a fire on
the eighth floor was caused by a flame emitted by one of
the motors that, in turn, set fire to some discarded
cuttings. Although it was extinguished quickly and no
harm was done, the employees reacted with panic. Even
if the owners felt secure because of the supposedly
fireproof construction of the building, the workers
realized that the flammable nature of the building's
contents was dangerous.
The danger from the fire was compounded by the fact
that many male employees smoked. Although smoking in a
factory setting was illegal, they smoked in the washrooms
and in the workshop itself, where they hid their
cigarettes in the palms of their hands and blew the smoke
under their coats. Many men would wait until the bell
rang signaling the end of the work day and then
immediately "light up, " tossing the match onto the
cluttered floor. '^^
Joseph Asch had installed a few precautionary
measures to safeguard his tenants against fire. On each
floor of the building he had coiled length of standpipe
hose installed that could be filled with water from a 5000
gallon tank located on the roof." John Casey, an Asch
Building engineer, was made responsible for checking the
condition of the standpipe. Later he admitted that he
never did more than glance at it and never realized that
the pipe had rotted and disintegrated in the folds."^^
The factory also had an alarm system.''^ After the fire
in 1909, Blanck and Harris hired night watchmen to keep an
eye on their premises during the evening hours and be on
the lookout for sparks from the motors that might ignite a
fire.''^ These safeguards, however, did not calm the
fears of the employees who recognized the dangerous
conditions in which they worked and the inadequate means
of escape in case of fire.'^'^ To complain would have been
unavailing and worse, since it was well-known that workers
who complained were blacklisted by the Triangle
Company
.
Blanck and Harris must have been aware of the
possibility of fire in their factory because, although
they did little to protect the lives of their employees,
they were increasingly careful about the extent of their
insurance coverage. They purchased their insurance from
the large New York City brokerage firm of Samuels,
Cornwall, and Stevens,''^ who, in turn, distributed the
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risks among thirty-seven different insurance companies.-
In the first decade of the century, Joseph Asch, the owner
of the building, and all his tenants purchased a maximum
of over a million and a half dollars' worth of insurance
on the building, paying more than a total sum of $15,000 a
year on the policies. More than $1600 of this amount
compensated the brokers for their efforts in obtaining
this insurance. «^ An increasing percentage of this
amount was paid by Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, even
though the Triangle Shirtwaist Company was known in the
insurance trade as a "rotten risk." it was designated as
a "repeater,
"
a company that collected on fires in its
places of business on a fairly regular basis, as indicated
by the following report of blazes
April 5, 1902 9th Floor, Asch Building
5:18 a.m. Cause Unknown
Insurance Collected-
-$19 , 142
November 1, 1902 9th Floor, Asch Building
6:00 a.m. Cause Unknown
Insurance Collected-
-$12 , 905
April 7, 1905 Factory owned by Triangle Waist
11:00 p.m. Cause Unknown
Insurance Collected-
-Unknown
December 28, 1906 Diamond Waist Company
7:30 p.m. Harris & Blanck, Proprietors
119 Mercer Street, New York
Insurance Collected- -Unknown
April 12, 1904 Diamond Waist Company
Harris & Blanck, Proprietors
165-7 Mercer Street
Insurance Collected- -Unknown
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1908 & 1909 On premises of Triangle Companyno exact dates Two small fires probably causedby smoking.
Insurance Collected-
-Unknown
The insurance companies covering the Triangle Company
seemed oblivious to the implications made clear by the
firm's loss record; most of the fires in their places of
business occurred during evening hours, and most of them
took place in April, a slack month in the shirtwaist
industry and one during which factory owners often
experienced some degree of financial distress."
Furthermore, it was known that Blanck and Harris had
suffered diminished profits as a result of the lengthy
Shirtwaist Strike in 1909, since their employees were
among those who initially walked off their jobs and were
also among the last to return to their positions when the
strike ended. In spite of this, in January 1910, the
Triangle proprietors increased their insurance coverage by
almost $10,000.^^
During 1910, probably still suffering from the
aftermath of the strike, Blanck and Harris allowed a great
deal of their insurance to lapse. They renewed a portion
of it in the amount of $75,750 in November of 1910 and
increased it further by $25,000 in December of that year.
There is no evidence that any of the insurance companies
involved in granting either of the reinstated amounts
questioned the transactions in any way. They requested
neither evidence of an enlarged inventory nor any
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confirmation of the firm's fiscal stability or enhanced
worth. To have challenged the Triangle Company's request
for increased coverage might have jeopardized their
relationship with the important brokerage firm of Samuels,
Cornwall, and Stevens and with the City's powerful
insurance monopoly.
In July 1910 Blanck and Harris lost their credit
rating because they refused to disclose their financial
condition to a commercial agency. It was returned to them
when they presented a statement of their resources based
almost entirely on the amount of insurance they carried at
that time, which was, as noted, about $100,000.^^ In
January of 1911, despite the fact that they were in some
financial distress,^'' they renewed another $75,000 of
their expired insurance, bringing the total to
$199,750.^^ Again, there were no questions asked by
their insurers. It was estimated that at this time the
Triangle Shirtwaist Company was overinsured by about
$80 , 000 .^^
On October 15, 1910, a fireman from Engine Company 72
inspected the Asch Building, as the department was
required to do semi-annually under Section 99 of the
department rules. ^° His report mentioned no
irregularities; as far as he was concerned, Joseph Asch
and the Triangle firm conformed to the standards in place
at the time. Actually, the Fire Department was aware of
the inadequacies of the current standards. Although new
an
buildings were being constructed all over lower Manhatt
in the first decade of the twentieth century, the City
failed to legislate either new building or factory laws
despite the fact that the new buildings were higher and
were planned to house increasing numbers of workers
.
In 1910 Fire Chief Edward Croker warned the complacent
city of the danger implicit in their inadequate laws.^^
On February 11, 1911, an inspector from the New York
Board of Fire Underwriters visited the Asch Building. He
represented not only the insurance companies that issued
coverage to the Triangle Company but also the ones that
insured Joseph Asch and the other tenants in the
buildings." The rag collector had not visited the
Triangle firm since January 15th, and, from all reports, a
considerable collection of rags, clippings, and lint had
accumulated in all parts of the three floors occupied by
the Triangle Company. The inspector made no mention of
the accumulated debris in his report
.
On February 28, 1911, a factory inspector also
examined the building for the New York State Labor
Department. His report mentioned that is was impractical
to order doors to open outward in the factory. He also
stated that the doors were unlocked on the day of his
visit^^ and noted that the premises were not
overcrowded . ^"^ His only concern related to the
inadequate lighting in the hallways, and on March 3rd, the
owners of the firm were ordered to correct this
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deficiency,- a request they complied with immediately.-
Interestingly enough, the inspector did report violation
by businesses on the second, third, fourth, and fifth
floors of the Asch Building, among them locked doors
during business hours
.
In the first weeks of 1911, after a tragic fire in an
antiquated factory building in Newark, New Jersey claimed
the lives of twenty-five employees
, the New York City
Fire Department made an investigation of hundreds of
factory buildings in the City, noting existing violations
and making appropriate recommendations to eliminate these
problems. The Department turned the list over to the
Department of Buildings, calling attention to the lack of
fire escapes and sprinkler systems and the inadequate
exits. They also criticized the fact that fire drills
were not mandated in most factories. The Triangle factory
was only one of thousands of buildings listed in this
survey. Few of the violations were acted on by the
Department of Buildings
. Max Blanck and Isaac Harris
were among those who were never formally notified of
infractions found in their establishment.^"
Another agency that took note of violations of the
law and life- threatening conditions in New York City
factories was the Joint Board of Sanitary Control. This
group, set up under the Protocol of 1910 that followed the
Cloakmakers' Strike, was charged with eliminating sources
of dispute between labor and management before disruptive
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strikes occurred. Composed of two representatives from
the manufacturing community, two representatives from
labor, and three citizens at large, the Board had
investigated the conditions in twelve hundred New York
City factories during the first weeks of 1911 and issued a
statement complaining that seventy- three shops were
flagrantly violating fire protection laws. They sent
notification of their findings to the mayor, the
Superintendent of Buildings, the Fire Commissioner, the
Police Commissioner, the Cloakmakers' Union, and to
employers on the list telling them of violations in their
places of business. The Asch Building was not on the
list
As early as 1909 it was suggested to the Triangle
partners that periodic fire drills would improve their
weak factory safety program. The proposal was made to
them by P.J. McKeon, a lecturer on fire prevention at
Columbia University who had inspected the Triangle
quarters when the company contemplated increasing its
insurance coverage. McKeon, in turn, recommended to
Blanck and Harris that they hire H.F.J. Porter, a New York
City industrial engineer, to organize fire drills for
their factory. Porter, who lived in the area and was
acquainted with the Asch Building, wrote the partners
offering to help set up the suggested fire drills at their
convenience. His letter was neither acknowledged nor
answered. The partners later cited the prevalence of non-
59
English speaking workers in the factory as the primary
reason for failing to instruct their workers about fire
safety."^ The Triangle Company was not alone in
ignoring the advisability of instituting fire drills.
Only one or two manufacturing establishments in New York
City had begun introducing them to their workers. One
factory owner told Porter, "Let 'em burn up. They're a
lot of cattle anyway.
In spite of the prevalence of this arrogant attitude
in the ranks of the city's factory owners, the New York
State Assembly's Labor and Industrial Committee, with an
obvious lack of enthusiasm, had been considering since
February 12, 1911 a proposed amendment to an existing law
that might have improved the situation. This amendment
called for an alarm system in all factories of two or more
stories and mandated weekly fire drills for employees who
worked at levels above the ground floors. The state labor
commissioner would be empowered to enforce the act with
appropriate fines for violations.^"
The Manufacturers' Association, a group of garment
company owners, were firm in their opposition to
protective measures on either the state or municipal
level
.
Complaining that the suggested measures were both
costly and unnecessary, they held meetings in a Wall
Street location to plan their campaign against the forces
of reform.
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While Blanck and Harris, active members of the
Manufacturers' Association, were always reluctant to
undertake safety measures that might prove costly to them,
Joseph Asch, owner of the Asch Building, was apparently
unaware of the problems in his building. He never visited
the premises since his rents were mailed to him, and he
was never notified by any agency or organization about the
deficiencies in his building. stated that if he
had been alerted, he would have rectified the problems
immediately. But the Triangle Company and almost all
other shirtwaist factories in New York City were not so
ethical. Their owners felt confident that they would
never be called to task about violations of existing
regulations. This was due to their recognition that the
division of authority among state and city departments in
regard to factory conditions led to confusion regarding
jurisdiction over inspections and the enforcement of
regulations
.
The State Bureau of Labor had always supervised
factory conditions in New York State, sending out
personnel on a regular basis to investigate firms involved
in manufacturing . In 1903, however, the Trustees of
Sailors' Snug Harbor Corporation were ordered by the New
York City Department of Buildings to add fire escapes to a
number of their buildings in New York City. They appealed
the requirement, arguing that the City had no jurisdiction
in such matters as fire escapes and that such concerns
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were the responsibility of the Factory Inspection Bureau
of the State Labor Department. The Appellate Division of
the State Supreme Court decided against the Trustees.
They held that the state had no right to dictate to
property owners in a city such as New York, where control
over buildings was vested in several municipal bureaus,
and that the New York City Department of Buildings had
exclusive jurisdiction over fire escapes within the five
boroughs of the City.^^^ The state labor department,
however, retained authority over the rest of the state in
all factory matters, as it did in New York City except in
the area of fire escapes.^"
The New York City Building Code was somewhat
ambiguous in its statements regarding fire escapes. It
stated that the Department of Buildings would decide what
was necessary in cases of fire escapes. Since that
Department was inadequately funded and employed only
eighteen largely untrained inspectors, they were not
expected to make periodic visits to sites. They made
inspections at the time of construction and returned for
subsequent visits only when alterations in structure were
made. They were unaware of changes made in the functions
of individual buildings- -if , for instance, buildings
designed as warehouses were converted to factories- -and,
even if they had been alerted to such changes, they lacked
the personnel to conduct necessary invest igat ions . ''^
62
The Building Department relied on the Fire Department
to keep them informed of potential problems since that
department did make periodic inspections of factory
buildings, issued written reports of violations, and kept
records of fire prevention measures undertaken in
manufacturing establishments
. There is ample
evidence, however, that officials within the Fire
Department were increasingly disconcerted about their role
in trying to persuade factory and firm owners to accept
even minimum standards for conditions in their
establishments. They were well aware that the City's
building codes and municipal and state laws were
inadequate. And even where they recognized violations of
the law and dangerous conditions, they lacked enforcement
powers and could only report such situations to the
Department of Buildings. Too often, however, that
department, because of inadequacies within its own ranks,
failed to investigate further the complaints it received.
As the first decade of the new century drew to a
close, it was apparent that several elements were in place
that could result in a major industrial tragedy. The lack
of concern on the part of employers about the welfare of
their employees, the deficient laws, the overlapping and
confused jurisdictions of city and state agencies
responsible for the enforcement of safety regulations, and
the unethical practices of the insurance companies all
63
combined to endanger the welfare of New York City's
factory workers.
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CHAPTER IV
THE WORKERS AND THEIR ALLIES
All employees in the garment factories of New York
City had to contend with dangerous and degrading working
conditions. However, most of the employees in the
shirtwaist industry were women, and this fact alone
weakened their position even further and made it
difficult, if not impossible, to improve their lot as
workers. Their traditional view of themselves within
their family structure and within society, the ethnic
differences among the women workers, the elasticity of the
supply of workers as a result of immigration trends, and
the community's overt bias against female employment
outside the home contributed to their lack of empowerment.
There had been some attempts by the New York State
legislature to safeguard women factory workers.
Protective factory laws had been enacted on behalf of
female workers as early as 1886 when the state prohibited
the employment of women under twenty-one years of age and
minors for more than sixty hours a week.^ In 1899, work
between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. for "girls"
and minors was prohibited.^ Later in that same year,
this law was extended to cover all women factory workers
except under certain approved conditions.^ The law
further stipullated that employers were required to allow
their employees a sixty minute break for their noon
meal.^ This law was appealed to the New York State
Supreme Court
,
^ but the Court ruled that it was
constitutional, the main justification of the jurists'
decision being the "delicate constitutions" of the female
workers.^ In 1907, attorney and journalist Crystal
Eastman, after investigating labor conditions and
accidents in the workplace insofar as they involved women,
helped to write New York State's first women's
compensation law, a piece of legislation that became a
model for later efforts in other states.
In spite of these well-intentioned efforts on the
part of state legislators, laws pertaining to women
workers were inadequately enforced. A study done in 1905-
1906 by the Russell Sage Foundation, a research
organization that sent out investigators to collect
statistics in order to document the need for remedial
laws, indicated that enforcement of these labor laws by
the state labor department left much to be desired.
Between 1901-1906, there were just four prosecutions for
violations in the entire state. Only one of the offenders
was even required to pay a fine.'' In 1906-1907,
fifty-two cases of violations were brought before the
courts, but their disposition was extremely lenient. Many
of the cases were suspended while other violations were
punished with trifling fines. ^ Women in New York City
were still working night shifts in the garment industry
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and were working far longer than sixty hours a week during
busy seasons. In fact, in 1906 Mary Van Kleeck, then a
fellow of the College Settlement Association, did a study
of the enforcement of women's labor laws, focusing
especially on the hours worked by factory women. She
discovered that in spite of the sixty-hour law many female
employees worked as many as seventy-eight hours each week
in garment factories. There were, Van Kleeck explained,
so many loopholes in the legislation under scrutiny that
it was almost impossible to prove a violation; therefore,
she believed that the laws were unenforcable . ^ This
study received considerable publicity and resulted in
further legislation stating that enforcement of the
sixty-hour law would henceforth be the responsibility of
local boards of health instead of the state labor
department.^" As early as 1908, however, another statute
returned the law's enforcement to the Labor Department
.
The transfer of jurisdiction resulted in no improvement in
the execution of the law.
A survey conducted among Italian workers by Florence
Odencranz under the auspices of the Russell Sage
Foundation supported Van Kleeck' s findings. Odencranz
discovered that most employers were either ignorant of the
law or disregarded any limitations placed on them by
legislation.^^ They not only required their female
employees to work overly long shifts but also insisted
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that they take work home with them during their evening
hours." They also disregarded a 19li New York state 1
requiring mandatory school attendance until age fourteen,
and minors, eluding the clutches of truant officers, went
off to work in the garment factories with their older
siblings and, in some cases, with their parents, many of
whom saw no need to educate their children, especially if
they were girls. In 1907, it was estimated that there
were at least 60,000 children at work in the factories of
New York City."
Odencranz's study also emphasized the dangerous
physical conditions that continued to prevail in garment
factories despite state and municipal regulations. Poor
ventilation, inadequate lighting, and extraordinary filth
were typical
.
Fire hazards were commonplace and evoked
little attention. Women workers were required to stand
all day and, if seated, were supplied with chairs without
backs. Odencranz also mentioned that the noise level in
factories, due to the use of power machinery, was so loud
and intense that it must have produced ill effects on
workers .
"
What is more, no effort was made to eliminate the
seasonal character of work in the shirtwaist industry,
with its peak periods of high employment and slumps during
which a high percentage of workers were laid off
.
Principally because of the large numbers of women employed
in the industry, businessmen saw little need to regularize
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the manufacturing process; after all, women were
expendable. Employers often, however, attempted to hold
onto their trained workers during slow periods. They
maintained employees on their work rosters and required
them to report to their shops each day and sit with
nothing to do for several hours until they were informed
that there was no work available. At that point they
would be permitted to go home, with no pay to show for
their hours spent waiting.
Exploited by their employers, denied help from the
state departments and agencies whose job it was to protect
them, and powerless to defend their own interests, women
factory workers recognized that if they were to realize
changes in their work environment, they would have to have
assistance from other segments of the community. The
existence of a notable reform spirit in the first two
decades of the twentieth century gave some hope that the
assistance they needed might, in fact, be forthcoming.
Two broad groups, liberals and radicals, were challenging
the status quo and seeking to ameliorate the consequences
of unrestrained industrialism.
Liberals, an elitist group of progressive reformers,
believed that the federal government should act to curtail
or eliminate existing injustices and abuses through
regulation and social reform. They argued that it was
imperative that such reform occur in order to check the
anger of an aroused working class embittered by the harsh
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living and working conditions. Forming cross-class
alliances of upper and middle-class reformers from various
unconnected circles such as labor and women's
organizations, the liberals hoped to expand democracy as a
means of solving the problems bedeviling American society
and to eliminate the corrupting ties linking government
and business. They hoped to accomplish their goals within
the framework of capitalism and the American tradition.
Radicals, however, were not satisfied with liberal
solutions and intended instead to restructure and transom
American political, economic, and social life to suit
their idealistic vision. They resolved to institute
revolutionary reforms that would result in a system more
responsive to the needs of the working class. While few
of them advocated programs that were truly revolutionary
in nature in nature, radicals from both the middle and the
working classes were willing to seek solutions to the
nation's problems that were not in keeping with American
tradition.
The lines between these two groups were fluid; often
their motives and methods overlapped and merged or they
formed coalitions, while at other times elements within
the discrete groups fragmented and hostile factions did
battle with one another. Although they were all located
to the left of center on the political continuum, they
particularly disagreed about the place of women in society
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and their function within the workplace. The reformers'
divisions in this regard often made them unreliable allies
for the powerless factory workers who hoped to benefit
from an alliance with them.
* * *
Many young Jewish girls, the most militant group in
the ranks of female workers, had ties to the socialist
movement and they forged ties with that movement. Modern
socialism had been introduced into the United States by
German immigrants prior to the Civil War. These
immigrants brought with them Marxist ideas about the
desirability of promoting class consciousness in the
working class, the inevitability of class conflict, and
the need to work through trade unions to accomplish their
ends. They also brought with them the ideological
differences that had originated among socialists in
Germany. One of the primary disputes centered on the
relationship between trade unionism and politics as seen
by Marx and the one envisioned by Ferdinand Lassalle and
Eduard Bernstein, late nineteenth century German political
and social thinkers who proposed revisionist theories
countering the ideas of Marx.^'^
Marxian socialists believed that trade unionism was a
result of the contest between labor and capital and that
such activity would eventually disappear, the reasons for
its existence having been eliminated after the final
revolution and the birth of the new socialist state. The
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followers of Lassalle, however, maintained that trade
unionism would appear at the opposite end of the spectrum
They believed that the conditions of working people would
be improved by the actions of existing governments after
those governments had been "purified" through universal
suffrage. The government could then assist the working
class by underwriting cooperative production that would,
in turn, make effective trade unions possible.
Bernstein and other contemporary European Marxist
revisionists, influenced by Lassalle, believed that the
determinist outcome preached by Marx might not be
inevitable and that class conflict could be avoided if
capitalism could be modified and reformed through the use
of democratic methods to protect workers' interests and
allow them some measure of economic security. These
socialist saw the middle class (as distinct from both the
capitalist class and the working class) as a potential
ally that could align itself with the proletariat and
perform some "useful" work for mankind, an outlook many
other Marxists, who saw society in terms of a two-fold
division, would have regarded as puzzling.^** Most of
these socialists also recognized that trade unionism, if
successful in realizing its goals, would undermine the
Marxian view of a future world order. By improving the
conditions and the status of the working class, trade
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unionism would inevitably eliminate the need for the final
revolution that would produce a classless society and
result in the eventual extinction of the state itself.
Debate as they might theoretical questions regarding
labor and politics, German socialist immigrants found
little to disagree about regarding the place of women in
the family, in the workplace, or in society. German
socialist held a highly romanticized view of women and
their pivotal role in the idealized household. While
they gave credit to women for their contributions in all
areas, they believed that it was the responsibility of the
husband to work to support his family and to protect his
wife against impending dangers including capitalism and
any attempts to further the emancipation of "the weaker
sex."^° While women, organized into auxiliaries, filled
several roles in the party, their activities were
peripheral to the German socialist agenda. They provided
social services to the socialist community; they ran
charity organizations, recreational programs, day
nurseries, and even choral groups. They were never,
however, given a position next to their men in either the
party organization or in any early unions.
Once they were settled in the United States, the
views of these German socialists began to change. There
were a few, mostly intellectuals and radicals, who became
outspoken advocates of women's rights soon after the end
of the Civil War. Many of this new breed of socialists
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were women. Outstanding among them were prominent writers
and speakers such as Mathilde Anneke and Augusta
Lilienthal, who, in efforts to advance the emancipation of
women, supported American suffragists, even such
freethinkers as Victoria Woodhull.^^ They were supported
by a few well-known intellectuals in socialist circles,
such as Adolf Douai, whose essays in German
-American daily
newspapers advanced the idea of women's suffrage." But
these radical ideas were not accepted by most of the early
socialists who settled in the United States.
However, as they adapted to life in an industrial
society that placed little value on the work of individual
laborers, German socialists recognized the economic
necessity for women to engage in wage labor and decided to
lift their traditional prohibition against women working
outside the home. Nevertheless, they maintained their
customary attitudes toward their wives and daughters and
attempted to shield them through support for the passage
of protective legislation in 1875 which was so restrictive
that, if enacted, it would have banned mothers of children
under fourteen from working. They also continued to
denounce women who agitated for suffrage rights as "bad
wives" working for something "not in their own best
interests . "^*
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
views of these German-American socialists began to change
in other ways. Their doctrinaire fervor was tempered by
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association with American social, economic, and political
realities. Most of them spent little time speculating on
the nature of the future as envisioned by traditional
Marxists. They avoided such visionary reflections because
they had become pragmatists and were more concerned about
the current problems facing society than about a vague
Utopian future.
Many of them also rejected the Marxian belief in the
demise of the state in an ideal socialist future. As
voters, many German-Americans identified with their
government and saw it as a mechanism to be used to enhance
their own status and that of their social class. It was
easier for them to identify with the state as a symbol of
their national pride than with an ambiguous international
working class composed of those with whom they had little
in common.
It was not long before the American socialists saw
their movement splinter in much the same way that European
socialism had. The hard-line faction within the movement,
led by the autocratic Daniel DeLeon, a former Columbia
University professor, and the Socialist Labor Party worked
together after 1890 to establish a trade union movement in
the United States subject to the control of the Socialist
Labor Party. While DeLeon subscribed to the fundamental
tenets of Marxist theory, he was an inflexible and
narrow-minded tyrant who was determined to destroy what he
could not control and did battle with the non-socialist
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labor movement as well as with those socialists who
disputed his attempts to centralize control of the party
and to direct and politicize the unions. He was not
impressed with either the ideas of popular government or
the potential of the masses to participate in determining
their own destiny. He put all his faith in the party as
an instrument to direct the future of the movement,
educate the proletariat about its eventual role, and
eventually control the state and the economy. His faction
argued that class struggle was inevitable and revolution
necessary to achieve the long-awaited dictatorship of the
proletariat
.
The right wing of the socialist movement was
represented by Morris Hillquit, a New York lawyer, and
Victor Berger, a Milwaukee political figure, an elected
mayor of that city who in 1910 was sent to represent his
constituents in Congress. These two men shared with
conservative elements of society a deep aversion to rapid
and radical change and looked to socialism, as they
perceived it, to protect society from the excesses of
capitalism and the specter of violent revolution. Berger
advocated a gradual approach through social reforms and
state ownership of utilities as socialism marched to its
inevitable victory. Hillquit, more to the center of the
movement than Berger, regarded the state, transformed from
its initial role as the preserver of the status quo for
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the benefit of the affluent classes, as a medium to effect
social change for the benefit of the working class. With
the coming of the long-awaited socialist nirvana, the
state would not disappear but would assume an
administrative role, since the need for its former
functions had been eliminated. Unlike DeLeon and his
faction, both Berger and Hillquit believed it possible and
even commendable for the socialists to seek accommodation
with non-socialist trade unions even though they deplored
their elitism.
The radical wing of the socialist movement was
represented by Eugene Debs' Social Democracy and, even
farther to the left, by the International Workers of the
World. Debs, never doctrinaire in his socialist
convictions, was enthusiastically supported by many
Americans, partly because of his commitment to the
democratic traditions they held dear. Always devoted to
the interests of working people. Debs expended much effort
in attempts to win converts to the ideas of industrial
unionism. He was, therefore, seldom willing to cooperate
with non-socialist trade unions and tried to win their
members over to his idea of one great union working for
the realization of political and economic equality for
all.^^
The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was located
on the far left fringe of the socialist spectrum. It was
a national syndicalist union that intended to transform
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society by means of industrial unions. The leaders of the
IWW were revolutionaries who scorned both the state and
trade unions. They hoped to banish capitalism and the
wage system after an inevitable class war. They were
feared and denounced by most Americans and found little
sympathy in the ranks of less radical socialists.
With the exception of the IWW, which advocated both
women's emancipation and a full political, social, and
economic equality, and Debs, who denounced women's
oppression and encouraged their full equality, most other
socialists retained the German mythos regarding women.
While professing indignation at the treatment of female
workers in shops and factories, they basically believed
that women belonged in the home tending to their domestic
duties. Socialists accepted the fact that women might
have to engage in work outside the home, but this was not
to be desired, since women were "not suited to wage
labor." When Adolf Douai was called on to give testimony
to a congressional committee in 1881 regarding women wage
earners, he suggested that the exploitation of women
workers resulted not only in the breakdown of their health
but could also endanger the lives and health of their
unborn children. Nor did socialists, except for Debs
and the IWW radicals, approve of granting women full
political rights so they could effectively protect
themselves . ^"^
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There were, nevertheless, after 1900, modest changes
in the socialist perception of women and their role in the
family, in the workplace, and in the party. When the
Socialist Party of America was formed in 1901 in an effort
to unite the various factions in the movement, eight of
the 13 8 delegates were women. None, however, spoke out
about the status of women in the party, nor did any of
their male counterparts
. Nevertheless, women activists
such as Kate Richards O'Hare and Josephine Conger began to
speak out for women's rights and argued that the
traditional auxiliaries should be avoided and that women
should demand equal status within the party. This
trend was further encouraged by the influx of young Jewish
women into the country. These immigrants, often activists
in the European movement, demanded a voice in the party.
However, it was not until after they became a force in
established unions that their concerns were noted and they
were given significant standing in the party. ^°
* * *
Women workers received little in the way of sympathy
or assistance from the socialist movement, and their
experience with organized labor offered little hope
either. Nevertheless, in the last decades of the
nineteenth century, as the dissatisfaction and anger of
women workers intensified, many spontaneous walkouts and
strikes took place. They were usually led by the Jewish
workers, recent immigrants from Eastern Europe who had
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participated in radical movements in the old country and
were associated with flourishing movements working to
achieve social justice in their neighborhoods on the Lower
East Side.^^ The disputes that produced the walkouts
centered on the workers' dissatisfaction with their low
wages, employers' attempts to enforce petty discipline in
the factories, and instances of sexual harassment.
As early as the 1880' s, women in the garment industry
realized they would have to organize as their male
counterparts were doing in order to obtain benefits for
themselves. In 1883 they, along with their male
co-workers, formed the Dress and Cloak Makers' Union, a
local assembly of the Knights of Labor. Although the
women unionists were required to meet separately from the
men,^^ in the single strike in which the infant
organization was involved, half of the strikers were
women." The union won this strike which had been called
to obtain better pay, more reasonable working hours, and
polite treatment from the employers. Nevertheless, the
Dress and Cloak Makers' Union died an early death shortly
after the termination of the strike. This became a usual
pattern in union activity that involved women. A
successful and enthusiastic organization would be formed
by women workers; it would become involved in
demonstrations or strikes to achieve specific demands; but
once their goals were realized, the women would rapidly
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lose interest in the organization they had created,
abandoning unionism until a future crisis roused them to
organize once again.
The Dress and Cloakmakers' Union was soon
reestablished in New York City, once again as a local
assembly of the Knights of Labor. The Union led the
entire cloak trade of the City out in a general strike in
mid-August of 1885. The women unionists, again meeting
apart from their male co-workers, decided to support the
strike, which lasted for two weeks. The strike settlement
not only resulted in wage concessions on the part of the
manufacturers, but in also set up an arbitration committee
to prevent further strikes in the industry. This was
apparently the first arbitration committee established in
the garment industry.
The late 1880 's witnessed a national wave of workers'
protests against the evils generated by rampant
industrialization. The garment workers in New York City
took part in a series of strikes during that period, the
walkouts being so numerous that the New York State Bureau
of Labor Statistics reported in 1889 that the garment
trade was "notorious for strikes. "^^ Many of these
strikes failed to win their objectives. The employers
were learning to deal with their recalcitrant workers, who
lacked the funds to withstand unyielding management
responses. The employers attempted to divide the workers
against each other or shipped work from city to city to
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break the strikes; when all else failed, they imported
ready-made clothing from Europe in an effort to force the
workers to abandon their demands
.
These upheavals produced a new interest in
unionization, and several new unions were organized in the
New York City garment industry, although during the
general strike of 1885 at least one of these unions allied
itself with the employers against it fellow unions."
These new organizations were notoriously short-lived,^^
partly due to the fact that there was a good deal of
disorder and discord among the workers attempting to
organize. Many of the individuals who won leadership
positions in the new unions were Jewish socialists and
anarchists who used the unions to further their own
competing radical ideologies
.
Few of the men who organized these new unions were
concerned about the need to organize women workers in the
garment industry, even though all of the new unions
included a women's branch. Moreover, few of the female
workers were convinced that union membership would prove
to be beneficial to them, at least in the chaotic
conditions that prevailed in most of the unions at that
time. As a result, their association with unions seems to
have been, at best, sporadic.^"
In the spring of 1891, garment workers from many
cities met in New York City and founded the United Garment
Workers of America (UGW) , a union for workers in the men's
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clothing industries. It was a conservative organization
that repudiated the ideas of making radical changes in
either American society or the American economy. it
sought to improve the condition of workers through
economic pressure on employers in the shops and factories
One of the primary means the union adopted to achieve its
objectives was the use of the union label, issued only to
those firms that agree to meet acceptable standards for
their employees and to accept the UGW as the bargaining
agent for their workers. Since the UGW insisted that
all employees in a shop belong to the union before it
would permit a firm to use the union label, the UGW was
forced to recruit the women working in factories. Even
so, the union usually demanded from employers only
concessions that would benefit male workers and ignored
the conditions its women members were forced to endure.''^
Nor were women given leadership positions in their unions
In several instances, women, usually young and
enthusiastic Jewish women, established their own locals
within the UGW but were seldom given either encouragement
or assistance by male members of the parent
organization
.
As a result of its moderate agenda, the UGW was able
to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
.
Originally established in 1881 as the Federation of
Organized Trader and Labor Unions, the Federation was
reorganized and renamed in 1886. Within a short time the
new organization became the nation's foremost spokesman
for labor, replacing the Knights of Labor, which had
faltered and died in the wake of the Haymarket debacle.
The AFL, a union of national trade unions operating
autonomously within the parent organization, appealed to
skilled workers who were willing to work within the
capitalist system as a distinct wage-earning class.
Samuel Gompers, founder of the Federation and president
until 1924, convinced members of his organization that it
would be more effective for them to pursue moderate goals
and adopt a policy of "pure and simple unionism" than to
seek more radical objectives and involve themselves in
partisan politics. Gompers and his union were even
reluctant to work for the passage of protective
legislation, insisting that it was wiser to depend on
economic pressure in the workshops to produce better
conditions for workers. By avoiding extreme political and
social programs and methods and by divorcing itself from
the masses of unskilled workers, the AFL was able to
maintain itself while earlier organizations fell into
oblivion
.
Even before Gompers and his close associates had
reorganized the Federation, they had encouraged women to
join their respective trade unions and called for better
pay for women and an end to the deplorable conditions with
which female workers had to contend. These AFL leaders,
however, had underlying motives when they displayed
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concern for women workers. Although convinced that
women's place was in the home filling their traditional
roles as wives, mothers, and homemakers
, they
recognized that economic factors had forced women into the
workplace in ever increasing numbers. In their new
capacity, they usually displaced male workers who were the
rightful bread-winners in their families and reduced the
wages in the industries in which they worked. Gompers and
his cohorts believed that encouraging women to unionize
and demanding equal pay for their efforts would eliminate
both problems. If faced with hiring either male or female
workers at equal wages, employers would certainly choose
the males, thus forcing the women to return to their
domestic roles while men would work at higher wages and
support their families adequately. What is more, the
individual trade unions belonging to the AFL were free to
restrict female membership as they saw fit, regardless of
the policies of the parent organization. In these first
years of the Federation's existence, therefore, only two
national unions, the Cigarmakers and the Typographical
Union, recruited women, while other AFL unions actually
prohibited their membership.''^
The AFL, in other words, spoke with a forked tongue.
Gompers made magnanimous public statements calling on his
elite membership to encourage female enrollment in their
unions and went so far as to appoint Mary Kenny as a full
time AFL organizer in 1892 and to invite prominent women.
knowledgeable about the problems of women in the
workplace, to address the Federation's annual
convention/^ Beyond this, however, neither the parent
organization nor its member unions displayed even minimal
concern about women's problems. ^'^
When the UGW affiliated with the AFL, the union
brought with it a sizeable contingent of women members.
Highly enthusiastic, they proved themselves to be loyal
and fearless strikers during the 1890' s. The depression
of 1894, however, caused the demise of most of the garment
makers' unions, although the UGW, with a reduced
membership, continued to maintain itself. The severe
economic problems generated by this depression caused
women union members, as well their male co-workers, to
forego militancy. They were willing to endure almost
anything to retain their jobs.
After the return of prosperity in 1897, unionism
enjoyed a healthy resurgence. The AFL not only survived
the depression but saw its membership increase to 548,000
by 1900; by 1914 it had 1,676,000 members in its 113
affiliated unions.''^ The garment industry also enjoyed a
great upsurge during this period, and increasing numbers
of women, mostly young Jewish immigrants, found work in
the factories of New York City. They joined a hodgepodge
of male-dominated unions in the industry and took part in
several small strikes with varying degrees of success.
The manufacturers were growing more determined to break
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the new unions and end the fledgling opposition of their
recalcitrant workers. Internal problems existed as well
and prevented much in the way of permanent achievements;
the disputes over dual union membership and the
ideological competition that existed between unions were
disruptive and caused distrust and hostility, when
increasing unity should have been their goal.
As early as 1898 there was a growing demand for a
national union to work for the united interests of the
workers in the garment industry. This enthusiasm resulted
in the establishment of the International Ladies Garment
Workers' Union (ILGWU) in the spring of 1900. Less than a
month after the formation of the new union, the AFL
granted a charter to the new national organization, and
local unions in various branches of the garment industry
requested membership.
The ILGWU differed from most other AFL affiliates in
that much of its leadership was socialist and its guiding
philosophy always conflicted with that of the parent
union, which advocated working within the existing system.
ILGWU, however, while never losing sight of the pragmatic
trade union approach, combined it with an aggressive and
militant idealism that was a legacy from its leftist
• • 4 9origins
.
The early leaders and supporters of the union were
Jewish immigrants , scholars , intellectuals , and socialist
activists who probably would have remained in those
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circles if they had remained in Eastern Europe. After
their arrival in the United States, they drifted into the
needle trades out of economic necessity. The workers in
the industry, mainly unlettered and often conservative in
their outlook, nevertheless turned to these intellectuals
for help and leadership in contending with the harsh
reality of sweatshop conditions. Benjamin Schlesinger,
who came from a Lithuanian rabbinical family, became an
early president of the ILGWU.^° Abe Baroff, another
early and influential official in the ILGWU, had been a
sensitive and poetic journalist in Russia before
emigrating. Schlesinger had socialist connections while
Baroff had been a nihilist before leaving his early
home.^^ Other individuals whose aid and support were of
utmost importance to the new union were immigrants from
the professional classes. Lawyers Meyer London and Morris
Hillquit represented the ILGWU in many of its efforts and
influenced the union to "speed the progress of this
country to the grand and noble idea of Social
Democracy. "^^
The ILGWU had a very inauspicious beginning. With
initial assets of only thirty dollars, the union provided
its officers with no salaries during the first year of its
existence. Unable even to rent an office for the infant
organization, the leaders had nothing but desk space in
the New York Cloakmakers' Union's office. Not until the
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union was into its third year did it move into its own
office on Third Avenue." The new union, however, grew
rapidly and by 1903 was able to boast of 10,000 members in
fifty-one locals, half of them located outside of New York
City.^^
The ILGWU managed to persist through its earliest
years despite a multitude of problems. Financial distress
caused worry. The Federation had to assist the ILGWU by
financing the cost of sending officials into the field to
organize. The AFL also donated funds to assist with
administrative costs, and, on at least one occasion, lent
money to the ILGWU." The ILGWU' s tenuous financial
plight encouraged it to recruit women working in the
industry, but in the early years the number of female
recruits who answered the call was less than promising."
In 1900, the New York City shirtwaist makers
organized the Ladies Waist Makers Union, ILGWU 12."
This involved the ILGWU in a bitter jurisdictional dispute
with the United Shirt and Waist Makers Union that was
settled in favor of the ILGWU through the mediation of the
AFL." By 1905, however. Local 12 had disbanded due to
lack of interest. In that same year a new
organization. Local 25, was established, but it appeared
likely to go the way of its predecessor.^" In 1909 Local
25 had only one hundred members and a sum total of four
dollars in its treasury.
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Until 1904, many employers in the needle trades were
earning large profits from their business ventures,
especially those outside of New York City, and seemed,
therefore, willing to deal with the unions in a
cooperative manner. Several unions gained recognition,
contracts were amicably agreed upon, and few serious
disagreements arose between labor and management in the
garment trades." In turn, the unions tried to
discourage strikes within the industry and attempted to
improve their relationship with employers." Boycotts
were used, and the union label modeled after the one
adopted by the UGW, was advocated. To their regret,
however, there was little initial enthusiasm for the
label; after five years of arguing its advantages, only
one company was actually using it."
This prosperous spell in the history of the garment
industry came to a sudden halt with the advent of hard
economic times in 1903-1904. An industrial depression
began, signaling an end to the steady growth of the ILGWU
Employers took advantage of the economic decline and did
what they could to weaken unions. Lockouts and
blacklisting were commonplace. Employees retaliated and
stikes proliferated, often without union sanction. The
national organization lacked central authority and was
unable to cope with the resulting deterioration of the
local's influence and the demoralization of the
membership." The ILGWU was further weakened in this
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time of trouble by the intrusion of the IWW into the
garment industry. its presence caused internal tension
and some splintering both within the unions and the
socialist movement.^''
Shortly after its establishment, the leaders of Local
25 came to realize that it was time to organize women
workers in earnest, but their efforts produced little
enthusiasm among factory women. As a result, Sam
Shindler, the Local's secretary at this time, publicly
deplored the fact that his women members were "irregular
and unenthusiastic . "^^ Despite the lack of interest in
collective action, growing unrest was evident among
workers in the New York shirtwaist trade and in the entire
garment industry, especially those workers employed in
firms located in the area of Washington Square. There
were continual confrontations between employers and their
workers. In the early autumn of 1909, aware of this
growing discontent, Shindler and Abraham Baroff, who was
then an organizer for Local 25, suggested to the officials
of the ILGWU that the problems in the shirtwaist industry
called for a general strike, a "walkout of all the crafts
in one branch of the industry."'^"
The leadership of the ILGWU had recently fallen into
the hands of moderates. Especially important was John C.
Dyche, the Secretary-Treasurer of the ILGWU. Dyche, who
had been involved in socialist activities prior to his
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emigration from Europe, came under the influence of Samuel
Gompers after his arrival in the United States. He was so
close to Gompers that he was referred to as "the Jewish
Gompers." He left the socialist movement and it was
rumored that the president of the Federation had helped
him obtain his position with the ILGWU in 1904.^^ Dyche
dominated the union and its president, Abraham Rosenberg.
Using his position of authority within the organization,
he helped introduce a centralized structure to the ILGWU,
making the locals more responsible to the parent union.
He also did what he could to discourage strikes and
confrontations with employers. Moreover, at no time was
he responsive to the problems of his women union
members.''^ When asked to approve Local 25 's request for
a general strike, Dyche and Rosenberg objected that the
idea of a general strike was "reckless" and advised
Shindler and Baroff to seek other options.
While the socialists were too divided in terms of
their ideology and too fragmented in their organization to
mount a concerted effort on behalf of women factory
workers, organized labor also lacked either the unity or
the motivation to seek solutions to their problems. Those
working women who were aware of the absence of concern for
their situation realized that they would have to structure
a course of action that would enable them to protect
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themselves. They looked to the social reformers to supply
them with the assistance they needed to effect changes in
their work environment.
* * *
The impotent workers in the garment industry in New
York City, Philadelphia, Boston, and other major
industrial cities did find support from a significant, if
unlikely, coalition of progressive allies. They were
befriended by an organization of upper- and middle-class
women known as the Women's Trade Union League of America
(WTUL)
.
This organization was originally the brainchild
of William English Walling, a well-to-do former factory
inspector who had been associated with the settlement
house movement in New York City. On a trip to^^^Englsjid he
became acquainted with the British Women's Trade Union
League, which maintained that women workers could improve
their wages and working conditions by joining existing
men's unions. This British organization, established in
1874 by trade unions working with social reformers, had
achieved some successes.
Walling was convinced that an American league,
modeled after the British organization, could improve the
conditions in which women in the United States were forced
to work. He and Mary Kenney 0' Sullivan, and AFL
organizer, drew up a constitution and brought their plans
before a group of social reformers and AFL officials
attending the Federation's 1903 convention in Boston.
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Although working women were part of the organization from
the start, the driving force behind the WTUL was a group
of dedicated, non-union, upper-class women who were
willing to contribute not only their efforts but their
financial support to the movement. It was, however,
anticipated that these "allies" would, in time, give way
to trade union members, women wage workers, who would
supply leadership and give direction to the WTUL.
The WTUL's primary goals, as formulated by the
founding members, were to "affiliate ourselves as closely
as possible with the AFL"" and organize women workers
into trade unions under the aegis of the AFL. It was
anticipated that once this was accomplished, collective
efforts would be launched to secure better wages and
working conditions for women.
Within a few months local branches of the WTUL were
formed in New York City, Boston, and Chicago, with the
national organization established in Chicago. The New
York League held its meetings at the University Settlement
House, where shirtwaist makers had been meeting since
1889. The shirtwaist makers became the first group to
unofficially ally themselves with the League.'" Although
amazed that League meetings included such unlikely
activities as tea parties and dancing the Virginia Reel, a
few working women began to join the new organization.
Rose Schneiderman and Leonora O'Reilly were two such
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activists, and their long association with the League
proved to be mutually beneficial. Professional women,
suffragists, and even a few socialists also sought early
membership in the WTUL.
This cross-class alliance of trade union women and
philanthropic reformers made its appearance at a less than
auspicious time. Business establishments in the garment
industry were closing at an alarmingly high rate due to
recession-induced financial distress. There was
increasing rancor toward working women competing with men
for the limited jobs still available in the industry.
Employers, in their determination to reverse the trend
toward worker organization, were forming manufacturers'
associations, insisting on open shops, and refusing to
recognize unions as bargaining agents for their employees.
Lockouts
,
blacklists
, and injunctions were also used in an
effort to quash the unions. Confrontation between
employers and their workers often ended in ignominious
defeats for the unions , and their leaders could do little
more than protest weakly as they saw hard-earned
concessions, won earlier from employers, abrogated during
the hard times. At the turn of the century, only three
percent of all working women were unionized. After the
recession their numbers dwindled still further, despite
the efforts of the WTUL.'^
The most difficult obstacle League members had to
face was the continued indifference of the AFL to their
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efforts. In spite of the fact that the WTUL worked
diligently to gain recognition and support from the AFL,
the Federation avoided making a real commitment to the
work of the League. In his autobiography, Gompers
recalled his wholehearted endorsement of the WTUL and the
cooperation he always extended to the League women."
The AFL president's memory did not serve him correctly.
His detached and passive attitude toward the WTUL and its
members afforded them little more than token support.
Undoubtedly, any real collaboration between the two
organizations was prevented by Gompers' aversion to women
in the labor force and his suspicions about the motives
and intent of the League's upper-class allies. He could
not understand their interest in the problems of working
women and feared that once the novelty wore off, they
might withdraw and "leave the working girls to the mercies
of their employers
.
"'^^ Unfortunately, the AFL affiliates
and their locals followed his example, frustrationg the
attempts of the League to involve working women in union
activities
.
Despite the fact that many socialist women such as
Rose Schneiderman, Pauline Newman, Leonora O'Reilly,
Theresa Malkiel, and bertha Mailly were staunch members of
the WTUL, rank-and-file members of the socialist movement
generally lacked sympathy for the aims of the League. In
fact, some socialists were unfailingly hostile to the
"rich ladies." They could not comprehend their
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association with the working women. Nor could they
forgive the League's determination to affiliate with
Gompers and the Federation. The socialists, however,
muted their suspicions of the WTUL, acknowledging its
successes in the campaign to aid working women. The
association of socialists with the League, however, fueled
Gompers' suspicions of its efforts and hampered the WTUL's
ability to work with the AFL.^°
The League was also afflicted with internal problems
from the time of its inception. A confrontation took
place as early as 1904 over a problem that was never
adequately solved. The progressive social reformers among
the WTUL members were anxious to have the League involve
itself in investigative work, amassing facts and figures
that could be used to good advantage in their struggle.
The trade union members objected and insisted that the
League remain true to its initial goal, enrolling workers
in trade unions. The AFL threw its influence behind the
tade union contingent, and they emerged, at least
temporarily, as the victors.
Other questions about the goals of the League
continually emerged and were never resolved, remaining to
vex members and foster discord in the organization. While
the members from the start constantly stressed their
commitment to the concept of sisterhood, they were never
able to decide if their primary obligation was to women as
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an oppressed minority among workers or whether their
dedication to the labor movement as a whole should
supersede other priorities. Their attempts to integrate
their feminist objectives with unionism were ongoing and
disruptive. Early members of the WTUL such as Harriot
Stanton Blatch and journalist Rheta Childe DOrr, both
involved with the suffrage movement, left the League
because they found it impossible to reconcile the two
concerns. ^2 Other League members such as Helen Marot,
and upper-class whose entire career was devoted to League
activities, argued that the organization should view women
workers as part of the working class, in need of the same
protections and benefits as male workers. The League, in
other words, should concern itself with "labor questions,"
not "gender questions.""
Working-class members such as Rose Schneiderman, a
Jewish immigrant from Poland whose early career as a cap
maker led her into union organizing and socialism*''' and
Leonora O'Reilly, first employed in a shirtwaist factory
before engaging in trade union activities , were seldom
primarily concerned about suffrage and equal rights, but
they understood all too well that their problems were
unique to their gender, and it was difficult, if not
impossible, for most of them to bury their concerns under
a blanket of class-conscious rhetoric. 86
League members constantly boasted, with some
validity, about their attempts to achieve "sisterhood."
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Nevertheless, the diverse composition of the WTUL
membership, each group with its own concerns, its own
agenda, and its own apprehensions, resulted in further
internal discord. The working women were wary of the
"fine ladies'* who were their upper-class allies. They
were conscious of and uncomfortable with the progressives'
inherent, if often subconscious, desire to transform the
immigrant-class women, divested of their old-world and
lower-class eccentricities, into acceptable Americanized
citizens
.
Ethnic differences were always a problem. Although
the League made great efforts to accommodate workers of
various nationalities, problems caused by cultural
differences and language problems were never completely
solved. The Jewish and Italian girls did not understand
or care for each other, and the American girls saw little
to admire in either group.
The WTUL understood the genesis of the problems and
the difficulties that restricted its successes during the
first years of its existence and truly attempted to
control , if not eliminate them . What is more , it never
lost sight of its commitment to the women enduring the
wretched conditions in the garment factories of New York
City. Although the nature of its charge, the
intransigence of its detractors, and the lack of accord
within the organization limited its early accomplishments.
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it was the most loyal ally the factory women had as they
began their assault on those who were their exploiters .
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CHAPTER V
CONFRONTATION AND TRAGEDY
As the first decade of the twentieth century drew to
an end, the rage of New York City's garment workers
escalated. At the same time, the intransigence of their
employers, determined to arrest the encroachment of the
unions into their factories and workshops, seemed to
intensify. The assortment of weapons they used to
accomplish their objectives-
-the blacklist, the lockout,
and the injunction-
-were accepted by most members of the
community as legitimate means of self -protection against
those who would restrict their supposed constitutional
right to expand their property and enlarge their fortunes.
Law-enforcement agencies, the courts, and the government
at all levels encouraged and protected the position of
these businessmen. They were, however, indifferent to the
discontent of the workers.
Late in July of 1909, two hundred workers in the
Rosen Brothers Shirtwaist Shop in the Washington Square
garment district walked off their jobs in a protest
against their meager wages. They picketed the shop wliile
their employers hired local ruffians to heckle them, and
the police arrested those pickets rash enough to shout
"scab" at workers who refused to join the walkout. The
strikers appealed for assistance from Local 25,^ which,
in turn, requested help from the United Hebrew Trades, an
organization formed by socialists in 1888 for the purpose
of encouraging union organization among Jewish workers.
^
The United Hebrew Trades eventually became an influential
federation of Jewish unions on the Lower East Side. The
ILGWU had fallen into the bad graces of the United Hebrew
Trades primarily because its conservative Secretary-
Treasurer, John Dyche, was exceedingly reluctant to lend
the union's support to strikes. At the same time, the
ILGWU charged that the United Hebrew Trades was calling
strikes of ILGWU unions and encouraging rebellions of the
locals against their parent union. ^ This is, no doubt,
why Local 25 asked for the assistance of the United Hebrew
Trades instead of going to the ILGWU. The aid of the
strikers during the five-week- long strike resulted in a
surprising victory for the workers; the Rosen Brothers
agreed to a twenty-percent wage increase and full union
recognition. The triumph encouraged more garment workers
to join the unions. They were, however, advised by an AFL
official who had little faith in either the women's
motivation or their ability to improve their own situation
to "attend all meetings and help those in the union to
carry out their plans for the betterment of your
condition
.
Encouraged by the results of the Rosen Brothers
strike, in early September of 1909 one hundred and fifty
women walked off their jobs at the Leiserson factory on
West 17th Street, protesting their inadequate pay and the
brutal behavior of a foreman employed to keep the workers
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in line. The result was an inordinate amount of violence
on the picket lines outside the Leiserson shop. One young
striker, Clara Lemlich, was beaten so badly by a group of
thugs that she was hospitalized for several days. The
police assigned to the site arrested the strikers, who
were then fined for needling scabs. When the hired
ruffians were arrested, they were discharged without
punishment by the magistrates at the Jefferson Market
Court .
^
Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, owners of the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company, were determined to prevent Local 25
and the ILGWU, weak as they were, from gaining access to
their company. Nor were they willing to chance the
possibility that their employees might be affected by the
restlessness in the local industry and walk off their
jobs. While the Triangle owners were never reluctant to
employ the means commonly used by other company owners to
achieve their purposes, they attempted the use of still
another method to forestall employee interest in the
union. In 1908, they formed a company union, the
Employees Benevolent Association.^ Only employees
considered loyal to the company were granted membership in
the organization. The Benevolent Association was,
therefore, limited in size and influence among the
employees since only one out of six workers was a member,
and its officers were all relatives of either Blanck or
Harris. This type of activity on the part of the
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company was commonplace in the shirtwaist industry at this
time, but at the Triangle Company it proved to be a less
than effective means of controlling employees. Because of
the restricted membership it caused divisions within the
ranks of the workers, and eventually, internal bickering
over the dispersal of funds ended any hope for the company
union's usefulness.^ It persisted then faded into
oblivion .
^
During the summer of 190 9, women from the WTUL made
contact with the workers at the Triangle Company and other
firms, pleading with them to organize and prepare to
strike. Among them, recalled Pauline Newman, then
employed by Harris and Blanck, was the inspiring Leonora
O'Reilly, originally a garment worker, whose efforts
impressed Pauline and had an impact on the other
workers. ^° Rose Schneiderman, who, as a young cap maker,
organized a local of the Cloth Hat and Cap Makers' Union,
had become a union organizer for the WTUL and convinced
many workers in the East Side factories that union
membership in Local 25 would benefit them. Sadly,
however, even after joining the union the workers were
unable to improve their situation, since all the officers
and members of the Executive Board were men who displayed
little concern about the women's complaints
.
A confrontation between management and two
subcontractors at the Triangle Company increased the
employees' anger, eventually motivating them to march out
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on strike at the same time the Leiserson workers were
walking the picket line. The two subcontractors, Jake
Kline and Morris Elzufin, pressured by the employees
working in their groups who wanted an increase in their
wages, decided to appeal to the company for more money.
They made their request through Samuel Bernstein, Blanck
and Harris' production manager, who fired them on the
spot
.
The group leaders protested and were physically
assaulted and turned out of the shop. Most of the machine
operators, angered at the attack on Kline and Elzufin,
left their machines in protest. Several went to Local 25
headquarters and asked for assistance. The union, with
few members and empty coffers, advised conciliation, and
the women returned to work.^^
The final rupture at the Triangle Company occurred in
late September of 1909, when over a hundred disgruntled
workers met in secret with officials of Local 25 and the
United Hebrew Trades. The company received word of the
meeting and laid off a hundred and fifty employees, ninety
women and sixty men, who had either been in attendance at
the meeting or who were suspected of union sympathies . ^-^
They were told that there was no work available for them.
Since the industry was in the midst of a slack period, the
discharged workers accepted their dismissal without undue
anger or suspicion. The following day, however,
newspapers carried advertisements for shirtwaist makers
needed at once at the Triangle Company. The leaders of
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Local 25, recognizing that they had no alternative if they
wished to retain any influence in the shirtwaist
factories, declared that Blanck and Harris had locked out
their workers and immediately declared a strike against
the company.
Although the workers began their efforts with great
resolve, they had few financial resources available to
them. Local 25 and the ILGWU were attempting to assist
the strikers at both Leisersons and the Triangle Company,
but they had little to offer. The amount received from
the United Hebrew Trades was also limited and
inadequate
,
Both companies were unfailing in their determination
to defeat their employees and, hopefully, deal a death
blow to the union at the same time. Leiserson continued
to hire hoodlums to heckle the pickets while Blanck and
Harris, perhaps more alert to the need for a positive
public image, recognized that a physical confrontation
between a young female striker and a professional thug
would win little sympathy for their company. According
to the strikers
,
Triangle ' s owners employed prostitutes
,
"bad girls", to harass the workers on picket duty. They
hoped that a confrontation between females would not be
viewed so negatively by the public. Police patrolled the
sites of the strikes, but had no sympathy for the strikers
and usually abused them verbally or physically. They
often arrested the demonstrating workers, charging them
with prostitution, claiming they could not tell the
difference between the two groups of women in the streets
outside the striking shops. Joseph Fletcher, an assistant
cashier at the Triangle Company, later claimed that
management was able to procure the assistance of the
police "by giving them a box of cigars with a hundred
dollar bill in it.""
Max Blanck and Isaac Harris decided to seek allies in
their battle against the two hundred strikers who
initially participated in the walkout
. With the goal
of forming an employers' association, they wrote a letter
to other area manufacturers asking them to join in the
fight against the "irresponsible" union. They requested
that the letter be kept in strict confidence, but it
somehow fell into the hands of Local 25. Secretary
Shindler decided to fight fire with fire and penned an
angry letter to all the same manufacturers, making a case
for the strikers . He claimed that the union was both
legitimate and conservative and had been forced to aid the
strikers because Harris and Blanck, the "Kings of the
Waists, " had fired about two hundred workers after they
had joined his union. He then advised the manufacturers
that Harris and Blanck had become the "largest waist
house" in the industry by "underselling every legitimate
manufacturer in the waist market and by using the cheapest
labor. ""'
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Blanck and Harris next attempted to stir up the
latent dislike and distrust that existed between the
Jewish and the Italian workers. They sent one of their
foremen, an Italian, to the office of an Italian language
newspaper II Giornale Italiano with a statement from the
Triangle owners that Local 25 was a union controlled by
Jews and that the strike began only because Jewish workers
refused to work any longer with the Italian girls. When
the officials at the union were informed of this
unscrupulous maneuver on the part of Blanck and Harris,
they sent Salvatore Ninfo, one of their organizers, to the
newspaper to refute the lie.^°
In their running battle with the union and its
supporters, the Triangle owners filed a $150,000 lawsuit
against the Jewish Daily Forward , a socialist newspaper.
They claimed that the Forward had slandered them by
accusing them of murder. Apparently Blanck and Harris had
crudely translated a Yiddish term in an article on the
strike as murder while the accepted translation of the
phrase was "cruelties . "^^ There is no evidence that the
case was ever brought to court
.
In spite of these few victories, the long-term
success of the strike was uncertain due to the strikers'
lack of available funds and their loose organization.
However, before the strikers were forced to abandon their
efforts, they received welcome assistance from several
sources. The United Hebrew Trades organized a
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fund-raising drive to aid the workers. Shirtwaist makers
all over the area pledged ten cents each for the
strikers." Other AFL-af filiated unions also donated
funds. The Typographical Union sent one hundred dollars,
and the Electrical Workers pledged fifty dollars. Even
the Central Labor Union in Brooklyn gave the strikers
permission to solicit funds from the unions under its
j urisdict ion . ^"^
Officials from Local 25 requested help from the WTUL,
whose members had unofficially been giving some assistance
from the beginnings of the Leiserson and Triangle strikes.
The response of the upper-class allies was immediate and
generous." From this point on, the WTUL and Local 25
worked together in an uneasy alliance to help the
shirtwaist makers. In an official history of the ILGWU,
written thirty-five years after the strike, the author
remembered that "when the WTUL ladies took their stand at
the side of the shirtwaist makers, the girls felt they had
strong and glamorous allies. "^^ This account pointed out
that the striking women even felt brave enough to ignore
the advice given them by ILGWU Secretary Dyche, who had
misgivings about the strike and was "very snooty about the
alliance between highbrow butters -in and irresponsible
little girls. "^^
By this time the "highbrow ladies" were well aware of
Dyche' s negative opinion of them and their organization.
Nevertheless, they sent out organizers to urge workers
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throughout the industry to organize and join the
strike. 2« Rose Schneiderman went to Massachusetts, and
Pauline Newman traveled to upstate New York to solicit
funds for the strikers from unions and sympathetic,
wealthy individuals in those areas."
In addition to providing monetary and organizational
assistance, the WTUL members set up a contingent of
forty-eight members who volunteered to join the picket
line, marching side-by-side with the workers in the hope
that their presence would provide some measure of
protection for the young strikers.^" Several WTUL women
were arrested along with the strikers, among them, Mary
Dreier, President of the New York City League. She was,
however, rapidly discharged from court when it was
discovered that she was one of the "rich ladies". The
League members protested in vain that picketing, when
carried on peacefully, had long been upheld as legal by
New York courts. Strikers continued to be arrested in
significant numbers, brought before magistrates, and fined
ten dollars each, often without even a hearing.
Members of the WTUL also gave their own money to aid
the strikers. "The Mink Brigade," consisting of Alva
Belmont, mother of the Duchess of Marlborough, Anne
Morgan, the daughter of J. P. Morgan, and others, made
substantial contributions that were used for bail money,
demonstrations, and strike benefits.
126
Probably the most helpful assistance made by the WTUL
women was their successful effort to organize and
disseminate information about the causes of the strikes
and the treatment of the pickets by the police and the
bullies hired to harass them. Not only those newspapers
sympathetic to the position of the strikers, The Forward
snd The East Side Socialist
, but also more conservative,
mainline papers such as the New York Times began including
articles about the plight of the shirtwaist workers: their
pitiful wages and the long hours of work and the
deplorable conditions in the factories. The Forward even
printed a list of names and criminal records of the
bullies hired to assault the girls doing picket duty.
Next to the list, they printed pictures of a few of the
strikers, complete with the disfiguring injuries inflicted
on them by these thugs. Public opinion began to
indicated an increasing sympathy in the community for the
strikers
.
In view of the altered circumstances, the leaders of
Local 25 once again considered the feasibility of calling
a general strike. They approached the officials of the
ILGWU and requested their approval of the idea. Secretary
Dyche still opposed an industry-wide strike and suggested
a continuation of efforts to investigate problems in the
shirtwaist industry. Ignoring his advice, the local
appointed a special committee to consider a general
strike. The committee of five, two of whom were women,
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recommended such action. It was decided to hold a meeting
on November 22nd to discuss with area shirtwaist makers
the ramifications of such a strike and ascertain whether
they could be counted on if such a strike was called. The
meeting was well
-publicized and scheduled to be held at
Cooper Union, but the thousands who arrived could not all
be accommodated there; other halls were expeditiously
rented, and workers were directed to simultaneous meetings
at those sites.
Most speeches given that evening were considered and
cautious. Samuel Gompers had agreed to address the crowd
at Cooper Union, and he warned them not to act in haste
but to give employers a chance to meet their demands. If,
however, they refused to consider the workers' legitimate
grievances, he exclaimed, "strike and let them know
it."" ILGWU officials urged the women to exercise
"realistic restraint ." Socialist leaders Meyer London
and Jacob Panken, as well as Mary Dreier, president of the
WTUL, gave enthusiastic endorsements of the proposed
strike. But it was nineteen-year-old Clara Lemlich, just
released from the hospital after being badly beaten
outside the Leiserson factory, who, in a ringing speech
delivered in Yiddish, urged support for the general strike
and convinced the crowd to shout their approval. Together
they took an old Jewish oath not to "turn traitor to the
cause .
"
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When the strike began, there were approximately
thirty- five thousand workers empolyed in about four
hundred firms in New York City's shirtwaist trade.
During the next few days, almost 30,000 shirtwaist makers
went out on strike in two hundred and fifty shops,
beginning the first major women's strike in American
history. Strike headquarters were set up at the WTUL
meeting hall on East 22nd Street, and the workers' demands
were issued to the employers. These demands included
union recognition and a closed shop, the end of the
subcontracting system, a fifty- two-hour work week, holiday
pay for salaried employees, and the elimination of all
fines and charges for needles, thread, and other
necessities. Wages were to be determined in individual
shops on a fair and equitable basis."
The degree of worker cooperation with the strike
differed from shop to shop. In some cases, all employees
of a firm chose to remain at their jobs. In other shops,
only a portion decided to continue work, and in several,
the entire work force joined the strike.
The strikers and their allies were optimistic about
the outcome of the strike after ten of the smaller
manufacturing firms came to terms before the strike was
one day old, and several small firms, financially unable
to withstand the financial distress entailed in a lengthy
strike, began, on a daily basis, to negotiate and agree on
their employees' demands. Strike settlements reached
through the efforts of the WTUL had often been weak and
ambiguous, and this remained true during the shirtwaist
strike of 1909. ^« Each business firm reached a separate
settlement with its workers, and these agreements differed
widely from shop to shop. Nevertheless, each employer who
came to an understanding with his workers had to post a
three-hundred-dollar bond as a guarantee that he would
live up to the agreement and observe union rules in his
shop." Unfortunately, the three-hundred-dollar bond
provided little assurance that changes would be made in
the shirtwaist factories of New York City.
One hundred and sixty of the larger employers joined
Blanck and Harris' Manufacturers' Association and met
regularly at the Hoffman House, an elegant Manhattan
hotel. They agreed that they were willing to either meet
the demands of the strikers or negotiate differences with
them, but they were adamant in their refusal to recognize
the union or to accept the closed shop. They also
denounced those firms that had already settled with Local
25 and suggested that those owners would be accepted into
the Manufacturers' Association if they would break their
agreements with the union, ""^ Calling the strikers
"irresponsible blackguards," they invited the press to
send a delegation to investigate the shirtwaist factories
so that they could report to the public about the
exemplary conditions they would find there. ''^
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In the meantime they fired strikebreakers to replace
their absent workers and did their best to retain
employees who had decided not to join the walkout. This
was a difficult task, since these employees had to face
the contempt of the girls on the picket line. The owners
of the Bijou Waist Company even installed one hundred cots
in their factory so that their workers could sleep over to
avoid confrontations with the strikers. Some employers
took responsibility for transporting their workers to and
from the factories/^ while the police on duty did what
they could to prevent verbal or physical communication
between the strikers and the scabs.
There was, however, continued violence which dismayed
officials of Local 25 and members of the WTUL. While the
strikers' behavior was sometimes suspecf", most of the
violence was directed at the picketing women. Not only
were thugs and strikebreakers guilty of physically
assaulting them, but the police continued their abusive
behavior. The girls were often arrested and taken to
police headquarters where the mistreatment continued. In
court the judges often verbally berated them. Prejudiced
magistrates sentenced many young girls to Blackwell's
Island, where they were housed with violent criminals and
prostitutes and suffered a great many indignities.
Some of the worst incidents occurred outside of the
Triangle Company, where Blanck and Harris were stubbornly
refusing to meet their workers' demands. Members of the
WTUL, doing picket duty, observed both hired thugs and
police clubbing the striking girls But within the
Triangle factory, the owners, in an attempt to retain the
loyalty of their workers, played music on a phonograph as
the girls worked and encouraged them to dance during their
lunch break. They even awarded prizes to the most
skillful dancers!"*^
In the streets below, the WTUL members not only
walked picket lines with the strikers but also hired a
bevy of lawyers to provide the women with legal assistance
and to furnish them with bail. The indignant allies even
organized a public march of five thousand strikers and
sympathizers, who walked in a silent body to city hall to
inform the mayor about the violent behavior of the city's
finest. Sadly, their efforts failed to end the violence
and abuse even though the mayor appeared to be
sympathetic
.
During the last week of 1909, the New York State
Board of Arbitration offered to mediate the shirtwaist
strike.'''' The Manufacturers' Association agreed to
accept arbitration and again offered to come to terms with
the strikers. ''^ They refused, however, to consider
either the closed shop or union recognition.''^ The
manufacturers claimed that they were ready to eliminate
the abuses in their shops, either unfair treatment of
their employees or dangerous conditions in the
factories.^" However, to permit union involvement in
their efforts would only lead to interference in their
businesses, and this they would not tolerate.
Apparently the striking workers, at this point, would
have compromised on the issue of the closed shop if they
could have been assured of union recognition. They
insisted that only the recognition of the union would
ensure the maintenance of the concessions wrenched from
the employers. Since no settlement could be reached on
this issue, the negotiations were discontinued after
December 27th.
From this point on, the shirtwaist strike, the
"Rising of the "Twenty-Thousand, " lost supporters and
sympathizers. Several AFL leaders endorsed the
manufacturers' proposals" and began to withdraw their
already lukewarm help. Many wealthy women, Anne Morgan
among them, ended the aid they had given the girls and
denounced the WTUL members as " socialists . "^^ Several
settlement house workers, many of whom had championed the
cause of the workers, suggested that the strikers might be
wise to give their employers a chance "to clean their own
houses" since they had indicated a sincere willingness to
do so. The strikers should be satisfied, they suggested,
with a moral victory, and, if the employers reneged on
their guarantees, legislative or administrative
alternatives could be attempted.^* Even some of the
newspapers, previously sympathetic to the strike, grew
more and more critical of the union and its demands. The
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World suggested that the strike had been a failure from
the vantage point of union labor. It claimed that the
strikers were, for the most part, Russian Jews who were
strongly influenced by socialists and anarchists," and
pointedly noted that "American" and Irish girls had always
refused to involve themselves in the strike."
The young women who were the backbone of the strike
were reluctant to abandon the cause to which they were so
committed. They had attended daily meetings, often late
into the night, done picket duty, suffered physical
assaults and arrests, sold newspapers that supported their
strike, given speeches before groups of wealthy club
women, and helped the WTUL allies to supply aid and
sustenance to the strikers and their families.
Nevertheless, as the strike dragged on into February of
1910 and many of the most important shops had not settled,
they faced the inevitable. The winter was especially
harsh, and picket duty was difficulty without warm
clothing. Many of them were ill, and the violence had
never abated. Without significant support from their
parent organization, lack of money was a problem, not only
for the union but for individual strikers. On February
15th, Local 25 announced that the strike was over.
Although two hundred and seventy-nine manufacturers
had already settled with about sixteen thousand
strikers, accepting union demands wholly or in part, at
the end of strike some six thousand workers^^ were forced
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to return to work in factories that had held out, refusing
to make any concessions to the strikers. Including those
workers who had not gone out on strike, there were about
thirteen thousand shirtwaist workers still employed in
open shops at the end of the strike/"
Nevertheless, the positive results of the strike,
limited as they were, gave encouragement to those who
sacrificed so much. The subcontracting system was
abolished, and the fifty-two hour week was accepted in
most shops. Limitations were placed on the amount of
overtime required, and an agreement made that workers had
to be compensated for overtime. Wages were increased, but
since the new pay scales were set in individual shops, it
is impossible to state the exact amount of the increases.
It was also agreed that employees would be furnished with
needles, thread, and other necessities free of charge.
The shirtwaist strike also had long-range
implications. It made obvious the potential power of
unions in the garment trade. Moreover, it indicated that
those existing unions that had been reluctant to organize
women had made a grave error. Organizations of women
could obviously contribute needed strength and relentless
persistence to the labor movement
.
The strike of 1909 also made clear to the shirtwaist
makers which allies could be trusted to give them support
and aid. The women of the WTUL had proved themselves
capable of standing firm in the most desperate situations.
135
They had come a long way toward achieving the true ideal
of sisterhood. The strike had indicated that an alliance
of women, wealthy and poor, American-born and immigrant,
educated and unlettered, could accomplish great things in
the name of justice.
It should be noted, however, that while individual
suffragists, women such as Alva Belmont and Anna Howard
Shaw, president of the American Women Suffrage
Association, gave passionate support to the strikers, the
National American Women Suffrage Association neither
endorsed the New York strike nor aided the workers
involved. They maintained strict neutrally toward labor
organizations and behaved accordingly. The Association
was especially careful to stipulate that Dr. Shaw, when
aligning herself with the strikers, did so as an
individual and not as a spokeswoman for the
Association
.
Even though they had cooperated during the strike,
socialist leaders of Local 25 and the socialist community
in general distrusted and disparaged the WTUL members,
still unwilling to trust the motives of the well-to-do
women. For its part, the WTUL leadership never fully
trusted the socialists, suspecting that they only wished
to use the young women strikers as a front in their
crusade on behalf of their ideology. The end of the
strike signaled a finish to this precarious alliance.
However, it also revealed a change in the socialists'
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attitude toward women workers and their status in the
labor movement. During the strike, the socialists had
abandoned the last vestiges of their outmoded traditional
view of the superiority of women's domestic role. The
socialist men, as well as the women in the movement, had
contributed all assistance and aid possible. They would
remain staunch allies of the workers, even though they
were always uncompromising in their determination to place
the future of socialism in the United States before the
needs of women workers and unions and the cause of women's
suffrage
.
The behavior of the male leadership of Local 25 had
also revealed its lack of trust of the WTUL. While the
leaders had given support to the strikers to the best of
their ability, they had attempted to manipulate and take
advantage of the League. During the strike, the WTUL
women had successfully attempted to overlook this in the
best interest of the cause they were serving, but by
January 31st, even before the conclusion of the strike,
the League's Executive Board formally decided that in the
future, any union that requested the League's help during
a strike would have to agree to several requirements: it
would have to explain and justify its grievances to the
League's Executive Board and permit two League
representatives to attend the union's executive committee
meetings. Moreover, the union's executive committee would
have to pass a formal resolution requesting League
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cooperation. The WTUL's leaders stipulated that the
League would have to have some input in setting policy if
it was going to provide help during a strike," even if
this meant that it might be accused of interferring with
internal union affairs.'^ The League also worked in the
following months to unseat those Local 25 officials who
were hostile to the WTUL and indifferent to the concerns
of women wage earners. But the officers of Local 25
resented the League's interference in their affairs, and
the allies' efforts accomplished little more than
increasing the existing animosity of the Local toward the
WTUL .
"
Secretary Dyche and President Rosenberg of the ILGWU
must have been impressed with the perseverance of the
young women strikers who continued their determined
efforts long after the men strikers, reluctant to suffer
continued abuse, had left the scene. They also must have
been amazed and gratified at the change in the fortunes of
their union as a result of the strike. Membership in
Local 25 had soared to over twenty thousand.^''
Nevertheless, they remained lukewarm toward their women
members and uncommitted to the task of eliminating the
problems that beset them in the workplace. They usually
treated women members with disdain or gave only lip
service in support of their endeavors.
Nor did the Federation reverse its view of the "women
problem." It continued to view the WTUL, suffragists,
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female workers, and women unionists with suspicion and
even contempt. It would seldom negotiate on behalf of
women unless doing so would in some way benefit male
laborers. League members attending the AFL's 1911
national convention in Boston were obviously distressed by
the patronizing manner with which they were treated by AFL
officials and by the lack of recognition given their
organization by the Federation . ''^ They were also
dismayed at Gompers' reluctance to endorse minimum wage
laws and work hour limitations for men and women, both
issues the League strongly advocated, Mary Dreier and her
associates decided that their most promising course of
action was to exert constant pressure on Gompers and his
associates in the hope that eventually they would be
forced to recognize the problems of women workers.
Unfortunately, the strike did little to change the
attitudes of employers in the shirtwaist industry, where
the short-term gains realized by the 1909 confrontation
proved ephemeral. Since the strike settlements in
1909-1910 had been made on an individual shop basis, no
common procedures were available ot make grievances known
or to apply sanctions when agreements were violated. The
only recourse the workers had was to go out on strike
again. Although there was a general reluctance to resort
to that alternative, many small walkouts took place over
the following months. Even more of a problem for the
workers was the fact that many of the manufacturers with
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whom agreements had been made either moved or went out of
business, leaving a large number of workers who had
believed they had union protection in the same position
they were in prior to the strike.'^ Due to these
discouraging developments, ILGWU membership, which had
increased to almost 20,000 during the strike, fell to
7,000 during the following year.'^^
Unfortunately, the music also ended at the Triangle
Company. Employees there realized few of the benefits
granted to workers in other factories as a result of the
strike. Max Blanck and Isaac Harris held out until the
end of the strike and were adamant in their refusal to
consider acceptanc of a union at their factory."
Considering the union an organization to be avoided at all
costs, they were more careful about their hiring practices
than they had been previously, interrogating each
prospective employee about any possible union affiliation.
Even after a woman was hired, she might be questioned from
time to time about her union sympathies and discharged if
her answers did not meet with the approval of the
company.^'' The union, nevertheless, continued its
efforts to organize this company. '^^
Although the shirtwaist makers were exhausted and
disillusioned after their great effort, workers in several
other garment industries considered the strike a more
viable option in the light of the shirtwaist strike
settlement. During the summer of 1910, the cloakmakers'
140
union, largely an organization of men, went out on strike.
They were well organized and financed and were assured of
the support and cooperation of both the ILGWU and the AFL
.
The Manufacturers' Association, however, obtained an
injunction from Judge John W. Goff of the Supreme Court,
New York County, forbidding picketing or any other "acts
of intimidation" or force that might be construed as
interfering with the property or with the right of the
manufacturers to do business.''^ This reactionary
injunction could have been interpreted in a way that would
have effectively ended the strike. It was a grievous
reversal for the union and successfully negated much of
the painfully won progress labor organizations had
achieved during recent years. The cloakmakers defied the
injunction, but considerable violence and many arrest
resulted
.
The strike was finally settled by the union and the
Manufacturers' Association with a "Protocol of Peace" that
awarded the strikers many of their demands and established
a procedure to avoid the escalation of labor-management
problems to the point where a strike became inevitable.
Largely the work of Louis Brandeis, a brillian Boston
lawyer and a trusted mediator, the Protocol contained
provisions for acceptable hours, wages, and, in place of
the disputed closed shoop, a "preferential shop, " giving
preferment to union members in cases where both skilled
union and non-union workers applied for positions. The
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protocol also established the Joint Board of Sanitary
Control to oversee working conditions and a Board of
Grievances and a Board of Arbitration to deal with
disputes and prevent strikes. Until March 1913, however,
the Protocol was concerned only with the cloak and suit
industries
.
'^'^
In spite of this promising agreement, during the
winter of 1911 several events in the shirtwaist industry
alerted concerned individuals in the labor movement to the
fact that there were still serious battles to be fought.
A rash of strikes occurred in several shops where
employers locked their employees out during a lull in the
business season rather than sign contracts with them. The
union met with WTUL representatives to confer about
possible joint action to deal with the new crisis.''^
Unfortunately, the WTUL membership was attempting to
resolve several internal problems, the most important
being the growing antagonism between the well-to-do
reformers and the trade union members of the League.''^ A
new agreement between the old allies was never
satisfactorily reached.
Even more ominous was a fire that occurred in a
Newark, New Jersey factory on Saturday, November 26th,
1910, in which twenty-five workers were killed. Six women
burned to death, and nineteen died after jumping from
fourth floor windows to escape the flames. The dead
workers were employees of the Wolf Muslin Undergarment
142
Company which had its headquarters in New York City. The
building was not fireproof and had been classified as
"extra-hazard" by an insurance company because there had
been ten fires there during the past ten years . ^°
No one either accepted blame or was able to place
responsibility on others. The Wolf Company supposedly ran
an acceptable shop, and the building's owner had obeyed
the necessary laws mandated by the State Labor Department.
The Newark City Building Department had made a few
inspections but had never enforced regulatins.
Nevertheless, it was held blameless.
The Newark fire alarmed New York City officials.
Fire Chief Edward F. Croker publicly stated that dangerous
conditions existed in many New York garment factories and
that those buildings could suffer the same fate as the
Newark building unless appropriate steps were taken
without delay. The WTUL, despite its internal disputes,
began a campaign to investigate and make public the names
of factories in New York City that the League deemed to be
unsafe. The files of the WTUL contain details about the
failure of New York City manufacturing concerns to
eliminate dangerous conditins in their factories. These
investigations revealed buildings with locked doors, no
fire escapes, and barred windows. The New York Times
published an article claiming that ninety-nine percent of
New York City's factories contained major fire hazards."
City authorities took no action to eliminate the problems.
The worst fears of Fire Chief Croker were realized
late in the afternoon of March 25th, I9ii. Martha Bensley
Bruere, as an active member of the WTUL, who had walked
the picket line in front of the Triangle Company during
the shirtwaist strike, was strolling down Fifth Avenue
shortly after 4:45. As she passed the beautiful homes in
which wealthy members of the New York City community
resided, she observed great clouds of smoke billowing
upward to the east.^' Within a short time most of the
city knew that there was a dreadful fire at the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company on Washington Square. Elevators had
stopped running when their cables burned through, and the
only available door, opening on to Greene Street, had soon
been cut off by flames. The Washington Place exit was
locked and could not be opened by the desperate
individuals trapped on the ninth floor. Young employees,
trapped and insane with terror, jumped to their deaths in
the street below. Others perished at their sewing
machines, unable to even maneuver themselves out of the
congested work area, while still others died when the
single inadequate fire escape buckled and collapsed under
the weight of the escaping employees, throwing the
frenzied figures on it to the ground or impaling them on
the iron fence below.
Firemen were at the scene within minutes but were
unable to save one hundred and forty-six employees of the
Triangle Company, most of whom died within twenty minutes
after the fire began. Police officers arrived from
their nearby neighborhood headquarters immediately after
the first alarm was given. They were the same group of
officers who had abused and insulted the strikers during
the 1909-1910 walkout. Now they carried the smoldering
bodies of the Triangle employees to ambulances that
transportd them to the morgue.
The horror of the Triangle Fire shocked the city and
the state. Only fifteen of the victims were men; the rest
were, for the most part, teenage girls, unmarried Jewish
immigrants. A few were Italian women. The city
newspapers were filled with articles analyzing the
particular details of the tradegy. Accompanying these
stories were gruesome pictures that helped to arouse the
outrage of almost all segments of the community.
The immediate reaction was a sweeping but haphazard
effort to place blame for the fire. Among those held
responsible was the owner of the Washington Place
building, Joseph Asch. He, however, shared the sense of
horror that gripped the people of New York City and easily
convinced his accusers that he had complied with existing
laws and regulation in every instance. The Fire
Department officials denied any culpability and heatedly
pointed to Chief Croker's admonitions after the Newark
fire. They also deplored the confusion that existed over
the question of responsibility for enforcement of safety
regulations. Governor Dix was appalled at the tragedy,
but he placed the blame for the shocking deaths on the
victims themselves; they had neglected to familiarize
themselves with the building and were unaware of the exits
available to them. The State Labor Department blamed the
City Department of Buildings for its failure to enforce
the law, while the Department of Buildings censured the
State Labor Department for neglect of its
responsibilities
.
Not surprisingly, almost everyone accused Max Blanck
and Isaac Harris of reprehensible negligence and even
criminal behavior. They were so hated by their employees
that many of the surviving women accused the Triangle
owners of starting the fire in order to collect insurance
money. Pauline Newman was in Philadelphia organizing for
the union at the time of the fire but returned to New York
after being informed of the tragic event. She had known
many of the dead workers, having worked with them at the
Triangle Company prior to the 1909 strike. Even years
later she claimed that Blanck and Harris were guilty of
deliberate murder and arson. Another woman, employed
at the Triangle Company at the time of the fire, wrote an
anonymous letter to a New York City paper, refusing to
sign her name because she "feared for her life." She too
claimed that the fire was planned by the owners for
financial gain.^^
Although the record of the Triangle owners in regard
to fire insurance claims is clouded at best, it is
unlikely that they started the fire. Earlier insurance
fires in their factories had all occurred during
non-working hours, while this conflagration took place
when hundreds of workers were still in the shop.
Furthermore, not only Blanck and Harris but two of
Blanck's young children were in the building when the fire
began. They barely escaped with their lives, making their
way to the roof from the tenth-floor offices.
A few hours after the fire, these gentlemen were
interviewed at Harris' nearby home by reporters from the
New York Times
.
Blanck, usually unemotional and polished,
could barely hold himself together as he answered
questions. The more taciturn Harris, his bandaged right
hand covering an injury received that afternoon, did most
of the talking. He was something of a hero. Keeping his
head while others panicked, he had helped save the lives
of several of his employees, leading them through the
terrible heat and smoke to the roof where they were
assisted to the roof of an adjoining building by New York
University students. While being interviewed, Blanck and
Harris expressed concern about relatives working in the
factory who had been hospitalized or were either dead or
among the missing.
Both partners were anxious to explain the precautions
they had taken to avoid fire and to stress the fact that
the Department of Buildings had recently given their
approval to their factory, asking only for an additional
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window in the women's dressing room and protective shields
for some of the machinery. Both men denied over and over
that the factory doors were locked on the afternoon of
March 25th. Blanck said that he made it his personal duty
each morning to check and ascertain that all doors were
unlocked. ®^
In spite of their protestations of innocence, on
April 11th Max Blanck and Isaac Harris were indicted on
seven counts by a grand jury. The charge was manslaughter
in the second degree under Section 80 of the Labor Law,
mandating that factory doors should not be locked, bolted,
or fastened during working hours. The New York State
Penal Code defined manslaughter in the second degree at
taking human life through an act of culpable
negligence
.
^° No one seemed unduly concerned that the
day before the indictment was handed down in the Court of
General Sessions, two of Blanck and Harris' top assistants
at the Triangle Company, Samuel Bernstein and Louis Brown,
were escorted from the court building after it was
reported that they had been attempting to influence
witnesses
.
The trial of the partners began on December 4th and
lasted until the 27th of that month. They were charged
with causing the death of Margaret Schwartz, one of the
girls who had died trying to get out of the Washington
Place door. The state called one hundred and three
witness, mostly either Triangle Company employees or
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experts hired by the District Attorney's office to examine
the premises after the fire. Most of the witnesses
testified that the Washington Place door was always locked
and had been locked at the time of the tragic fire. The
defense also called several witnesses who testified that
the door was usually open and was open on the afternoon of
the fire. Many of them had made earlier statements that
contradicted their testimony on the stand.
Before the case went to the jury, the judge gave the
jurors a lengthy charge, in the course of which he warned
them that to find the defendants guilty, they had to agree
that Margaret Schwartz's death was caused by the locked
door and that the defendants, Blanck and Harris, knew the
door was locked. Legal experts believed that this charge
probably determined the verdict. The jurors deliberated
about two hours and returned a not guilty verdict. They
later stated that they had agreed that Margaret Schwartz's
death had been caused by the locked door, but were not
sure that Harris and Blanck were that the door was
closed. The other indictments against the Triangle
owners went untried. The District Attorney's office
feared that the other six charges would meet the same fate
as had the Margaret Schwartz case, and, furthermore, a
question arose as to whether another trial would leave the
state open to a charge of double jeopardy.
As the partners left the courthouse, they were
surrounded by a protective ring of policemen as a
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threatening group of the fire victims' relatives, holding
pictures of their dead, followed them down four flights of
stairs shouting "Murderers."" Public opinion agreed
with the distressed kin that justice had not been served.
No one was held directly responsible for the fire, which
had taken one hundred and forty-six lives.
Since many of the fire victims were the sole support
of their families, a vigorous community-wide effort was to
raise funds to aid those who had lost loved ones in the
conflagration. Each family eventually received about
seventy-five dollars.'" Blanck and Harris even offered
to pay to the families of the dead workers a sum of equal
to the weekly wages earned by their deceased relatives."
At the same time Blanck and Harris employed the New
York firm of Goldstein and Company to act as their public
adjusters in negotiating their insurance settlement. For
their services, Goldstein and Company received a total of
$8,500. They did an admirable job for their clients. The
Triangle partners carried insurance in the amount of
$174,750 on their stock and $25,000 on furniture and
fixtures. There was, however, no proof that the value of
the stock and furnishings in the shop at the time of the
fire amounted to more than $134,000. Since the company's
inventory books had been destroyed in the fire, the
insurance carriers had to accept Blanck and Harris' word
that they were overstocked with goods and were constantly
buying more goods
.
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Nevertheless, thirty-six of the thirty-seven
insurance compaines paid off their share of the claim
without complaint. However, the Royal Insurance Company,
which seldom contested its losses, refused to settle until
an investigation occurred and, therefore never settled.
Even so, by May of 1913, the Triangle owners had collected
$190,000 in insurance claims. It was, at the time, the
largest insurance profit in the history of New York.^^
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CHAPTER VI
THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRIANGLE FIRE:
LOCAL CALLS FOR REFORM
Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, with the help of a
skilled attorney and a judge willing to overlook
contradictions in the evidence presented and the
possibility that the Triangle owners had bribed witnesses,
emerged from the Triangle Fire absolved of guilt and with
an inordinate insurance settlement enhancing their bank
accounts.^ The public, however, was not satisfied that
justice had been served. Unwilling to forgive Blanck and
Harris their transgressions, the press, reformers, and the
general public also demanded that an even wider net be
cast in an effort to fix blame. State and municipal
agencies, officials, and inspectors fell under scrutiny in
an attempt to find those responsible for the tragedy. In
turn, recalling widespread indifference to badly needed
improvements in New York City's garment factories at the
time of the shirtwaist strike in 1909, some analysts
suggested that the public should also hold itself
accountable for the terrible fire.
Since Blanck and Harris were acquitted and confusion
over departmental responsibility to inspect and enforce
existing regulations and laws made it almost impossible to
fix the burden of guilt for the fire, few official heads
rolled. Raymond B. Fosdick, a former settlement house
worker who had become Commissioner of Accounts in New York
City, did investigate the inadequate enforcement of a few
inspectors. Everyone, however, dismissed this as a feeble
action that would do little to remedy the existing
problems. Fosdick himself admitted that the bribery of
inspectors was so common and so deeply rooted in New York
City that he felt inadequate to cope with it.^
Failing to effectively fix the blame, the press,
reformers, union officials, businessmen, politicians, and
other members of the community called for measures to
improve factory conditions and thus prevent another
disaster in the future. This reform impetus continued
with decreasing fervor for the next three years. It
exposed the political power of the city's entrepreneurs
and the inadequacies of municipal and state regulation and
enforcement. At the same time, it brought together
several groups within the community, all with differing
agendas, many of them conflicting, to work for legislative
action on both the city and the state level. Too often,
however, the organizations that called for reform were
weakened and distracted by internal disagreements. Nor
were they able to put aside their individual concerns and
cooperate with one another to make concrete demands for
the elimination of the dangerous conditions that existed
in garment district factories. They also failed to speak
with a single convincing voice on behalf of the women who
worked under the threat of a future holocaust.
The WTUL had grown increasingly disenchanted with
union organizations at all levels and was itself fraught
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with internal discord. The League's socialists and other
members who wished to retain their original goal of
unionizing women workers and those within the organization
who were attempting to push the membership to support the
efforts of militant suffragists were involved in continual
disputes about the future of the WTUL . Nevertheless,
League members were united in their concern for the women
with whom they had walked the picket lines during the 1909
strike. They took the initiative in calling for immediate
reform measures.
On the morning after the fire, eighteen members of
the League made direct contact with the families of the
victims to determine the extent and the immediacy of their
financial distress. Meanwhile, Leonora O'Reilly, then a
member of the WTUL Executive Board, served luncheon to
several of the shaken survivors of the fire. O'Reilly
interrogated the women about working conditions at the
Triangle company in the weeks preceding the fire.^ Later
in the same day, she addressed a large luncheon-meeting at
League headquarters where several religious, political,
and reform leaders, shocked and angry about the fire, met
with WTUL members. She shared with them the information
she had obtained earlier from the Triangle employees,
emphasizing their agreement that locked doors at the
factory were a common occurrence.
The president of the League, Mary Dreier, also
addressed the assembly. She denounced the Triangle owners
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as the worst of the employers her organization had to deal
with during the strike in 1909. She recalled a time
during the strike when Max Blanck had come to her,
appealing for her intervention with the strikers on his
behalf and promising to improve conditions in his factory
in return for her help. The League had trusted him and
encouraged the Triangle employees to return to work,
Dreier recounted, but Blanck had reneged on his part of
the agreement and had failed to make the promised
improvements. Furthermore, several of the Jewish girls
who had returned to work had subsequently been fired, and
newly arrived Italian immigrants, easier to exploit, had
been hired to replace them. It was therefore
understandable, Dreier complained, that while unionized
shops were paying sixty cents a dozen for completed
shirtwaists, the Triangle Company paid only thirty-five
cents a dozen. ^ Before the meeting adjourned, those
assembled agreed to seek further information from workers
in other factories about their working conditions. They
also began to plan for a mass meeting to be held at the
earliest possible date to continue their crusade against
dangerous and exploitive factory conditions.^
On the following day, the New York EveninQ Journal
published a WTUL questionnaire asking factory workers to
reply anonymously to the questions asked:
Name of your factory.
Number and street of your factory.
What is your trade?
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How many floors in your building?
How many people in your room?
Are windows bared or nailed down?
Are doors locked during working hours?
Do doors open in or out?
How many fire escapes are there?
Are staircases wood, iron, or stone?
Is the way to the fire escapes clear or obstructed-?
Are halls dark or lighted?^
By Wednesday the 29th, over 1000 replies had been returned
by frightened workers. They indicated that several
factories were in far worse shape than the Asch Building
had been.^ The League then sent out inspectors to verify
the conditions that had been reported, and, after
collating the results, they sent notifications of the
violations of regulation to Police, Fire, and Building
Departments and to the State Department of Labor.
^
Meanwhile, other organizations held meetings to voice
their horror and indignation about the Triangle Fire. On
the evening of March 29th, the socialist leaders of Local
25 conducted a memorial meeting for the fire's victims.
Held at the Grand Central Palace, it was attended by about
2000 people, mostly women, many of whom were either
survivors of the fire or relatives of the dead workers.
The assembly was addressed by Abraham Cahan, editor of the
Jewish Daily Forward , an individual with much influence in
the Jewish community. An impassioned speaker, Cahan
stirred his audience to a point where sobbing and fainting
women had to be carried out by the police who were in
attendance. After Cahan related a suggestion that had
been made to him that a "few bombs in the camp of the
capitalists" would improve the workers' conditions, the
meeting was briefly disrupted by emotional outbursts from
the audience. Once order was finally restored, several
socialist speakers rose to promote their radical cause as
the remedy for the capitalistic evils. Among these
speakers was A. M. Simons, the former editor of an
influential publication, the International Socialist
Review. Simons suggested that only by joining unions
promoted by militant socialists could workers protect
themselves against those capitalists who "begrudged the
Triangle workers the price of another fire escape."
Before leaving, the exhausted audience was invited to.
attend a socialist debate to bee held at the Rand School
in a few days so that they might better understand the
benefits of socialism.^
Another meeting was held on March 31st by the
Suffrage League at Cooper Union where indignant speakers
also passionately argued that they had a remedy for the
problems that had permitted the Triangle Fire to occur.
They demanded the vote so that women could protect
themselves against horrors such as the recent holocaust
.
Socialist leaders attended this meeting, among them Meyer
London and Morris Hillquit, who again used the fire as a
pretext to call for support for their ideology. Dr. Anna
165
Howard Shaw, the president of the Suffrage League angrily
told them not to
lay the responsibility on someone else... you men,forget not that you are responsible; that as voters
It was your business ... the most cowardly thing that
men ever did was when they tied women's hands and
left them to be food for the flames.^"
Only a handful of the dead Triangle Company workers
had been union members. Nevertheless, Local 25 officials
were shocked and enraged as the events surrounding the
fire were made public. With the WTUL, they arranged for
the funerals of the victims, took part in public meetings
demanding reform, and discussed with the press Blanck and
Harris' criminal lack of concern for the safety of their
employees
.
The leaders of the ILGWU also called for action on
the part of government officials at all levels as they
publicly mourned the dead workers. John Dyche advised
workers in the ILGWU to refuse to work if they knew that
dangerous conditions existed at their places of
employment . -^-^ He failed, however, to indicate the means
factory women should utilize to support themselves and
their families if they followed his advice.
Samuel Gompers expressed the outrage of the American
Federation of Labor by penning an angry and accusatory
article for the American Federat ionist . He complained of
the lax enforcement of existing factory laws and laid the
blame for this regrettable circumstance on clothing
manufacturers who either bribed crooked officeholders or
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took advantage of the incompetence of inspectors. He
ignored, however, both the lack of concern his union had
displayed toward women workers in the past and his own
efforts to block the passage of protective legislation
that might have safeguarded the Triangle employees and
other women working in factories.
Even manufacturers expressed a desire for more
stringent enforcement of existing regulations and, if
necessary, the passage of new legislation. L. J.
Horowitz, President of Thompson-Starret Company, publicly
called for mandatory sprinkler systems and fire drills in
garment factories. Members of the Merchants'
Association wrote a letter to Mayor Gaynor complaining of
the diffusion of authority in regard to the enforcement of
fire prevention regulations. They insisted that problems
in local factories could be traced to the existing
confusion and maintained that they, as an organization,
had always encouraged the formation of a Fire Prevention
Bureau. Nevertheless, on the same day, the Protective
League of Property Owners in New York City complained that
sprinkler systems were cumbersome and costly. It
expressed the hope that the Triangle Fire would not be
used as a weapon to force businessmen to install such
apparatus. Both points seemed to confirm the claim of
one socialist that the organization's main purpose was
"smoothing over city ordinances detrimental of factory
owners' interests ."
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On the evening of March 31st, the Business Men's
Group of the Society for Ethical Culture met. The topic
of their discussion was "The Safety of Life in Factories."
Among the evening's speakers was H. J. Porter, the
industrial engineer and fire expert who again, as he had
many times in the past, spoke in favor of regular fire
drills in New York City's factories, advice that had
previously been regularly disregarded by members of his
audience. Another speaker, progressive reformer of Dr.
Felix Adler, called for stronger enforcement of existing
laws .
Forgetfulness is our weakness. We must strike while
the iron is hot. Don't just pass new laws and
ordinances. We do that every year but then fail to
enforce them. We must press for a steadfast
enforcement of the laws.^'^
The point was perhaps well taken, except that it ignored
the way members of his audience had, over the years,
bribed factory inspectors so that they could ignore
factory safety laws.
The New York Civic Federation, reacting to the furor
over the Triangle Fire, publicized the fact that it had
been working for several months on formulating a new model
safety act that placed great emphasis on prevention
.
At the same time, the National Civic Federation met to
discuss implications of the fire and frankly admitted that
for several leading American manufacturers, the welfare of
their employees was secondary to their profits and
investments.^^ It also asked the public to consider that
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New York State, which contained more factories than any
other state, had seventy- five inspectors employed by the
Department of Game to protect its animal resources but
only fifty inspectors in the State Department of Labor to
oversee working conditions for those toiling in the
state's factories. ^°
The manufacturers were sensitive to mounting public
censure of them, and they were increasingly aware that
labor unrest and the lack of rationalized procedures in
this industry placed them at a clear disadvantage in their
efforts to deal with competition from the small,
fly-by-night businesses setting up garment -making shops in
New York City.^^ They realized that they would have to
make some concessions to their employees. Furthermore,
they understood that if they failed to cooperate with
those formulating reform measures, they would lose their
opportunity to restrict the scope of the new laws and
regulations and would likely have even more stringent
ordinances forced on them. With this in mind,
manufacturers made little effort to justify their behavior
and together mustered up a joint, if subdued, mea culpa .
Perhaps, however, their genuine reaction to the Triangle
Fire and the circumstances that had caused it can be
discerned by noting that on the day that Blanck and Harris
were acquitted, several members of the Manufacturers'
Association waited in the lobby of the Municipal Building
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to congratulate the Triangle owners on the decision of the
j ury . ^^
The commitment of the business community to the cause
of reform can be questioned on other grounds as well.
While the trial of the Triangle owners was in progress,
newspaper reports indicated that two of the City's
clothing manufacturers were arrested, tried, and found
guilty of locking their factory doors during working
hours. Isaac Feldmen, whose business establishment was
located at 60 University Place, not far from the site of
the Washington Place fire, was fined fifty dollars.
Morris Sautlifer, from Cherry Street, was fined
twenty- five dollars. Judge Mclnerny sternly lectured the
two businessmen standing before him in Special Sessions
Court on December 13th. "Violations of this law," he
stated, "must stop or the lives of employees are not safe.
A second offense will mean imprisonment for you."^^
Progressive reformers also raised their voices to
denounce past ineffective attempts to safeguard workers
and to encourage more effective efforts in the future.
The City Federation of Women's Clubs reminded New Yorkers
that they had encouraged the establishment of mandatory
fire drills in the City's factories a year ago. They had
tried in vain to force the City's aldermen to pass an
ordinance to that effect and were rebuffed. Ida Rauh, a
member and a field worker for the WTUL, told of her
frustration while trying to force the mayor and the
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Building Department to take action against known firetraps
in New York City after the Newark fire.^^ Meeting with
indifference from these officials, they had turned in
another direction. They had only recently succeeded in
having a bill introduced in the state legislature making
fire drills compulsory in factories.
Religious leaders, addressing their congregations
from the pulpits of New York City churches and synagogues,
also voiced concern, but in many cases their previous
deeds did not seem as strong as their present words.
Although several Jewish rabbis, chief among them Stephen
Wise, had for several years called upon the community to
heed the wretched circumstances in which the
recently-arrived immigrants lived and worked, the emphasis
in Judaism was placed on individual acts of charity rather
than on cooperative attempts to eliminate the causes of
the poverty afflicting the immigrant poor.^^ After the
fire, however. Rabbi Wise led his congregation in mourning
the dead and called on the city to demand reforms.
The disaster was not the deed of God but the greed of
man. This was no inevitable disaster which could not
be foreseen. Some of us foresaw it. We have laws
that in a crisis we find are no laws, and we have
enforcement that when the hour of trial comes we find
is no enforcement. Let us lift up the industrial
standards until they will bear inspection.^''
Other religious leaders joined Rabbi Wise in calling
for a comprehensive program of labor legislation, even
though their concern in the past for such problems was
hardly noteworthy. Before the Progressive Era there had
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been a noticeable silence on the part of many Protestant
clergy in regard to working-class issues. Many Protestant
men of the cloth, ministering to their congregations, had
long been unsympathetic to the plight of the
poverty-stricken immigrants, judging them to be unwelcome
members of other religious groups. After 1908, however,
the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America
pledged its efforts to promote its efforts to promote a
new Social Gospel. A primary component of its program of
social justice was a pledge to enhance the security and
well-being of industrial workers. In the days
immediately after the fire, Protestant Bishop David H.
Greer added his voice to those denouncing the system that
had permitted the Triangle Fire to happen. Mindful of his
church's commitment to the mandates of the Social Gospel
and aware of his coreligionists' previous neglect of the
plight of the immigrants masses, the bishop stated:
This calamity causes racial differences to be
forgotten for at least a little while and the whole
community rises to one common brotherhood. One thing
is sure. Hereafter the laws as to fire protection
must be enforced not for a few weeks or a few months
but for all time, faithfully, continuously and
effectively. If this is not done the
responsibility- -the sin--is on the public, on us.^^
Catholics, until the last decade of the nineteenth
century, had followed their church's ancient belief that
there would be little to gain in trying to affect change
in men's social condition since earthly existence was
meant to be a time of travail. Catholic clergy had
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usually ignored social problems, enjoining their
congregations to "offer up" their daily tribulations in
atonement for their sins. Their reward would be a
heavenly eternity. To this long-accepted tenet of
Catholicism was added the Church's determination to
deflect some measure of the uncomfortable resentment
leveled at it from its Protestant neighbors, who
controlled the communities in which it was attempting to
establish itself. If this meant ignoring abuses in
American society and giving government at all levels their
unqualified support, so be it.^°
In 1891 Pope Leo XIII promulgated his encyclical
Rerum Novarum
, denouncing the "very rich men who have been
able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little
better than slavery itself." He reminded businessmen that
"they were their brothers' keepers" and suggested that
workingmen form labor unions and even political parties
under the auspices of the Church in order to protect
themselves from the abuses of greedy capitalists. The
Pope had been inspired to promulgate this landmark epistle
by the appeals of James Gibbons, an American cardinal.
Gibbons was concerned that the number of Catholics for
whom he was responsible had increased from six million to
ten million in the last twenty years. These newcomers,
mostly working-class immigrants, had moved into the
tenements of the country's major cities and were working
for pitiful wages in dangerous industrial concerns.
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Mindful of the Pope's directives, individual members
of the Catholic clergy began to emerge as progressive
reformers and critics of the existing social order.
Outstanding among them was Father John A. Ryan, later
Monsignor Ryan, who became a spokesman for reform. In
1906 he wrote A Living Wage and later even flirted with
communism as he confronted the unwillingness of government
officials in the United States to address the problems of
oppressed Americans
. Another progressive
representative of the American Catholic hierarchy was
Monsignor William J. White, the Director of Charities for
the Diocese of Brooklyn. After the Triangle Fire, joining
his voice to that of the Jewish and Protestant clergy.
White warned that in the United States
we have allowed a contradiction to grow up between
our economic and our spiritual ideals; we have put
property rights above life.
The workers have a right to life and it comes before
our right to the ease and luxury that flow to the
community through the production of the wage earners.
But industrial salvation must come from the working
class itself, through its labor unions.
On Sunday April 2nd, these clergymen attended a mass
meeting organized by the Citizens' Committee of Public
Safety, a diverse group of twenty- five prominent citizens
of New York City working in conjunction with the WTUL.
The meeting was held at the Metropolitan Opera House.
Several of those serving on the committee as well as
union, political , and religious leaders were invited to
present their views regarding the evils that had caused
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the Triangle Fire and were still threatening the safety of
the City's factory workers. The Opera House was filled to
capacity. Well-to-to West Side residents sat near the
orchestra section, while those from the East Side filled
the galleries. The religious leaders and the learned
academics who addressed the audience urged that a
permanent citizens' committee be created to advocate
protective legislation and to monitor the enforcement of
existing laws. The West Siders in the audience agreed
with their suggestion, but the socialists, the union
members, and the East Siders who were present disrupted
the speeches with shouts and hisses. They argued that in
the past similar citizens' committees, despite their good
intentions, had failed to produce needed changes. They
contended that the only way to achieve reform was through
working-class militancy. They further insisted that
unions be given the authority to make necessary
inspections.^^ Rose Schneiderman, although affiliated
with the WTUL reformers, was a socialist and a former
garment worker who had been almost traumatized by the
Triangle Fire. She made a moving and influential speech
in which she agreed with the East Siders, arguing that "it
is up to the working people to save themselves ... by a
strong working class movement. "^^
In spite of Schneiderman' s eloquence, the assembled
group with only partial agreement, adopted a resolution
urging the state legislature to create a Bureau of Fire
Prevention and to a appointed a permanent citizens'
committee to obtain new legislation and stronger
enforcement. The resolution was immediately forwarded to
both the governor and the state legislature.
While state officials were pressed to act without
further delay, municipal officials, conscious of public
outrage and anxious to absolve themselves of blame, made
haphazard and disjointed initial efforts to remedy their
past deficiencies. Mindful that the community's attention
was focused on the funerals planned for the fire victims,
aware that generous contributions were being solicited for
the destitute families of those killed in the fire, and
sensitive to public interest in the preliminary hearings
being conducted by the district attorney's office
regarding the feasibility of indicting Max Blanck and
Isaac Harris, members of the City's government, with
little enthusiasm and in no apparent haste, decided to
act. Alderman discussed the implications of the
Washington Place fire at their weekly meeting just three
days after the fire. They aid the victims' families and
called on the Charities Committee to make cemetery plots
available for the unidentified dead. After dealing with
these minor issues, they then passed a resolution
requesting the Law and Legislative Committee to
investigate the advisability of establishing an ordinance
to make fire drills compulsory in factory buildings like
the Asch building.^''
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Landlords all over the City, determined to escape the
odium being heaped on Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, acted
more expeditiously than did the city government and busied
themselves repairing faulty fire escapes and adding
ladders to those that failed to reach ground level. ^«
Building and Tenement inspectors suddenly displayed a
commitment to their duties previously unnoticed. By March
31st they had hauled sixty-four individuals charged with
violations of the City Building Code into court.
Forty- four of those violators were factory owners. Judges
began viewing these cases with a new severity, fining
those at fault $250.00 and court costs for their
transgressions
.
Local 25 called for the condemnation of lax
inspectors whose lack of concern about violations could be
traced to bribery.^" Investigations were made and Mayor
Gaynor's administration acknowledged that bribery was
indeed commonplace but emphasized that efforts were
underway to weed out those who had thus betrayed the
public trust.
The New York Society of Architects contacted the city
government, calling for uniform building requirements and
permits to be issued by all five city boroughs. They
believed that this would help to eliminate many of the
inconsistencies and confusions regarding regulations
stipulated in the Building Code . Former mayor Seth
Low, who recognized that the insurance system was one of
new
the indirect causes of the fire, called for
regulations for the insurance industry.
The Fire Department administrators met to discuss the
inadequacies that left them unable to deal with the
Triangle blaze. Their extension ladders reached no higher
than the sixth floor of the skyscrapers, and their nets
were inadequate to save those jumping from great heights.
They were aware that the firemen who responded to the
alarm on March 25th did not even have axes with them and
had to break down doors by kicking them in.^^ They
called once more for a strengthening of the City Building
Code and demanded an end to the confusion over inspection
and enforcement of fire protection regulations."^
In the midst of the proposals being suggested to
accomplish reform and the internal investigations being
conducted to determine deficiencies, little attention was
given to a notice placed on the Asch building two days
after the fire, warning those who passed by that the
building was no longer considered safe. Nor were many
concerned that even while the debris from the fire was
being cleared away from the Washington Place site, a
building permit was obtained to refurbish the structure.
The permit called for the Asch Building to be restored to
its previous condition; no improvements, no changes to
ensure safety would be undertaken . ''^ A notice was also
placed in trade papers just a few days after the fire by
the Triangle Company advertising for workers for their
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business establishment, newly located at 5-7-9 University
Place on the top floor of a six-floor building. Alerted
to the reestablishment of the company, officials from the
Building Department arrived to inspect the premises and
found that the building was not fireproof, had no fire
escapes, and lacked adequate exits. Furthermore, inside
the factory machines were crammed together so closely that
workers were unable to stand without disturbing those
seated behind them. The Triangle partners, facing
indictment and a public appalled at the holocaust that had
occurred in their former place of business, assumed they
could return to business as usual. The authorities
intervened and stopped work at the factory until
violations of the law could be corrected.^''
In the weeks, months, and years following the
Triangle Fire, the clamor for reform made itself heard
from all sectors of the community. At the municipal
level, however, efforts to effect necessary changes were
sporadic, lacked any coordination, and were too often
criticized by those who called for modifications of
existing regulations and statutes rather than passage of
the new and radical changes being suggested. The ILGWU,
with a membership that was largely socialist but led by
officials whose views were akin to those of Samuel
Gompers, was locked in an internal struggle for power and
was thus unable or unwilling to focus efforts on
formulating clear proposals. In order to obtain
ces
undisputed control of their union, John Dyche and Abe
Rosenberg fought to centralize authority in their offi
Denouncing the autonomy of local unions which, they
claimed, crippled the central union and intensified its
financial woes, they blamed "those warbling for the class
war."^« as being responsible for the union's lack of
power. At their conventions, held every other year, they
requested authority to decide on when to initiate strikes
and called for a significant increase in funds sent to the
General Office by locals so that they, and not the locals,
could dispense strike benefits. Dyche 's and Rosenberg's
proposals proved unpalatable to the delegates at their
conventions and were consistently voted down."*^
Even though Dyche and Rosenberg continued to
disparage the idea of organizing women, Local 25 joined
with other organizers from other garment workers' locals
to endorse the unionization of women workers who, after
the Triangle Fire, showed a growing interest in the ILGWU.
Local 25 lent a modicum of assistance to the WTUL during
the summer and autumn of 1911 in their struggle to educate
workers about the need to unionize and about the laws that
existed to protect them in the workplace.^" They
assisted members of the WTUL who met with young girls in
street corner meetings and as they left their places of
employment in order to explain what they should do if
their employers were ignoring protective legislation
.
Rose Schneiderman, Pauline Newman, and other union
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organizers worked tirelessly to strengthen the union
presence in small shops in the garment district and to
fight employers' efforts to decrease wages and to subvert
growing union influence."
In spite of Local 25 's enthusiastic efforts to
increase their membership, the ILGWU officials continued
to indicate their uneasiness about the activities of the
shirtwaist makers' local. The officials of Local 25
recognized that many of the ILGWU' s criticisms were valid
The financial situation of their organization was indeed
precarious. It was usually in debt to the ILGWU and had
failed to pay assessments levied on it to support strikes
elsewhere. The seating of Local 25 's delegates at ILGWU
conventions was often questioned and debated because of
their indebtedness." What is more, the number of those
enrolled in their local had decreased considerably since
their glory days in 1909-1910. They had tried various
expedients to increase their membership with little
success. Believing that the most promising way to
rebuild their organization was through the enthusiasm
generated by a general strike, they continually asked the
ILGWU to support them with the sort of financial backing
given other locals. Without such support, they realized,
they would be unable to risk a strike.
Although the ILGWU had refused to endorse earlier
strike plans made by Local 25 with statements about the
local's depleted treasury, in 1912 they reluctantly
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endorsed a general strike that would include not only the
Ladies Waist and Dressmakers' Union (Local 25) but also
the Cutters' Union, the Wrapper and Kimono Union, and the
Whitegoods and Underwear Union."
The Shirtwaist Manufacturers' Association,
representing 60% of the businesses in the trade, was at
that time increasingly concerned with the escalating
numbers of small competing firms springing up in its
industry and was reluctant to become involved in a new
wave of worker protest. The manufacturers signified their
willingness to negotiate in order to avoid the anticipated
strike. A series of conferences was held in order to
reach some agreement. In addition to representatives from
the business firms, those in attendance included delegates
from the locals involved, the ILGWU, and the Federation.
Gompers himself was often present.
The manufacturers argued that their employees
included only one-third of the workers in the trade and
that they would be placed at a distinct disadvantage if
forced to come to terms with the union while employers of
small, unorganized shops were under no compulsion to meet
the union's demands. They indicated their readiness to
come to terms if unorganized workers employed by the
competitors could be unionized. A deal was worked out
with the manufacturers. Recognizing that employees had
always hastened to seek union affiliation in the heat of a
newly-called walkout, both sides agreed that an
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industry-wide strike would begin on January 15, 1913.
Workers from the entire industry, ninety percent of them
women, responded. As planned, the entire trade was tied
up. Within a short time, the strike produced both a surge
in union membership and the demise of some of the poorly
established shops. At that point the Manufacturers'
Association and the union's executive board reached a
collective agreement that resembled in most particulars
the Protocol established in 1910 in the cloak industry.
It had been structured under the guidance of Louis
Brandeis, the Boston attorney who had previously assisted
in settling labor agreements in that city.^^
The Protocol of 1913, like the cloakmakers' earlier
agreement, established the "preferential shop" and set up
a Board of Grievances and a Board of Arbitration to handle
industry disputes. Controversies between labor and
management would be submitted to the Board of Grievances,
composed of five representatives from the Manufacturers'
Association and five from the union. If these mediators
were unable to negotiate a resolution of the problem, it
would be referred to the Board of Arbitration for
settlement. No strike would be undertaken until disputes
were first considered by both bodies.^"
The Protocol also established a Joint Board of
Sanitary Control that was charged with establishing
standards of acceptable workplace conditions and with
enforcing those standards within the industry. In
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addition, a union label for garments was adopted to
certify that they had been manufactured under conditions
approved by the union. Unique to the Waistmakers'
Protocol was a stipulation providing for a Wage-Scale
Board to act as a court of appeals in wage disputes. This
board, which included four members from the Manufacturers'
Association and four from the union/^ did not, however,
have jurisdiction over piece rates which were to be set in
individual shops after negotiations between employers and
a "price committee" of workers."
The American Federation of Labor assured the ILGWU of
its endorsement of the Protocol, and Gompers indicated his
approval by signing the agreement for the Federation."
Initially the Protocol met the optimistic expectations of
both the union and the manufacturers. It brought a
measure of peace and economic order to the industry,
although work stoppages and other evidence of the endemic
instability in the industry continued during the
Protocol's first year." The larger manufacturers were,
nevertheless, appreciative of the agreement because it
succeeded in driving small cut-rate competitors out of
business." At the same time, they were far from
satisfied with the arbitration procedures, since questions
brought before the Board of Arbitration were usually
decided in favor of the workers. The employees were far
more satisfied with the decisions rendered by the Board of
Grievances," although the unions, while approving the
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arbitration procedure and satisfied with the preliminary
benefits of the Protocol agreement, complained about the
dilatory procedures employed by the Board of
Grievances
.
^"^
The agreement of 1913 was revised in 1916 and expired
in 1919. Between 1913 and 1919, the union label was
never utilized, and the Wage-Scale Board soon died off.
Although an attempt was made to substitute another
procedure to negotiate wage agreements, it also failed.
Gradually, the preferential shop, initially so important
to the employers, evolved into the closed shop." The
Joint Board of Sanitary Control, however, took significant
steps toward improving working conditions in the seven
hundred dress and waist factories, employing approximately
36,868 workers, that fell under its jurisdiction.'" six
months after initiating a program of inspections, the
Joint Board of Sanitary Control, with the cooperation of
the Manufacturers' Association, was able to report
impressive progress in reducing the danger of fire and
improving sanitation and lighting in dress and waist
factories.'^ Nevertheless, 17.42% of the workers in the
industry were still employed in shops that had resisted
efforts to reform. Moreover, the movement of some shops
out of the area and the entry of new businesses with
glaring defects into the districts under the Joint Board's
province left the goals of the reformers far from being
realized. '''^
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The City of New York also initiated some reforms
after the Washington Square tragedy. Foremost among these
efforts was the Sullivan-Hoey Act approved by the City
Board of Aldermen in October 1911. The Act established a
Bureau of Fire Prevention and, in keeping with the
requests of Fire Chief Edward Croker, ended the confusion
about which departments were responsible for the
investigation of violations and the enforcement of the
City's fire laws and ordinances. it stipulated that it
was the duty of the city's superintendent of buildings to
put the owners or proprietors of defective structures on
notice that violations of the City's Building Code had
been noted on their premises."
Urged on by the City's reform element in the years
immediately succeeding the Triangle Fire, the Board of
Aldermen gradually adopted changes to the Municipal
Building Code that provided increased protection for
factory workers. All newly-constructed buildings housing
factories and workshops had to be fireproof and contain
windows, doors, and trim that could pass a specifically
prescribed fireproof test.^" For older buildings that
were not fireproof, regulations were imposed mandating,
among other stipulations, fireproof construction of
enclosed stairwells with fire partitions continuous from
the foundation to the roof.''^ Buildings more than
eighty-five feet in height had to have at least one
interior stairway contained in a firetower constructed of
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brick or concrete at least eight inches thick, with doors
to the firetower from outside balconies or from fireproof
vestibules
.
'^^
Owners and proprietors of all buildings where large
numbers of people were employed were required to install
fire alarms, fire extinguishers, fire doors, adequate fire
hoses, and other means of preventing and extinguishing
fires." Factories were further required to store
combustible fibers and wooden packing boxes in areas
protected with fire retardant material and in a manner
approved by the fire commissioner. Excelsior, sawdust,
paper, and waste materials had to be removed from the
premises each day, although the fire commissioner was
empowered to modify or waive regulations if he felt that
individual situations required such modifications. An
anti-smoking code forbidding all smoking of any kind and
at any time on the premises of a factory building was
reaffirmed by the Alderman.''^
These local measures, limited in scope though they
were, convinced many of the citizens that their collective
conscience, uneasy in the wake of the Triangle Fire, had
been appeased. However, New Yorkers of a more progressive
persuasion remained unsatisfied. They believed that
meaningful reform could best be mandated at the state
level, and, with this in mind, they took their reform
campaign to the State House in Albany.
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CHAPTER VII
STATE INDUSTRIAL REFORM
AFTER
THE TRIANGLE FIRE
Those who recognized the urgent need for industrial
reform after the Triangle Fire realized that protective
laws would have to be passed at the state and not just the
municipal level. Accordingly, the New York City Committee
on Public Safety was formed to bring concern about reform
to the attention of the governor of New York State. The
committee was comprised of twenty- five prominent citizens,
among them Anne Morgan, Mary Dreier, Rabbi Stephen Wise
and Amos Pinchot
.
It was chaired by Henry Morgenthau,^
and Frances Perkins was its secretary. The members
contacted Governor John A. Dix, who suggested that they
consult with the leaders of the state legislature about
the most effective means of pursuing the passage of
protective laws.
The Committee on Public Safety had initially wanted
to avoid involving the legislature, since it feared that
the issue might be used as a political football, and had
hoped the governor would appoint a commission of
influential people from across the state that would be
financed by executive funds or solicited public donations.
However, the committee was convinced by Assemblyman Alfred
E. Smith to forgo its original plan and accept a
legislative commission whose membership would include
mostly senators and assemblymen and that would be financed
by legislative appropriations. Such a body, Smith argued,
would have considerably more power, and its efforts would
be more likely to lead to statutory accomplishments
because of the involvement of key legislators in the
preliminary process.^
Senate Majority Leader Robert F. Wagner concurred
with Smith's suggestion, and, with the New York City
committee's approval, its state representatives submitted
the Wagner-Smith Resolution to the legislature.^ In
response, on June 30, 1911, that body, created
a factory commission to investigate the conditions
under which manufacturing is carried on in cities ofthe first and second degrees in this state.
^
It was stipulated that two state senators, three
assemblymen, and four private citizens would serve on the
commission. The president of the senate appointed Senator
Wagner to serve as chairman and Senator Charles M.
Hamilton as a member, and the speaker of the assembly
appointed Al Smith to serve as vice chairman and Edward D.
Jackson and Cyrus W. Phillips as members. From the
private sector. Governor Dix appointed Simon Brentano, a
New York City publisher, Robert E. Dowling, a realtor from
the same city,^ Samuel Gompers, and Mary E. Dreier,
President of the Women's Trade Union League and the only
woman to serve on the Factory Investigating Commission.
The legislature appropriated the inadequate sum of
$10,000 to cover the initial expenses of the commission.
Senator Wagner and Assemblyman Smith complained to
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Morgenthau about the meager allotment, and the Chairman of
the Committee on Public Safety promised to engage a group
of experts who would agree to assist the commission
without compensation. The commissioners themselves served
without pay.^
The charge given the Factory Investigating Commission
by the legislature was sweeping in nature. The
commissioners were directed to
recommend such new legislation as might be found
necessary to remedy defects in existing legislation
and to provide for conditions at present unregulated.
They were instructed to investigate and suggestlegislative measures in regard to
hours of labor, safety, ventilation, sanitation,
occupational disease, tenement house manufacture,
wages, defects in existing legislation, and the
extent of the enforcement of existing laws.''
It should be noted that the object of their investigation
would not be just the problems of women workers but of
industrial workers of both genders.^
The appointment of this commission was the first
comprehensive attempt to investigate the waste of the
human life in our modern industrial system, and to
endeavor to devise means to prevent such a
sacrifice
. . .
^
The commission was given all the powers held by any
legislative committee. It was able to compel the
attendance of witnesses and the surrender of requested
books, pamphlets, and other evidence. It was also
required to submit a preliminary report to the legislature
no later than February 15, 1912.^°
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The commission chose Abram I. Elkus to serve as chief
consul and Bernard L. Shientag to assist him. Dr. George
M. Price, an experienced New York City physician, was
engaged to superintend the work of inspection, while
several advisors, individuals with distinguished
credentials, agreed to assist with their help when called
on H. F. J. Porter, the mechanical engineer whose
specialty was fire prevention, and Dr. Henry Moskowitz, a
member of the Ethical Culture Society and a staff member
at the Madison Street Settlement House, were two such
experts. Frances Perkins, Secretary of the New York City
Committee on Public Safety and also Secretary of the New
York Consumers' League, was hired as one of the
investigators for the commission. Most of the work done
by these individuals was done without compensation.
The work of the commission began immediately and with
great energy and commitment. Public hearings were held in
industrial cities throughout the state. Between October
10th and December 21st, 1911, over 3000 pages of testimony
were taken from 222 witnesses in 22 different sessions.
These witnesses were from diverse backgrounds and
occupations.^^ During the eight hearings held in New
York City, several persons who had been connected to the
Triangle Fire and the subsequent investigations testified
about industrial conditions in the factories of the City,
among them Leonora O'Reilly, Rose Schneiderman, Henry
Morgenthau, and ex-Fire Chief Edward Croker, who had
resigned his position a month after the Washington Square
tragedy to head a fire prevention company.
Beginning with specific testimony about the fire at
the Asch Building, the commission expanded its inquiry to
include deficiencies that existed in all types of
factories throughout the entire state. Teams of
inspectors were dispatched to nine New York cities to
examine conditions in 1,836 factories in a total of 20
different industries. Establishments involved in the
manufacture of clothing were inspected but also businesses
that made paper boxes, artificial flowers, tobacco
products, candy, and other items.
Frances Perkins, who was responsible for arranging
tours of inspection for those affiliated with the
commission, often invited Al Smith and Robert Wagner and
other commissioners to accompany the inspection teams.
The two legislators, at first glance, seemed poor choices
to serve as members of this team of reformers. Although
they both came from lower-middle-class families and New
York City districts, they had long been associated with
Tammany Hall and its political interests. Called the
"Tammany Twins," Wagner and Smith were proteges of Charles
Francis Murphy, the enigmatic Tammany chieftain who, more
than anyone, was responsible for reshaping the interests
and direction of the New York City machine during the
progressive era.
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Charlie Murphy had emerged as the head of Tammany
Hall in 1902, shortly after that position had been
abdicated by Richard Croker, the last of the old-time
Tammany sachems. Murphy had assumed the position at a
precarious time in the history of both the New York State
Democracy and Tammany Hall itself. Croker and his
predecessors had blatantly used their formidable powers to
determine elections, distribute patronage to Tammany
favorites, and enrich themselves. Few of Tammany's
critics acknowledged or appreciated the organization's
efforts to look after new York City's impoverished
immigrants population and to help them adapt to life in
the United States. Instead, progressive reformers
attacked the machine's corruption and its arrogance. They
were loud in their denunciations of Tammany's connections
with the city's vice and gambling interests and held it
responsible for the bribery and corruption of public
officials
.
When Murphy assumed command of Tammany Hall, the
Wigwam was being battered from all sides. Many of the
progressive reformers' efforts were coming to fruition.
New laws were restricting Tammany's traditional prowess in
stealing election. Many of the jobs that had previously
been distributed by the bosses were falling under the
purview of civil service. Republican critics and members
of the Democratic party who wished to distance themselves
from the odium of Tammany graft were publicizing the
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consequences of corrupt political leadership. m 1903,
New York City voters had turned out the Tammany incumbent,
Mayor Robert Van Wyck, in favor of Republican progressive
Seth Low, a mugwump who had attempted, with little
success, to institute reform measures. In Albany a
reform-minded Republican, Charles Evans Hughes, was
winning adherents to the ideal of progressive reform,
while at the national level a popular politician who was a
critic of political machines had inherited the executive
office
.
Murphy, faced with these formidable obstacles to the
well-being and prosperity of Tammany Hall, recognized the
need to set a new direction for the organization. It also
appears probable that he was blessed with something of a
social conscience." He pulled the Hall out of the
prostitution business and attempted to limit its
involvements with blackmail and illegal saloons. He
did not, however, receive much public acclaim for his
efforts. After the appearance of publisher William
Randolph Hearst in city politics in 1905, Murphy found
himself in an even more vulnerable position. Hearst, a
maverick Democrat, had established the Municipal Ownership
League, an organization that pushed for public ownership
of utilities and public transportation facilities. He
attacked those individuals who, like Boss Murphy, did not
accept his views.
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Although Murphy never turned down "honest graft" when
it was available and did his best to keep control of
patronage, he did continue his efforts to clean up Tammany
Hall. He began to support new, younger men at the Hall
who had not been tarnished by association with the Croker
regime, and, at the same time, he directed Tammany
politicians to support passage of progressive social
legislation, especially legislation that would benefit the
lower classes.
Up until this point, the Wigwam had been notoriously
indifferent to the need for any type of social welfare
legislation. Before 1910 neither Smith nor Wagner had
ever displayed any concern about factory or sweatshop
conditions, despite the fact that they represented
districts where abuses were common. Both men were largely
dependent on Murphy for their seats in the legislature and
knew little of the daily trials their constitutents had to
endure.^'' Frances Perkins, accompanying them on factory
investigations throughout the state, made sure that the
Tammany politicians experienced such adventures as
personally crawling through the tiny hole in the wall
that gave egress to a steep iron ladder covered with
ice and ending twelve feet from the ground which was
labeled "fire escape!"
Their education while members of the Factory Investigating
Commission changed their political vision. Although they
retained their affiliation with Tammany Hall, both became
supporters of social welfare legislation. Historian
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Richard Hofstadter has singled out Smith as "the first
effectual bridge between the humanity of the reformers and
the humanity of the bosses... a development that was to
reach its peak under Franklin D. Roosevelt Many
years later, however, Edward J. Flynn, a Democratic
politician from the Bronx during the days when "Murphy's
boys" were powers to be reckoned with in Albany, told
historians "to remember that none of the progressive
legislation from the State House could have been passed
unless. (Charles Murphy) urged it and permitted it to be
passed . "^°
With Tammany's blessing. Smith, Wagner, and their
colleagues collected pertinent facts. The commission then
evaluated and analyzed the information. Professor John R.
Commons, a labor economist at the University of Wisconsin
and a member of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission,
traveled to New York City to assist the commissioners in
collating the mass of material and preparing a report for
the state legislature.^^ So overwhelming was their task
that they were compelled to request an extension of the
time initially allowed them, and their preliminary report
was not turned in until March 1, 1912.
In preparing their recommendations, the members of
the Factory Investigating Commission had to consider the
reaction they would receive not only from the legislators
but from progressive reformers, socialists, organized
labor, the business community, and the general public.
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unfortunately, the interests and needs of these groups
were diverse, and there was frequently division even
within the groups themselves. Most progressive reformers
had few reservations about granting regulatory powers to
government at any level, and they were especially
interested in the treatment of women workers who were
forced to labor under exploitative and dangerous
conditions. Members of the New York City Consumers'
League and the National Consumers' League, staff members
from various area settlement houses, and other progressive
reform groups all described to the commission health
hazards endured by women factory workers, and, influenced
by the arguments that Louis Brandeis and Josephine
Goldmark had presented to the United States Supreme Court
in 1908 in a successful effort to persuade the justices to
uphold a ten hour law for women, they urged the commission
to make mandatory protective legislation for women a
reality
.
Members of the suffrage movement, however, gave only
lukewarm support to the call for protective legislation.
Harriot Stanton Blatch had assumed leadership of the
movement in 1910, beginning a period of concentrated
national effort toward the achievement of suffrage
equality for women. Though the members of the suffrage
movement were not, of course, opposed to protective labor
legislation for the benefit of women, they simply saw it
as a secondary goal
. They assumed that once women were
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granted suffrage equality, the needed statutes would, in
time, be passed in state legislatures throughout the
nation
.
This less-than-enthusiastic support from the
suffragists, however, helped divide the energies of the
Women's Trade Union League. That organization, often torn
by internal differences because of its diverse membership,
was again locked in disagreement over the issue of
protective legislation. The allies who had founded the
League and were its primary source of financial support
were all upper- and middle-class women who generally
supported feminist concerns, and most of them shared the
goals of the suffragists. Some, however, wanted to focus
solely on efforts to realize protective legislation as did
the working-class women destined to become a driving force
in the organization, who had little interest in the
suffrage movement but worked enthusiastically for
protective legislation. Socialists members of the WTUL,
whether allies or working-class women, were also critical
of efforts on behalf of suffrage. They argued that energy
would be better spent supporting the socialist program to
affect crucial changes in the nation's economic system.
To do otherwise, they claimed was to act the part of a
"bad doctor who pretends to cure his patient by removing
the symptoms instead of removing the disease itself."^''
They were also critical of the WTUL's continued
affiliation with the American Federation of Labor.
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Fortunately, the WTUL included members who were able
to work with all factions in the organization. Rose
Schneiderman was such a person. Although she was a
socialist when she began her long association with the
WTUL, she moved nearer to trade unionism after becoming a
member of the League. Often angered and disillusioned by
the indifference of Gompers and the AFL and by the
conservatism of John Dyche during his leadership of the
ILGWU, after the Triangle Fire she began to call for
protective legislation to improve working conditions for
women. 2^ At the same time, she participated
enthusiastically in the suffrage movement. She was
respected by both feminist and working women, by the
socialists and the supporters of the AFL. She and others
like her worked hard to promote the passage of protective
legislation but at the same time called for voting rights
for women. She argued that women had to have the vote in
order to ensure their continued protection under the law.
Acting as a liaison among the various factions, she
attempted to explain to the allies the position of working
women and why the constant tensions, the deprivations, and
the injustices in their everyday lives required them to
give priority to immediate problems rather than to focus
on long-range remedies, laudable though they might be.
Under the influence of Schneiderman and Mary Dreier,
the New York WTUL president and a member of the Factory
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Investigating Commission, the WTUL eventually became one
of the most vocal champions of protective legislation for
women. The League simultaneously increased its efforts on
behalf of women's suffrage while directing an increased
amount of the organization's resources and energies to
lobbying in the state legislature for laws that would
benefit working women. At the same time, the WTUL
moved further away from its original emphasis on trade
unionism as a solution to the problems faced by exploited
women factory workers.
Nevertheless, progressive reform organizations such
as the WTUL were viewed with suspicion by some working
women, who resented and objected to protective
legislation. They feared that regulatory laws were
intended either to prevent women from competing with men
for jobs with improved status or to keep women in
low- income positions. Women who were the sole support of
their families argued that they had to work long hours in
taxing positions in order to earn the money necessary to
meet their obligations. While the progressives
sympathized with the plight of these women, they felt that
these few workers might have to sacrifice their interests
for the benefit of the whole of the female work force then
and in the future.^''
Many individuals who had initially experienced horror
and outrage over the Triangle Fire had, after considering
the effects of reform on their individual interests, lost
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the original zeal for corrective actions that had filled
them in the early spring of 1911. Ideology as well as
financial considerations played a role in the waning of
concern. Within the WTUL, there was an exodus of those
members dissatisfied with the organization's new emphasis
on suffrage and the passage of protective legislation.
Foremost among them was Helen Marot, the League's
influential secretary, who resigned as early as 1913.
Although Marot was distrurbed by the attitudes of male
union leaders toward women workers, she nevertheless felt
that the best interests of women would be furthered by a
close relationship to the AFL and not by seeking the
passage of laws to protect them specifically. Even
Rose Schneiderman gradually adopted a similar position on
protective legislation. "Working women, to be equal with
men, " she wrote later, "must not ask for any kind of
protection against exploitation."^^
Several organization were lukewarm at best in
their support of protective legislation for women.
Although the socialists continued to emphasize the need of
protective legislation for both men and women, this was
viewed as a grave error by officials of the AFL, who were
only reluctantly willing to accept protective legislation
for women. The AFL stood firmly on its traditional belief
that government protection for male workers was little
better than no protection at all. Samuel Gompers continued
to oppose government protection of the eight -hour day and
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minimum wage laws for men and denounced compulsory health
insurance as "class legislation." He seldom lost a chance
to say that "social workers wanted to do something for
labor whereas labor wanted to get things done for
itself
.
"
Business leaders, who had initially charged that
the true cause of the Triangle Fire was the lack of
effective government regulation, were suddenly dragging
their feet. Uneasy, perhaps, due to new conditions in the
garment industry, they were showing increasing dismay at
the prospect of regulation or of costly employee benefits.
During the previous two or three decades, the rate of
growth in the women's garment industry had been
phenomenal. After 1909, the industry reached a point of
equilibrium where it had adjusted to the demands of the
market and the growth rate began to slow down, especially
after 1914.^^ To make things worse for the New York
business community, the effects of a recession made
themselves felt in 1914. The manufacturers and their
political allies reacted to these problems by launching
determined opposition to protective legislation. The
Republican leader of the powerful upstate bloc that fought
against labor legislation was Senator Elon Brown, who,
after the Republican take over of the New York State
legislature in 1914, became Majority Leader. Brown called
protective labor legislation "burdensome" and pledged to
prevent the passage of new laws and to repeal those laws
208
already on the books. "The state and its people must be
relieved of the vast and incalculable waste of capital and
energy resulting from laws passed in the name of the
public welfare. Senator Wagner charged in return that
"there never was a Legislature so completely owned by the
private interests" as the one controlled by Brown. Al
Smith, angered at the Republican resolve to block the
passage of further labor legislation, exploded in
frustration: "Tammany Hall is a bed of roses comparedto
the
... Republican Party of New York."^^
The arguments put forth by these adversaries of the
work of the Factory Investigating Commission were firmly
rooted in the early national experience. Always suspicious
of governmental power, Americans had replaced mercantilism
with laissez-faire capitalism as the basis of the economic
system. In the first half century of the national
existence, those individuals determining governmental
policies decided that the national wealth would be
increased if governmental interference could be minimized.
Nascent business enterprises were freed of controls
imposed on them by Washington and encouraged to develop
within a free-market system. The passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the late-nineteenth century judicial
interpretation of its "due process" clause further
reinforced this anti -regulatory feature of conservative
thought
.
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Efforts to prevent the national and state governments
from interfering with property rights were extended to
include freedom of contract, which held, in part, that
wages and other terms of employment were private matters
best determined by a free agreement made between employers
and their workers. Interference by government in such
arrangements, either through controls or regulations, was
considered a violation of the right of contract and was
firmly discouraged by the courts. It could not be
abridged unless the judiciary decided that to do so was
necessary for the maintenance of public order or the
protection of public health, safety or morals. The
earliest protective legislation was upheld by the courts
only when it was decided that the laws were a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power in these regards.
In time the courts also curtailed freedom of
contract, when proven incapacities existed on either side
of the agreement. In those cases, the court allowed
recourse to outside aid for the less substantial party,
since the latter was not able to negotiate from a position
of equality and was therefore at a disadvantage.^^ Such
individuals were, in fact, recognized to be at the mercy
of their employers when attempting to bargain. Seldom,
however, was such protection provided for women alone.
Terms of employment and legislation usually applied to
both genders on an equal basis. After the Brandeis Brief
was submitted to the Supreme Court in 1908, presenting a
convincing body of evidence proving the fragility of women
and their need for protection under the law, the states
finally began to consider intervention on women's behalf
without fear of judicial disapproval.
Other nay-sayers in pre-World War I American society
viewed protective legislation with dismay because they
feared that such "class legislation" would only bring the
United States another step closer to what they warned
would be a socialist debacle. Samuel Gompers, even while a
member of the New York State Factory Investigating
Commission, warned of this possibility. in the years
after 1914, as the United States drew closer to England
prior to our intervention in the European war, some saw
another sinister intent on the part of those working to
achieve protective legislation. Republicans such as
Frederick Davenport, who had left the GOP with Roosevelt
in 1912 but, with Roosevelt, returned after his defeat to
Taft's party, denounced protective legislation as
"Prussian. "^^ When the progressive reformers responded
to the apprehensions of their critics, their arguments
were not received with anything resembling enlightened
acceptance by men like Gompers and Davenport.
Most business interests up to the turn of the
twentieth century displayed no interest in protective
legislation for workers of either gender, and they
denounced attempts to promote such legislation on the
grounds that it would work an undue hardship on American
business. These same monied interests were equally averse
to feminist demands for suffrage, fearing that if women
were granted voting rights, they would use their new power
to ensure the passage of minimum-wage laws, protective
legislation, or "welfare laws."^^
Not all business interests, however, regarded
protective legislation for women with the same jaundiced
eye. Large corporate concerns, such as those associated
with the Civic Federation, few of which employed women
workers in any capacity, denounced industrial firms that
exploited and ill-used their employees. They quietly
suggested that these abusive firms "clean their own
houses" voluntarily. However, the Civic Federation never
actually supported the passage of protective
legislation
.
On the other hand, the National Association of
Manufacturers, after 1903, expended great efforts not only
to prevent the organization of industrial workers but also
to oppose the passage of protective legislation. During
the course of the first decade of the new century, its
position, although still unconditional, became somewhat
guarded and even covert. After the Triangle Fire, The
Monitor
, a business publication, stated that the call for
labor laws was the result of an "outcropping of hysteria."
They argued that
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Because someone locked a door in the TrianqleShirtwaist Company, someone out of 55 000 the n^h^r-
It.llLTlLl^'^.f^''^' avalanche 'or^o^Sal?^^^^
They were nevertheless more restrained in their
comments, especially in what they said about their women
and children employees, since they feared further public
condemnation. However, they claimed that employers should
not be blamed for fires and accidents in their places of
business. Such problems were the result of negligence on
the part of workers, miscalculation, fate, or the evil
behavior of a few greedy men. They argued that the demand
for protective legislation was misdirected at best and,
more to the point, placed business interests at a great
disadvantage
.
Manufacturers received little in the way of
admonition from Samuel Gompers and the officials of the
American Federation of Labor. The union and its leadership
maintained its traditional hostility to government
assistance and instead advocated voluntarism, self-help
and coercion through economic action. Gompers, an
indifferent and unconcerned member of the Factory
Investigating Commission,^" always warned that government
was not a reliable ally and could, under pressure, turn
against labor and abandon laws previously enacted. He
warned workers that they should not anticipate "at the
hands of government what they could accomplish by their
own initiative and activities." He even used Margaret
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Dreier Robins, President of the National WTUL, as an
example of someone whose initial intent was laudable but
who was misled after her involvement in politics. Sadly,
he remembered in his autobiography that when this
happened, Robins' "influence in the labor movement began
to wane.- Only the union, he argued, could be depended
upon to stand fast in support of its membership, and only
the benefits won by the union could be viewed as
permanent
.
Encouraged by the approval of their supporters, the
Factory Investigating Commission, in making its
preliminary report to the state legislature, also
recommended a slate of fifteen bills to be considered for
passage. Many of the proposals went far beyond the
correction of fire hazards in factories, which was, of
course, the commission's first charge. The proposals
addressed all types of industrial dangers, bad sanitation,
low wages, long hours, and other threats to the well-being
of workers, both male and female. The commission
recommended first that a Bureau of Fire Prevention be
established to investigate whether exits opened properly,
if fire drills were being utilized, and whether
fireproofing and automatic sprinkling systems were
installed in factories. Other bills mandated that
workrooms had to be adequately ventilated; there were
restrictions on the kind of work that could be done by
women who sought employment after childbirth; women
workers had to be guaranteed rest periods, and working
children had to have medical examinations before they
could be legally employed. The hours that women and
children could work had to be regulated. People who had
been injured on the job would, in the future, have to be
compensated.
Al Smith, serving at that time as the Democratic
Minority Leader in the Assembly, and Robert Wagner,
President Pro Tem of the Senate, worked tirelessly to win
passage of this legislation. They were consistently
oppposed by Republicans from upstate working on behalf of
farmers and cannery owners. These Republicans joined
hands with other representatives supporting industrial
interests that were primarily interested in defeating the
bill mandating employer compensation for injured
workers
.
'^^
The conservatives were successful in defeating seven
of the proposals in 1912. However, even these reform
bills were passed in the next few years, all of them
supported by progressives in a crusade led by Tammany Hall
Democrats
.
The progressive reformers, at the pinnacle of their
influence in the state and in the nation, rejoiced at
their accomplishments. They recognized, however, that the
laws passed in the 1912 session were but a first step in
the fight to realize labor reform. The legislature agreed
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and extended the time allowed the commission to complete
its work until January 15, 1913.
Several more permanent experts were appointed to the
commission's staff, including Dr. George Price and six
field inspectors. Their numbers were later augmented
periodically with the addition of selected specialists. As
the commissioners continued their investigations, they
increased the scope of their activities both
geographically and in terms of the industries into which
they inquired. During this second phase of their work, the
Factory Investigating Commission surveyed conditions in
1338 factories in forty-five cities of the state. They
continued to explore complaints that might lead to fires,
not only in the factories of New York City but in cities
throughout the state. They also investigated working
conditions in the same area, taking testimony from
employers and employees about matters such as lighting,
heating, ventilation, sanitary facilities, and the general
construction of factory buidings . They extended their
concerns to canneries, looking into conditions in almost
every cannery in the state. In addition,, they
investigated situations in the tobacco, printing, and
chemical industries, and they sent out a crew of eleven
field investigators to report on the manufacturing that
was carried on in tenement houses in New York City and in
fifteen other cities in the state.
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Political factors did not bias the deliberations of
the Factory Investigating Commission. Their staff
investigated the conditions in factories operated by their
progresssive allies and criticized them when they
uncovered "vile and uncivilized" situations. Therewere,
however, instances when Smith and Wagner must have felt a
certain amount of gleeful satisfaction as they did their
duty on the commission. Thomas Mott Osborne, a wealthy
manufacturer of farm machinery from Auburn, in the central
area of the state, and a Grover Cleveland type of anti-
machine Democrat, had founded the Democratic League in
1909. Dedicated to purging the Democracy of "bossism" and
to serving the political ambitions of the eccentric and
disputatious Osborne, the League had on occasion sought
alliances with Theodore Roosevelt and Charles Evans
Hughes. When it suited his purposes, Osborne would even
seek an accommodation with Tammany Hall, which he was
attempting to eliminate as a force in the Democratic
party. During the Factory Investigating Commission's
investigtions
,
Wagner and Smith discovered conditions in
Osborne's Auburn factory to be among the worst in the
state. They righteously publicized their findings.''^
The commissioners drew up about thirty tentative
bills, which they then forwarded to several thousand
interested individuals throughout the state. Many of
these people filed either suggestions or negative
commentary on the bills, all of which was considered by
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the commissioners. The proposed legislation was then
discussed and analyzed in special hearings held in either
Albany or New York City. Critics of the bills made their
views known and were permitted to cross-examine
investigators and experts. Interested individuals and
delegates from civic and social organizations also gave
voice to their concerns and added their counsel for the
benefit of the commissioners . '''^
When the Factory Investigating Commission made its
report on January 15, 1913, included with the general
document were a number of additional statements and
special studies related to "dangerous trades."
Descriptions of conditions in factories refining or using
wood alcohol and accounts of physical problems suffered by
employees in chemical plants were submitted.
Finally, the recommendations of the commission were
refined and forwarded to the state legislature in the form
of twenty-eight proposed bills. The election of 1912 had
given the Democrats control of both houses of the state
legislature; Smith had assumed the speaker's chair in the
Assembly while Wagner had become President of the Senate.
As a result of the control exercised by the Democrats, who
were in turn controlled by their Tammany leadership,
twenty-five of the Factory Investigating Commission's
proposed bills were passed into law during the tumultuous
1913 session of the state legislature . ""^
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The first new statute reorganized the Department of
Labor and enlarged its jurisdiction. Everyone familiar
with the Department had long since recognized its
inadequacies. The Commissioner of Labor had testified in
one of the hearings that he had only eighty- five
inspectors available to visit the 3 0,699 factories known
to the department. They were able to contact each factory
no more than once every two years. The new legislation
increased the number of inspectors in the Labor Department
to 158 and increased its yearly appropriation almost one
hundred percent. =° This, of course, led to more
strenuous efforts to implement the labor laws. For
example, in 1909, New York State spent the clearly
inadequate sum of 12.2 cents per wage earner to enforce
the existing laws. After the passage of the new
legislation, the state spent 19.0 cents per worker, a
higher amount than that spent by any other state.
Another bill passed during the 1912 session provided
for punishments to be levied on those who might violate
the labor law, the industrial code, or the orders of the
Commissioner of Labor. First offenses carried mild
punishments; offenders had to pay fines of not more than
fifty dollars. Second-time offenders were liable to more
onerous fines and the possibility of a 30 -day
imprisonment, while a third- time offender might be jailed
for as long as sixty days and was required to pay a fine
of $250."
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other laws recommended by the Factory Investigating
Commission and passed by the state legislature seemed to
remedy most of the deficiencies responsible for the great
loss of life in the Triangle Fire. New factory buildings
more than four stories high had to be provided with at
least one exterior enclosed fireproof stairway. Stairways
had to be wide, well-lit, fireproofed, and unobstructed.
Doorways had to open outward, and interior partitions had
to be constructed of fireproof materials. Fire escapes
had to be safely constructed."
Another newly-passed law stipulated that structures
such as loft buildings that had been erected in the past
for purposes other than manufacturing could not be used as
factories unless they conformed to standards that
protected workers against the dangers of fire. Such
buildings had to be inspected, and those that met the
regulations would be granted certificates indicating the
approval of the Bureau of Inspections.^^
The majority of the legislators agreed that children
fourteen and under would henceforth not be permitted to
work in factories, and employers were forbidden to hire
women to do night work. Adequate numbers of sanitary
washrooms had to be provided for workers, and all parts of
factories had to be kept reasonably clean and free from
accumulations of dirt and garbage. Employers were ordered
to protect their employees from accidents caused by
dangerous machinery, and elevators had to be properly
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maintained. It was also firmly stipulated that no doors
leading into or out of any floor in any faotory could be
locked during working hours."
There had always been concern that the existing laws
had lagged behind the realities created by a burgeoning
industrialism. A new law expanded the power of the Labor
Department by allowing it to extend existing laws when it
became apparent that new industrial problems had been
created that were not adequately covered by laws already
on the books. The commission also recommended that a
five-member Industrial Board be created coordinate with
the Department of Labor. This board would supervise the
drafting of industrial codes for various trades, once
again ensuring that legislation would cover current
needs.
In 1915, on the recommendation of the Factory
Investigating Commission, this Industrial Board was
abolished and a newly-structured Industrial Commission
took control of the New York State Department of Labor.
The five-member Commission was given the authority to
administer not only the labor law, but also the workmen's
compensation law and the state insurance fund. Within the
commission, deputy commissioners were appointed. One was
given responsibility for overseeing the Bureau of
Inspections, another for superintending the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, and a third for supervising the
Bureau of Mediation and Arbitration.^''
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It should be noted that both organized labor and
large numbers of progressive reformers objected to the
creation of the Industrial Commission. While it was
understood that the merger of the Labor Department and the
Workmen's Compensation Bureau would result in greater
efficiency, prevent overlapping of efforts, and centralize
the administration of the labor law, they were reluctant
to relinquish or even endanger procedures that had been
developed with great effort within the Department of
Labor. Even the WTUL's spokeswomen warned that the new
commission might be a mistake. They warned that states
that had Industrial Commissions had a tendency to grant
them too much discretion in granting exemptions to
existing regulations." Nevertheless, the Industrial
Commission worked well and served to prevent violence in
labor confrontations. In 1919 Frances Perkins was
appointed to the State Industrial Commission, where she
acted as a true advocate for women in her efforts to
enforce obedience to labor laws.^°
Under the 1915 reorganization, a new ten-member
Industrial Council was also established. It contained five
repesentatives of the state's employers and five
representatives of its workers. This body would serve in
an advisory capacity to the commission, advising on "all
rules, regulations, amendments, or repeals submitted to
them for consideration and advice before enactment."
While members of the Industrial Commission received
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generous salaries for their services, members of the
Industrial Council served in their positions without
compensation
.
The Industrial Commission approached its tasks with
great energy. It published a monthly bulletin reviewing
the results of its inspections, and it drew up a Safety
Manual for the use of its inspectors and formanufacturers
in the state. It also established a "block system of
inspection" for use in New York City whereby all the
industrial firms contained in a city block would be
inspected as a single unit. It was anticipated that under
this system, no factory, no matter how insignificant,
would be overlooked
.
Although the passage of this needed legislation
convinced many that the work of the Factory Investigating
Commission was drawing to a close, others felt that much
still remained to be done. A disastrous fire in a clothing
factory in Binghamton in July of 1913" persuaded many
that the state legislature had been correct in extending
the term of office of the Factory Investigating Commission
to 1914 " and then again to 1915."
An important piece of legislation, recommended by the
Factory Insvest igating Commission in its final period and
passed into law by the legislature, created a Building
Department with jurisdiction throughout the City of New
York. The commissioner who headed this Department had the
right to authorize his subordinates to enter, examine, and
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inspect buildings within the city in order to ensure the
safety of their construction and the proper adherence to
the state's laws and ordinances. The Commissioner of
Buildings had the right to order repairs made to dangerous
structures, to mandate the removal of dangerous buildings,
or to condemn buildings that did not meet with the
standards authorized by the State of New York. Equally
important, it established a system of penalties for those
employees of the department who inadequately performed the
duties of their position or those who were found guilty of
accepting bribes. This law eliminated much of the
confusion that had existed in regard to the jurisdiction
of agencies and departments over inspections and
enforcements throughout the City of New York."
Much of the work done by the Factory Investigating
Commission during the remainder of its existence dealt
with the inadequate wages paid workers in New York State.
The commission authorized a comprehensive investigation of
the wage problem that was instigated by the reports made
by various progressive groups regarding the very low wages
paid to workers in many industries." Employers'
associations denied these charges, claiming that they were
exaggerated and biased toward the employees and because
they were based on defective investigations that had
examined only a single side of the case. The
commissioners, therefore, decided to gather further facts
and statistics to resolve the controversy in a fair and
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impartial way. if, during the course of this examination,
they concluded that inadequacies and injustices did indeed
exist, they agreed to suggest ways in which the problems
might be corrected.
The commission investigated wages in the Empire State
during the course of the next year and reached the obvi
conclusion that wages were inadequate. A single worker
residing in New York City, they discovered, required a
weekly wage of nine dollars to survive." At that time,
one-half of area industrial workers investigated, both
and women, earned wages of less than eight dollars a week,
and one-eighth of them, less that five dollars a week.'°
Recognizing the consequences of the situation they
had surveyed, the Factory Investigating Commission devised
a minimum wage plan. It proposed the formation of wage
boards that would set minimum industrial wages for women
and children. Samuel Gompers opposed the idea of a
minimum wage for both men and women. He feared that
setting a minimum wage for women and children would
eventually result in a similar regulation for men.
Protesting that such legislation would be little better
than slavery for union men, he argued that workers who
received adequate wages might see their pay reduced with
such a law on the books. Weaker unions disagreed with
Gompers and supported the idea of a minimum wage . '^^
Progressive labor leaders and the Tammany leaders of the
Factory Investigating Commission stood firmly against the
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Federation's president, especially in regard to wage
protection for women and children. Al Smith argued that
Gompers had to realize that men were not dependent on a
minimum wage since they were protected by unions, but
women and children were largely unorganized and had to be
protected from exploitation.- Senator Wagner insisted
the something had to be done to assist women and
children." Facing such determined opposition, Gompers
reluctantly decided not to contest the Factory
Investigating Commission's recommendation for a minimum
wage for women, and the 1914 AFL Convention even endorsed
the resolution.
The type of a minimum wage that the Factory
Investigating Commission wished to see enacted into law in
New York State had already become law in nine other states
prior to 1915.'' They, in turn, had been influenced by
similar laws in England and in other European countries.
It seemed as if efforts in New York State were simply part
of a national trend, but, unfortunately, before the
proposed bill came up for consideration by the state
legislature, the reform momentum generated by the Triangle
Fire had dissipated. Conservative Republicans had
regained control of the state legislature in 1914, and the
bill met a resounding defeat despite Wagner and Smith's
attempts to promote its passage.''^
The New York State legislature failed to extend the
Factory Investigating Commission's term of office in 1915.
The Republicans in the legislature and their allies in the
business community, concerned about the sharp recession
that was under way in New York State, were convinced that
further reform efforts by the commission would endanger
their economic interests.- A lawyer attached to the Real
Estate Board of New York publically complained:
You can no longer distinguish the real estate ownerby the smile of prosperity because his property isnow a burden, a liability instead of a comfort andsource of income. To own a factory building in NewYork IS now a calamity."
Other businessmen bemoaned the fact that the new labor
legislation meant "the wiping out of industry in this
state
.
While the upstate Republicans and their farm,
cannery, and industrial allies were pleased to see the
expiration of the commission, there was little in the way
of concern about its termination from any quarter. It was
agreed that the work of that body had been largely
completed, and the progressives took pride in its
accomplishments. During its brief existence, a
short three and a half years, and at a cost to the state
of only $110,000,^^ it had instigated what its eulogists
claimed was a "revolution in the field of labor and
industry." Frances Perkins maintained that the
accomplishments of the New York State Factory
Investigating Commission signaled a "turning point in
American attitudes and policies toward social
responsibility. "^° A consequence of the public fury in
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the wake of the Triangle Fire and progressive
determination to humanize the deplorable effects of the
industrial impulse, the Factory Investigating Commission,
with the thirty-six laws for which it was responsible,
rewrote New York State's labor and factory codes,
producing the most advanced and comprehensive standards in
the nation. They would serve as a model for the rest of
the states until the New Deal, when, under the influence
of many of the same individuals who had worked so
assiduously for the passage of the industrial code in New
York State, the national government would enact similar
standards for the entire country.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE FAILURE OF THE ENFORCEMENT
OF
PROGRESSIVE LABOR LEGISLATION
Between the years 1911 and 1917 resistance to the
progressive reformers' attempts to obtain passage of
protective legislation and failure to enforce the new laws
and codes as they came into effect were both widespread.
Indifference, competing interests, bureaucratic
inefficiency, and divisions within reform organizations
over the issues involved in protective legislation all
played a part. As time passed after the Triangle Fire,
many of those who had initially advocated protective laws
lost interest due to the fact that they had little close
connection with the workers affected by the regulations.
Those who might have been expected to support protective
laws, such as the Tammany administration, often did not
because of conflicting interests. Charlie Murphy, who
controlled the Tammany organization at that time, was the
leader of the state Democratic party and the primary
influence on the Democratic majority in the state legis-
lature until 1914. Following the example of his
predecessors at the Hall, he was covertly affiliated with
powerful real estate businesses in New York City and on
occasion used his influence to further their interests at
the state level. ^ In the first years of the twentieth
century, before Murphy changed the direction of Tammany's
efforts, the Hall had worked either to defeat labor bills
that threatened the Wigwam's business associates or to
emasculate the proposed statutes with burdensome
amendments.^ With or without the Hall's intervention,
realty lobbyists in New York City were so powerful that
exemptions had legally been granted to buildings four
stories and under. In some instances, six-story
structures, even if they were old and hazardous, were not
required to have fireproofed and enclosed stairways.^
When labor legislation was passed either at the state
or the city level, the Tammany administrations neglected
to enforce the laws. At the same time, in an effort to
secure the allegiance of labor interests, the Wigwam
pledged to help procure legislative guarantees for
industrial workers, but it seldom delivered on its
promises because of its obligations to its unacknowledged
associates in the business community.^
Immediately after the Triangle Fire, the forces
working for the passage of labor legislation hoped that
the public outrage generated by the fire would produce
enough sympathy for the sorry condition of women workers
to ensure passage of a fifty-four hour bill for women.
Reformers joined with the state AFL, which had been
assured of Tammany's support, in an effort to push the
bill through the legislature. Boss Murphy, however,
failed to produce the promised votes, and the bill never
got out of committee.^ Al Smith confided to Frances
Perkins, who had lobbied hard for the passage of the
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fifty-four hour bill, that Murphy's friendly relationship
with the proprietors of Huyler's Candy Factory had
produced the stalemate.''
Still, while business influence on Tammany cannot be
disputed, it was far from absolute. Politicians
associated with the Democratic bosses were always known to
break ranks when it suited them. There were also
instances when the sachems ignored the interests of their
business associates. This was especially the case after
Charlie Murphy took over the leadership of the Hall. For
instance, when an amended fifty-four hour bill finally did
pass in 1912, Big Tim Sullivan, a Tammany ward boss from
New York City, and his cousin Christy Sullivan, both state
senators, were prevailed upon to cast votes in favor of
the measure, votes that carried the day for those who had
worked so assiduously for its passage.'' A few years
later, Frances Perkins, working to win support for the New
York State Factory Investigating Commission's
recommendations, solicited assistance from Charles Murphy
himself, and, in spite of his commitments to the City's
businessmen, the Tammany boss ordered his people in the
legislature to support the factory bills in question.^
Nevertheless, the power of Tammany Hall was
recognized and often feared. It used its dominance not
only to defeat its enemies but to keep its own associates
in line. In 1912, a Democrat, William Sulzer, was elected
governor with Tammany's blessing. Prior to his election.
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Sulzer had served for seventeen years as a pro-labor
member of the state assembly. The progressives and
organized labor rallied behind the new governor in support
of an AFL-sponsored compensation bill. They assumed that
Murphy and his Tammany proteges also appproved the bill.
The insurance companies lobbyists, however, promoted a
self-serving bill of their own that Murphy supported and
that was finally passed. Governor Sulzer vetoed it, and,
indignant at his independent action, Tammany engineered
Sulzer' s impeachment,^ much to the chagrin of the state
If workingmen and women could never be sure about
where they stood with the Democratic party, they had
little doubt about the opposition party. Republican
support of issues pursued by organized labor for workers
was practically nonexistent. The G.O.P.'s poor voting
record on labor bills earned most of them high-ranking
positions on the blacklists regularly compiled by the
Federation. The state Republicans had long since
abandoned political power and patronage in New York City
to Tammany Hall and its supporters and contented
themselves with controlling seats from upstate districts,
where businessmen and employers were their traditional
supporters. These Republican politicians were loyal to
their constitutents and consistently fought bills that
favored labor's interests.
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The Republicans gained control of the state
legislature and the governor's office in 1914 largely
result of public displeasure at the impeachment of
Governor Sulzer. After 1915, this conservative upstate
faction began to work with great determination to reve
gains made by the supporters of protective legislation and
to weaken what they believed to be the growing power of
organized labor. Led by State Senator Elon Brown, their
attack was directed at the entire slate of reforms
previously enacted. Organized labor usually joined with
progressive reformers to prevent the wholesale undermining
of earlier efforts. Florence Kelly, the dynamic Secretary
of the National Consumers' League, recognized that
progressive accomplishments were threatened by the upstate
law makers. She complained, "This is such a dreadful
Legislature that it is no use asking anything of them but
that they stop sinning a little. "^^
The recession in 1914 disrupted the prosperity that
business had enjoyed for several years, causing corporate
interests to encourage their representatives in the
legislature to fight the reforms that they believed were
at least partially responsible for the downturn in the
economy. Labor and the progressives, they argued, should
discontinue their attacks against management, recently
shorn of its former iniquities and made timid by the
assaults of the reformers. Instead, they should join
240
hands with their former adversaries and work to realize
class cooperation, which, in turn, would restore
prosperity for all."
The reactionary spirit that dominated the state
government after the elections in 1915 led to the
introduction of anti-labor "ripper bills" in the
legislature. One of these bills attempted to transfer
responsibility for the enforcement of the new Industrial
Code in New York City from the State Department of Labor
to the five borough governments where, traditionally, such
enforcement would be less rigorous. The mayor of New York
City, recognizing the deleterious effects that could be
expected from such a move, vetoed this proposal, as was
his right under the Home Rule provision of the state
constitution
.
Also, aware that the canning industry had already
been granted exemptions by the Industrial Commission"
allowing it to extend the working hours of women employees
beyond the legal limit when seasonal demands required it,
the conservatives suggested that further exemptions might
be in order. They introduced three bills in 1915 that
would have extended the hours that women could work to
seventy- two per week, allowed women to work on Sundays,
and allowed employers to require women to work until
midnight." These bills almost became laws, but they
failed to pass due to an intraparty squabble over
leadership and patronage between Governor Charles Whitman
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and Senator Elon Brown and his supporters. Whitman was a
moderate Republican who had been able to build support in
New York City while serving as the City's district
attorney. He was willing to work with organized labor and
the social progressives in order to preserve that support,
but to do so, he had to do battle on numerous occasions
with Brown and his conservative allies.^''
The governor, Tammany, and the urban progressives
finally prevailed over the Republican conservatives and
business allies before Whitman left office in 1918. But
the subsequent legislative disputes served to weaken the
government's commitment to vigorous enforcement and, at
the same time, strengthened the conservatives' hostility
toward labor legislation.
In 1915, one of these controversial ripper bills
caused the state AFL to desert the reform forces. Allying
themselves with the Industrial Commission, the State
Manufacturers' Association, and the conservative
Republican faction in the legislature, AFL leaders agreed
to a new and more extensive compromise labor program that
contained a provision permitting women to work extended
hours in canneries when seasonal demands required it
.
Political considerations, including the need to blunt
criticism directed at labor's delegates on the Industrial
Commission, dictated this move. It earned the state
Federation the outraged criticism of the WTUL,^^ other
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progressive organizations/^ and several New York City
unions, ^° even though the proposal was eventually vetoed
by Governor Whitman.
On November 6, 1915, in the same year that the
Factory Investigating Commission brought its work to an
end, another gruesome fire took place in a factory in the
Williamsburg section of Brooklyn. The three-story
structure housed several business concerns, among them a
candy-making business and a shirt
-making establishment
.
The fire broke out in the elevator shaft and spread
quickly to the adjacent stairway, blocking that means of
egress for the two hundred workers on the premises. There
was an emergency exit, but it was locked. There was also
a single fire escape, but it was made of flimsy metal
which, soon after the fire began, became a grill, roasting
those who tried to escape by that route. It soon buckled
and collapsed. The building was not fireproof, and,
since sprinklers had never been installed, the fire
quickly engulfed the structure. The workers,
unprepared by fire drills for such an emergency, panicked
and jumped from the flaming building. Thirty-six workers
were injured. Twelve men and women were killed. The
youngest was a girl of fifteen,
Although news of the European war, encroaching more
insistently on American consciousness each day, dominated
the City newspapers, details of this new fire absorbed New
Yorkers for a while, briefly reminding everyone of the
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devastating grief that preoccupied them four and a half
years earlier at the time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire.
New Yorkers were unable to understand how the latest
tragedy had occurred, given the tireless efforts over the
past sevevral years of the New York Committee on Public
Safety, the Factory Investigating Commission, the State
Department of Labor, the short-lived Industrial Board, the
newly-structured Industrial Commission, and the New York
State Legislature. The public demanded an immediate
investigation.
In less than two weeks, the results of the
investigation were made public. The information was
shocking. The owners of the Brooklyn factory had been
notified after a visit by an inspector from the Industrial
Commission three months prior to the fire that conditions
in their building were not in compliance with the law.
The warning had been ignored. The public was even more
incensed to learn of the confusion and poor administrative
practices existing in the offices of the New York State
Industrial Commission
. The commission's
sporadically-kept records indicated that a total of 3,711
directives to fireproof defective stairways had been
issued to owners of area factories but that only 246 of
these orders had been complied with. Similar situations
existed regarding other irregularities in factories.
Furthermore, many of the commission's inspectors
apparently failed to keep records regarding their
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investigations, and no system was in place^^ to record
follow-up inspections that would ensure that attempts to
correct problems had been taken.
The commissioners neither denied the charges laid at
their doorstep nor excused themselves on the grounds that
the commission had only recently come into existence.
They admitted that they were in a sorry state. They
claimed that a follow-up system had been created within
the Department of Labor as early as 1911, but that it had
lapsed by 1913. However, they did attempt to exonerate
themselves by arguing that they had too few inspectors.
Indeed, they stated that they needed at least three times
as many as were then on staff in order to properly
investigate the hundreds of other factories operating
under conditions as dangerous as those in the Brooklyn
factory
.
^'^
Much of the blame for the commission's problems was
placed on John Lynch, the Commissioner of Labor, and John
Mitchell, Chairman of the Compensation Commission, both
members of the Industrial Commission. They were both
labor men, Mitchell having formerly served as vice
president of the AFL and Lynch as the president of the
International Typographical Union. The state AFL had been
the primary force behind their being appointed to the
commission, and now that they were under attack because of
the fire. Federation leaders felt duty-bound to support
them. They feared that without such support, their two
representatives might be dismissed in disgrace and
replaced by hostile conservatives
.
There is also evidence that police magistrates and
the courts failed in their duty to uphold the labor laws.
When inspectors noted unacceptable conditions in
factories, they issued only warnings to violators, except
in child labor cases, those involving working hours for
women, the one-day-of f
-of
-rest
- in-seven act, and the law
prohibiting locked doors. Cases involving the latter
violations were immediately referred for prosecution.
Lesser offenders were admonished on several occasions and
not referred for prosecution until it became obvious that
they did not intend to comply with the law. Too often,
however, sentences were suspended and fines were remitted.
At other times, the fines were ludicrously low." it has
been estimated that at least 50-70% of the violations
brought before the courts during the period in question
went unpunished. ^° As late as igle, Bernard Shientag,
former Assistant to the Chief Counsel of the Factory
Investigating Commission and at that time Chief Counsel of
the New York State Industrial Commission, complained that
in that year, sentences were suspended in New York City
courts in fifty-eight percent of cases where violators of
the labor law had been convicted. Seventy- five percent
were suspended elsewhere in the state.
Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, the owners ofthe
Triangle Shirtwaist Company, continued their business
enterprises after the 1911 fire with no apparent qualms of
conscience and little in the way of efforts to mend their
ways. They consistently violated the laws and got away
with it. By August 20, 1913, the Triangle Company had
transferred its operation to a Fifth Avenue address. On
that day. Max Blanck, listed in the city directory as the
president of the company, was charged with locking one of
the doors to his establishment while 150 of his employees
were at work. He claimed that the lock in use was
extremely easy to manipulate and that, in case of fire, it
would not endanger the lives of his workers; they could
easily open the door. He was brought to court, and the
judge, although he fined Blanck twenty dollars, apologized
to him for the imposition
.
On December 1, 1913, Max Blanck was summoned to court
again. This time he was charged with "allowing" one of
his young employees to work on Sunday, by that time a
violation of the law. Again, his punishent was the
minimum fine allowed: twenty dollars.
Later in the same month, members of the Bureau of
Fire Prevention were invited by Blanck to visit the
Triangle Company in order to inspect a new lock that he
was considering for use in his factory. The visitors were
not impressed by the lock, and they were exceedingly
distressed at the littered interior of the Triangle
Company. Once again, scraps had accumulated throughout
the workshop, rubbish was piled six feet high in one
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corner, and wicker work baskets, rather than the mandated
metal containers, were in use. On this occasion, Blanck
was not even hauled into court but was issued a "stern"
warning
.
^'^
Blanck' s defiance of the law was certainly obvious,
as was his contempt for the social progressives whose
reform efforts were aimed at business concerns such as
his. In mid- July of 1914 Blanck was summoned before the
Superior Court, County of New York, to answer charges
brought by the National Consumers' League and others that
for the past year fradulent imitations of the National
Consumers' League labels had been used in the shirtwaists
manufactured by his company. The League granted companies
that could prove they were improving working conditions
for their employees the right to affix League labels to
the garments they produced. Sixty-one companies were
then using their labels, seven of them producing
shirtwaists
.
Blanck and Harris sold their shirtwaists to companies
in the Northeast, among them Forbes and Wallace in
Springfield, Massachusetts and George Bean in Boston.
These stores purchased Triangle's shirtwaists, believing
that the label on the garments was that of the National
Consumers' League. An employee of the Triangle Company
initially reported her employers to the League, but the
League's attorneys could not obtain an affidavit, since
the employee, fearful that Blanck and Harris would
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blacklist her, refused to assist further. The League,
however, brought charges against the Triangle partners,
acting as agents for George Bean, who wanted $50,000 in
damages but who, as a resident of Massachusetts, could not
sue directly in a New York Court. The plaintiffs were
represented by Bertha Rembaugh, an attorney involved in
the prosecution against Blanck and Harris in 1911. The
Triangle partners' attorney was Max D. Steuer, who had so
skillfully managed their defense after the fire."
Although The Triangle Company had neither met the
criteria necessary to obtain the right to use the labels
nor even applied to obtain the privilege, the defendants
denied the charges made against them. Blanck' s statement
before the court as he claimed his innocence contained a
myriad of misleading statements as well as blatant
untruths, not only about the charges in question but about
the history and reputation of his business concern. The
Triangle Company, during the summer of 1914, was operating
in a ninth-floor loft building at 79 Fifth Avenue. Blanck
claimed that it was "a model of cleanliness and sanitary
conditions
.
"^^ It had been organized for him by the
Singer Sewing Machine Company with the intent of
establishing an environment that would produce the
"greatest comfort" for the employees of the company."
He complained, however, that the reputation of his
business had been unfairly damaged by the terrible fire at
the company's former location on Washington Square and
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stated that it was difficult to overcome this prejudice
against him and his concern. Therefore, he was obliged to
affix the labels to his shirtwaists in order to assure his
customers that his employees were well
- treated, but he did
not do so in imitation of the National Consumers' League.
In fact, he denied even knowing of the existence of the
League and suggested that perhaps the League, in promoting
the use of its labels, was doing so in imitation of him.
He argued that, in using the labels, he and Isaac Harris,
then the factory supervisor, were merely assuring the
public that his factory, which did a business of nine
million dollars a year, was and always had been an
outstanding establishment in which to work. He further
maintained that his acquittal after the 1911 fire proved
that the authorities recognized "that the Triangle Waist
Company was a model of its kind, second to none in the
entire country.
It is unlikely that any of the Triangle Company's
employees during the sixteen years of the company's
previous existence would have recognized the glowing
description of their workplace as set forth by the
company's owner. During several preceding years, while
herculean efforts were being made to effect reform in the
garment industry, the Triangle onwers had remained
oblivious to the demands of their workers, indignant
reformers, and determined legislators. They continued to
operate with impunity as they had since the company was
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established in the first decade of the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, ignoring their sorry record, once again, in
the summer of 1914, the authorities refused to take
forceful action to require the Triangle Company's owners
to recognize their obligations not only to their employees
but to society. Judge J. Giegerich merely agreed that
the defendants' label was an unfair imitation of the label
used by the National Consumers' League and issued an
injunction ordering Blanck to discontinue using the label.
He also ordered him to pay court costs in the amount of
ten dollars.
The Triangle Shirtwaist Company's lack of concern for
the welfare of its employees was shared by other business
concerns in New York City. In 1916, a study was done for
the Russell Sage Foundation regarding the health problems
of all factory workers in the city. The investigators
reported that tuberculosis, rheumatism, influenza, heart
disease, asthma, and diseases of the digestive and
circulatory systems were rampant in the ranks of
industrial workers of both genders. They concluded that
the long hours, poor wages, and dangerous working
conditions, combined with wretched living conditions,
caused the illnesses that were so widespread in this
segment of the city's population. They further stated
that conditions in factories were so hazardous that they
were responsible for accidents and injuries that
contributed to the health problems of workers."*^ Even if
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only a few years had passed since the passage of the state
labor laws and the refurbishing of the New York City
Building Code, it would seem that these investigators
should have made note of some successes in ameliorating
the deplorable conditions in factories. Some evidence of
beneficial change could have been cited to indicate that
the new regulations and statutes put in place by the
combined efforts of the progressive reformers and the
Tammany-led politicians were having positive results.
Since this was not the case, it can only be assumed that
lax enforcement of the legislation was commonplace and
that improvements had been minimal.
The WTUL recognized the problem but found itself
isolated politically and struggling with internal
divisions. Former alliances with other organizations that
had shared its goals, even in a halfhearted way, had
broken down. Even before the United States' entry into
World War I, the WTUL lost all hope of winning over Samuel
Gompers and the AFL unions. Women labor organizers such
as Rose Schneiderman, angry and resentful, resigned their
positions with the ILGWU, a union that was usually at
least nominally concerned about the problems of working
women, because they believed that the unions were failing
to aggressively safeguard women working in factories.'*^
It was not enough to just pass protective legislation.
The women reformers demanded effective enforcement and
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could not understand the union's passive attitude about
the dangers that still existed in factories.
Other WTUL members, while giving up on the AFL and
its conservative approach to the "woman problem, began tc
consider the benefits for women that might result from
forming alliances with those urging the formation of
industrial unions/^ They were, however, rebuffed by the
more radical industrial unionists such as members of the
IWW, who expressed intense suspicion of the leisure-class
women who led the WTUL and the suffrage organizations.
They were all, warned the Wobbly organization, part of a
"ruling class conspiracy" determined to prevent the class
struggle, which the IWW recognized as inevitable."^ An
alliance with such an intransigent organization would be
impossible for the WTUL to even contemplate."^
Nor were other socialist groups growing more tolerant
of the WTUL's membership and agenda, despite the fact that
there were many socialist members in the WTUL. Socialists
did continue to work actively to support the idea of
protective legislation and were, on occasion, known to
criticize Samuel Gompers for his lack of enthusiasm for
such laws, but their interest in protective laws continued
to take a back seat to their dedication to their own
agenda and their hostile view of capitalism. The
socialist members of the WTUL, therefore, became more
ambivalent as time passed. They were uncertain as to
whether they should advocate unionism or protective
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legislation, class consciousness or the unity of interests
between worker and employer, safeguards solely for women
workers or defenses to protect the entire workforce,
regardless of gender. Leonora O'Reilly, a long-time WTUL
member and a confirmed socialist, disturbed by the
perplexity in which she found herself, resigned her
membership in the WTUL in 1915. Communicating her
frustration to her friend Mary Dreier, she wrote:
Trade unions are necessary. They must be worked form season and out. Women must be organized betterthan men are organized. The powers that be in thelabor movement in New York State do not and will not
recognize an outside body's right to help with the
work. Worse than that, they attribute their own
shortcomings to the outside body's
disinterestedness
.
''^
O'Reilly found new battles to fight and obstacles to
overcome working in the suffrage movement.
Socialists were also distracted by the war being
waged in Europe. The energies of socialists, whether
moderates or radicals, were primarily directed to
America's entrance into the hostilities and to ending the
conflagration that was destroying the European working
class. The injustices with which American workers were
forced to cope in factories and workshops were fast
assuming a secondary importance for American socialists.
While many socialists and progressive reformers were
struggling with these questions, more and more members of
the WTUL continued to argue that their organization should
take steps to disentangle itself from the concerns of
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organized labor and turn to other programs that might
prove to be more productive. Their primary interests
became the passage of further labor legislation, the
education of women in regard to existing laws, and the
suffrage movement. In addition, they discussed efforts tc
set up permanent law enforcement committees in all union
shops. Women workers, aware of infractions that might
endanger them, would be instructed to report the dangers
to the members of the committees who would, in turn,
report them to the State Department of Labor or to the Nev^
York City Fire Commissioner. They also encouraged the
WTUL to investigate ways in which they could deal with
judicial indifference or even the nullification of
protective laws. It was proposed that the WTUL might
promote the institution of the recall to use as a weapon
to unseat judges who lacked sympathy for women workers.
Recommendations that the League work to gain acceptance of
a minimum wage, to set up employment agencies, or to seek
the passage of banking laws to protect workers' savings
were a few of the proposals that were analyzed and debated
at the organization's annual conventions in the years
before 1917.
Businessmen and their oganizations had been divided
over whether to join hands with progressive reformers and
exert some measure of control over inevitable legislation,
which was the policy of the National Civic Federation, or
whether to stand firm and militantly battle labor and
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reform efforts, as the National Association of
Manufacturers insisted. Instead of pursuing either of
these options, they had cooperated with labor in setting
up Protocols in many of the garment industries in
mid- January 1913. They were hailed by Gompers and many of
the unions as well as by businessmen and reformers as
harbingers of a new era in industrial cooperation.
The Protocols had, during the six short years of
their existence, proved beneficial to all parties
concerned. The supporters of the Protocols had solid
reasons to celebrate the new "Industrial Democracy" that
the agreements had initiated. In addition to the
president off the Federation, other giants in the labor
movement approved of the Protocols. Among them was Sidney
Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers'
Union, a new organization set up in 1915 in opposition to
the conservative, AFL-approved United Garment Workers,
and, in a later era, one of Franklin Roosevelt's trusted
and powerful advisors. Under the Protocols, unions
bargained with management over wages, hours, health,
safety, and social welfare arrangements. Grievances that
could not be settled through conciliation and mediation
were settled by arbitration. The process worked
relatively well for a brief period. During the first
eleven months of 1913, after the adoption of the Protocol
in the "Ladies Trade" industries, only 2.1 percent of the
workers' grievences proved impossible to settle through
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conciliation and mediation. These few problems were
directed for settlement by means of arbitration . ^«
Using the process established in their Protocols,
unions were able to assist manufacturers in keeping the
cost of operation as low as possible. Businesses, in
return, were willing to grant previously denied workers'
benefits to their employees. Labor leaders also
championed the Protocols because they tended to eliminate
many of the employers' earlier self-serving actions that
had too often left employees in a powerless state.
Businessmen came to realize that the Protocols helped to
increase their profits and to prevent the unwelcome
entrance of competition into the garment industry.
These benefits helped to stifle the Manufacturers'
Associations' earlier criticisms in regard to unwelcome
cooperation with labor.
The Protocols were, however, short-lived. As the
National Association of Manufacturers had forewarned,
attempts by either labor or interested third parties to
involve themselves in decisions that, they believed, must
of necessity be controlled by employers, would not, in the
long run, be acceptable to business." At the same time,
workers, although they noted efforts to enforce some
regulations and to clean up the shops and were pleased to
see their wages increased as a result of the Protocol
process, grew restive and dissatisfied with the
agreements. The Protocols had actually forced the unions
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to exert a tight control over their rank-and-file
membership. This resulted in considerable strain between
the leaders and members of unions such as the ILGWU. The
workers mainly complained that the Protocols forced them
to relinquish their right to strike, even when they
believed that their best interests were not being served
by the 1913 agreements with their employers.
The employees were also angered when large numbers of
manufacturers began to withdraw from the Dress and Waist
Manufacturers' Association, which represented the
employers' interests in the Protocol process. From 1913
to 1916, membership in the Association declined from 300
to 204." The unassociated manufacturers would then
distribute their work to subcontractors in outside shops
whose workers were unorganized, thus avoiding the higher
wages agreed to under the Protocols. As a result, grave
injustices were allowed to continue. In 1916, a
fifteen-year-old married Italian girl from the City's
garment district testified to a Congressional
Investigating Commission that she did home work for
garment manufacturers, earning sixty cents a day."
Evenmore irritating to the workers was the growing
tendency of the employers, troubled by an economic
depression, to dismiss union help and replace them with
non-union workers, an obvious violation of Branders'
preferential shop as mandated by the Protocols."
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Employers also had their grievences
. They were
angered by the growing number of unauthorized strikes that
had become commonplace in their shops and factories. The
problems these work stoppages caused should have been
settled by other means under the terms of the Protocols.
They also objected to the "trivial" problems they were
asked to deal with during the conciliation and mediation
processes. Individual workers' problems were submitted
for consideration and settlement rather than principles
and policies of a more comprehensive nature.
Much to the disgust of the rank-and-file members, =^
the leaders of the ILGWU continued to advocate adherence
to their agreements. A rancorous internal dispute took
place betweeen ILGWU officials and leadership in the local
unions. John Dyche attempted to placate the
Manufacturers' Association, explaining that the
ant i -employer contention was being generated by
"irresponsible and irreconcilable elements in our
organization" and not by their "responsible leaders." At
the same time, Dyche admonished the ILGWU' s locals about
their part in the dispute, warning them to back off or
face "severe retaliatory measures" from the central
organization
,
At one point, John Mitchel, Mayor of New York City,
and other prominent citizens appealed to both parties to
save the Protocols and avoid industrial conflict in the
interests of the community. An effort was made in the
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early spring of 1916 to revise the Protocols, a task
undertaken by Louis Brandeis, who had to leave the
negotiations prior to their completion to take a seat on
the United States Supreme Court, Robert W. Bruere, an
upper-class urban reformer and advisor to Mayor Mitchel,
Hamilton Holt, editor of the Independent , and a six-membei
Council of Conciliation appointed by the Mayor."
However, the amended agreements failed to satisfy either
the workers or the employers. Even though the Dress and
Waist Makers' Protocol machinery remained ostensibly in
force until the final days of 1918, it was actually
abandoned after the fall of 1916.^8 q^^^^^ Protocols did
not survive even that long. The failure of the Protocols
eliminated another means by which the progressive labor
reforms might have been enforced, and the abuses that the
reformers had hoped to eliminate permanently remained,
once more leaving the members of the industrial work force
at the mercy of their employers.
Organized labor, divided over the issue of protective
legislation, did little to demand more official attention
to the enforcement of the laws. Unions were themselves
under seige, internally from the discord in their own
ranks and externally from the manufacturing interests that
were determined to debilitate them^^ and from progressive
reformers who had earlier hoped to enlist the unions in
their crusade.
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Gompers' refusal to alter his earlier stand cost the
AFL much in the way of unity. Radical elements in the
garment industry, frustrated by his views and angry at his
intransigence, were more than willing to join the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America after the split
from the United Garment Workers. Gompers viewed the new
union as treasonous and continued his long-time support of
the UGW. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers accepted the
exodus of workers from the AFL union and soon surpassed it
in size but, in doing so, divided the voice of organized
labor
.
In conclusion, during a brief period after the
Triangle Fire attempts were made to alleviate the dangers
and injustices suffered by industrial workers, but efforts
to enforce the new laws and building codes consistently
fell short of the ideal. The new regulations were often
weakened and neglected even before the United States
became an active participant in World War I. The various
groups that had marshalled their energies and raised their
voices in the drive to bring about improvements in the
working conditions of industrial laborers found themselves
divided by internal conflicts. The coalition that had
organized to press for legislative intervention on behalf
of factory workers broke down, individual agendas taking
precedence over concern about the hazards existing in
industrial workplaces. The corpus of progressive labor
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legislation proved to be a Ipcjo hv,-,r. -;^ ije less than impressive memorial
to the victims of the Triangle Fire.
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EPILOGUE
The Progressive Era was permeated with a sense of
unbridled idealism and energized by a pronounced moral
fervor. This combination resulted in a growing awareness
of the injustices that had been generated by the rapidly
developing industrialism of the first decade of the
twentieth century and a desire to eliminate those evils
that seemed to betray the American dream. A wide public
constituency now demanded that state and municipal
governments undertake expanded welfare and regulatory
activities. Among the enlarged concerns of government at
both levels was a newborn interest in the protection of
industrial workers, especially those women, mostly
immigrants, forced by the new economy to labor in
factories and workshops and endangered by the sort of
conditions that caused the Triangle Fire. Consequently,
commissions were set up, legislation was debated and
passed, and regulations proliferated.
Sadly, however, this flurry of activity failed to
live up to its initial promise. Many of the political and
social groups that had demanded government intervention
lost their original fervor. This was not surprising,
since in some cases even the initial enthusiasm had
shallow roots. Business interests, happily distracted by
profitable war preparations and no longer concerned about
a declining economy or the threat of ruinous competition,
saw little need to cooperate further in efforts to extend
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benefits and protections to their labor force. Volunteer
associations, embroiled in internal dissensions and
disheartened by the seeming failure of previous exertions,
redirected their energies and resources. Even workers
themselves, too often uneasy with protective legislation
that placed unwanted limitations on them, failed to demand
adequate enforcement and attempted to undermine or evade
the very laws created to safeguard them. Coalitions that
once prompted cooperation among unlikely allies now
weakened or disintegrated as previous concerns fell by the
wayside and new considerations became paramount.
Legislation only recently passed was often
disregarded. Building codes inspired by the need to
prevent tragedies as appalling as the Washington Square
fire were sometimes halfheartedly monitored and enforced.
Strategies like the industrial protocols that promised
some degree of protection for workers were discarded. The
progressive dynamism that had generated such optimistic
expectations lost its vitality and abated, and
accomplishments realized through the joint efforts of so
many individuals and groups were notsustained
.
After the United States declared war on Germany in
the spring of 1917, the position of labor improved,
especially in terms of wages and other short-range
benefits. At the same time, however, businessmen and
conservative politicians waged a behind- the-scene
campaign, using the exigencies created by the war, to
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negate earlier gains won by labor. m New York State, the
legislature approved a bill that actually permitted the
Industrial Commission to suspend all laws designed to
protect labor for the duration of the war.^ The WTUL
leaders were, however, still vigilant, and now they had a
new source of political clout; women had recently, through
a state-wide referendum in New York State, received the
vote. The League lobbied Governor Charles Whitman against
the moratorium on regulation and rejoiced when he vetoed
the bill.
2
On the other hand, Samuel Gompers and his close
associates in the AFL objected to a directive issued by
the National War Labor Board in 1918 forbidding employers
to interfere with the unionization of their employees.
Gompers looked askance at the measure, since he feared it
would lead to government intervention in collective
bargaining after the conclusion of the war.^ He
continued to fiercely defend his belief in voluntarism,
arguing, even in the face of growing disenchantment with
the concept in union circles, that government and social
workers should not "carry the ball" for labor. "Labor,"
he said, "wanted to get things done for itself.""*
Workers flocked to join unions during the war years.
Although they had to trade away their right to strike,
labor organizations were aided by increasing wages,
government protection of union recognition, improved
hours, and other advances. Membership in the AFL from
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1917 to 1918 increased by over a million. = The Wil
administration, concerned with a crucial labor shortage
the face of increasing wartime demands on American
industry, was willing to maintain a conciliatory
relationship with organized labor. The administration
encouraged union membership and guaranteed the benefits
that made such membership attractive. Unfortunately,
women workers throughout the nation seldom participated
the benefits received by their male counterparts during
World War I .
^
After the 1918 armistice, organized labor found
itself a victim of the reactionary and repressive
atmosphere that pervaded the nation. In New York State,
even with Al Smith holding the gubernatorial office, the
upstate, business-controlled legislature, directed by it
ultra-conservative Republican leadership, blocked all
legislative efforts to improve the position of the state
industrial workers. Not only did legislators refuse to
enact any new, meaningful laws, they did all they could
weaken or repeal existing laws. The courts, at both the
state and national levels, also joined in efforts to
sabotage labor's earlier achievements.
Employers emerged from the war years determined to
reassert their previous dominance. Joining together in
powerful associations, they did battle with organized
labor during the early 1920' s, and, encouraged by the
pro-business administrations in Washington, they emerged
victorious. Despite years of bitter strikes, labor found
itself struggling not only with employers but with the
government and the American public, which had grown
increasingly suspicious of labor. People in all ranks of
American life had been influenced by the efforts of
anti-labor elements to connect unions and striking wcnkers
with un-Americanism and the threat of Bolshevism.' Union
membership, as a result, declined before 1925 by
1,500,000." Organized labor and its allies found
themselves forced to retreat durin(7 the "return to
normalcy" decade. The employers, emerging victorious from
the struggle, dictated terms to the quiescent labor
organizations. While conditions in the workplace never
declined to what they had been in 1911, little progress
was made in attaining industrial justice.
The rank-and-file womon workers in the garment
industry failed to sustain their earlier milit.nu'y (iuring
the 1920' s. This was at least partly due Lo the fact that
Italians were replacing the more assertive Jewish women in
the factories.'' These new workers tended to rely for
protection more on the paternalism of their employers than
on their membership in labor unions. They often failed to
realize that the employers' benevolence was mot Ivat-oci by
the manufacturers' desire to discourage their employees
from organizing.
The employers' distaste for militant unionism was so
pronounced that many of them preferrtMi federal protective
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legislation rather than a revitalized union movement.-
Other voices were also raised, for opposing reasons, in
calls for federal intervention in labor affairs.
Encouraged, perhaps, by their efforts at the national
level on behalf of women's suffrage, the WTUL was foremost
among them. The League had promoted the idea of
establishing a Women's Labor Bureau in the Federal Labor
Department and were gratified when, in 1918, this was
accomplished.^^ They began, as early as February 1918,
to actively agitate for federal rather than state
legislation mandating an eight-hour day for women workers.
They also called for federal regulations to ensure one
full day of rest in every seven work days and to guarantee
that women would be required to work no more than half a
day on Saturdays.
Not only was the WTUL focusing its attention more
often on Washington, D.C. than on the State House in
Albany, it was identifying more and more closely with the
Democratic party. During the early years of its
existence, the League had many socialist members; others
had been supporters of Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive
party or moderate Republicans. After the war, however,
American socialism was rendered impotent as a result of
government persecution and its own internecine conflicts.
During the 1920' s, the Republican party fell more
completely under the control of conservative elements in
the party. Inasmuch as the WTUL had been greatly assisted
in its reform endeavors in New York by the state
Democratic party and by Democratic governors Al Smith and
Franklin Roosevelt, members of the League subsequently
tended to associate themselves with the Democratic
party .
"
This relationship was rewarded after Franklin D.
Roosevelt was elected to the presidency in 1932. Eleanor
Roosevelt, who had become a member of the WTUL after World
War I," introduced Rose Schneiderman to her husband who,
in turn, frequently called on this dedicated advocate for
working women for counsel on labor problems
. Frances
Perkins, a former member of the WTUL'"^ who had witnessed
the Triangle Fire and who had, like Schneiderman, become
convinced of the need for protection for workers, came
to Washington to serve in the Roosevelt cabinet as a
spokesperson for labor interests. These women and their
associates, many of them people like Robert Wagner, all
deeply involved in efforts to protect industrial workers
since the time of the Triangle Fire, helped focus the
attention of the new administration on labor issues. They
gave the public the impression that the Roosevelt
Administration was far more sympathetic to the needs of
America's working class than it actually was.
The National Industrial Recovery Act in its famous
Section 7a guaranteed labor the right to organize and
bargain collectively. The National Recovery
Administration further attempted to protect the working
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man and woman by establishing a minimum wage and
abolishing child labor. After much of the NRA was
abolished by the Supreme Court, new protective legislation
was more carefully drafted with the Wagner Act. This
important piece of legislation prohibited unfair labor
practices and further guaranteed labor the right to
organize, a right earlier granted to workers in the NIRA's
Section 7a. At the same time, the Wagner Act and other
New Deal legislation sounded the death knell for Samuel
Gompers' voluntarism. Organized labor would no longer be
able direct its own destiny, independent of employers and
the government. Henceforth, American workers, even when
unionized, would be dependent for protection on the
federal government
.
Those allies of working women who came to Washington
during the New Deal period were especially concerned about
the passage of protective legislation for female workers
and, encouraged by the First Lady and members of the Labor
Department, worked to improve the status of women workers,
especially in regard to hours and wages. Severe
restrictions were placed on industrial home work and
states were encouraged to continue their efforts to
protect women who found it necessary to do industrial
work
.
While protection for workers became a reality under
the New Deal, there were still those, like Max Blanck and
Isaac Harris, who were willing to place human lives in
jeopardy in their single-minded pursuit of profits. On
November 23, 1960, a letter was printed in the "Letters to
the Editor" section of the New York Times. It was written
by Leon Stein, the dedicated editor of the ILGWU
publication Justice, who would in 1962 pen the story of
the Triangle Fire as a memorial to the 14 6 workers who had
perished. Stein warned New Yorkers that loft buildings in
the city much like the infamous Asch building were still
being used for manufacturing purposes. They were, he
claimed, as unsafe then as they had been in 1911. The
wooden partitions and staircases and the open air shafts
could all cause the spread of fires, and it was just too
costly to install sprinklers in the structures. The only
solution, he argued, was to demolish these firetraps.
Two years earlier, in March 1958, a fire had broken
out at the Monarch Undergarment Company, just five blocks
from the site of the Asch Building on Washington Square.
Before it was converted to serve as a factory, it had been
a warehouse- -one of Stein's loft buildings. It was
seventy-seven years old, six stories high, and equipped
with a defective fire escape. The Monarch fire claimed
twenty-four victims.^® It also motivated the state
legislature to enact several measures to ensure the safety
of factory workers. In March of 1961, however, a bill was
passed by the same state legislature that, if approved by
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the governor, would have dismantled the safety precautions
legislated just three years earlier.
Perhaps history does repeat itself.
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APPENDIX B
A RECORD OF FINES IMPOSED ON FACTORY OWNERSCONVICTED OF LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS
IN THE YEARS BETWEEN
1914-1915 and 1917-1918
Number of
Factories
Total Fines
Imposed
1914- 1915
1915- 1916
1916- 1917
1917- 1918
845
1923
2835
1301
$ 4,387.00
$ 9, 856 . 00
$25,250 .00
$13, 755
. 00
Information about the number of fines that were remitted
after being imposed is not available.
This information is taken from the Annual Reports of the
Industrial Commission for the Fiscal Years 1914-1915 to1917-1918. It was found in Baker, Elizabeth F.,
Protective Labor Legislation . p. 297.
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